Preamble

The House met at Half past Two o'Clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

DEATH OF A MEMBER

Mr. Spaker: I regret to have to inform the House of the death of Campbell Stephen, Esquire, Member for the Burgh of Glasgow (Camlachie Division), and I desire, on behalf of the House, to express our sense of the loss we have sustained and our sympathy with the relatives of the honourable Member.

PRIVATE BUSINESS

SELECTION

Lieutenant-Commander Gurney Braithwaite, Mr. Byers, Mr. Daggar, Mr. Dobbie, Sir Stanley Holmes, Colonel Sir Charles MacAndrews, Mr. McKinlay, Mr. Mathers, Mr. Messer, Colonel Ponsonby and Sir Robert Young to be Members of the Committee of Selection.—[Mr. R. J. Taylor.]

OFFENCES (MOTOR VEHICLES)

Address for Return
showing the number of offences relating to Motor Vehicles in England and Wales, the number of persons prosecuted for such, offences, the results of the proceedings in Courts of Summary Jurisdiction, and the number of alleged offences, in respect of which written warnings were issued by the police, together with the number of persons concerned, during the year ended the 31st day of December, 1946."—[Mr. Younger.]

Oral Answers to Questions — BURMA (DEFENCE AGREEMENT)

Mr. A. R. W. Low: asked the Secretary of State for Air, as representing the Secretary of State for Burma, what are the terms of the agreement on defence recently concluded between His Majesty's Government and the Government of Burma.

The Secretary of State for Air (Mr. Arthur Henderson): The terms of the agreement to which the hon. Member refers will be found as an annex to the Treaty concluded between His Majesty's Government and the Government of Burma which has been published today as Command Paper 7240, and of which copies are available in the Vote Office.

Mr. Low: Has this agreement not been kept secret for far too long; and would the right hon. and learned Gentleman say why it is that this agreement signed on 29th August, which is an annex to a treaty signed on 17th October, should not have been published until today?

Mr. Henderson: Length of time is, of course, relative. With regard to the second point, I do not really think the hon. Member has any serious objection. It is perhaps for convenience that the publication of this agreement should be tied up with the publication of the Treaty.

Mr. Walter Fletcher: Whose convenience?

Oral Answers to Questions — GERMANY

De-Nazification

Mr. Pickthorn: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he will publish as a White Paper the directions issued by the Military Government in Germany with respect to de-Nazification.

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Mayhew): The relevant Control Council Directives and British Ordinances are available to the public from His Majesty's Stationery Office, and it is therefore not proposed to publish them as a White Paper. I have, however, arranged for copies of the latest British Ordinance to be placed in the Library.

Building, Berlin (Removal)

Mr. Beswick: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on whose authority, and for what reason, attempts have been made to blow up the concrete building in the Tiergarten, Berlin, originally intended as an anti-aircraft base and air-raid shelter, and more recently used to provide hospital accommodation.

Mr. Mayhew: This building must be demolished in order to comply with quadripartite decisions on the demilitarisation of Germany.

Mr. Beswick: Does my hon. Friend not think it is time to have a quadripartite decision affecting a thing like this; and when there are already so many ruins is it not absolutely absurd to spend labour and material in blowing up this building in the Tiergarten, Berlin?

Mr. Mayhew: We will certainly bear that in mind. This particular building, however, is quite useless for the purposes of a hospital, or housing, or anything of that kind, in view of its very specialised construction.

Mr. Beswick: My hon. Friend says the building is useless, but is he not aware that when I went round it it was serving its purpose very well as a hospital?

Mr. Mayhew: For a very short time it was used as a temporary hospital, but as the accommodation part of it has no windows whatever it obviously is not suitable for permanent use as a hospital.

Mr. J. Langford-Holt: Would not the hon. Gentleman agree that there is no such thing as a useless building in Berlin?

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: Or in England?

Sir Peter Macdonald: Is it not a fact that an attempt to blow up this shelter has not been very successful?

Mr. Mayhew: The lack of success in blowing it up was due largely to our concern not to damage surrounding buildings; we tried to use the minimum explosive charge possible.

Works (Dismantling)

Mr. Stokes: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs why the continued dismantling of works carrying out

locomotive repairs in the British zone is being allowed, in view of the insufficient repairing capacity which is now available.

Mr. Mayhew: No works carrying out locomotive repairs in the British zone are being dismantled, except for two category I war plants which have done a few such repairs. There is more than sufficient capacity available to take over their work.

Mr. Stokes: Is my hon. Friend aware I was informed by the people responsible for transport that as a consequence of these two works being dismantled they were looking for capacity in Czechoslovakia and Belgium for which they will have to pay dollars? How does he reconcile that with what he has just said?

Mr. Mayhew: I should be glad to have any special information in possession of the hon. Member. The hold-up is definitely due to a lack of materials, and not to workshop capacity.

Mr. Stokes: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he is aware that an amount of 15 million dollars, almost equal to the saving achieved by the abolition of the basic petrol ration, is this year being spent on the purchase of mechanical excavators from America, and this being so, why three factories in Germany capable of producing the same type of machinery are now to be dismantled for reparations.

Mr. Mayhew: As far as I am aware, only one plant which has in the past produced mechanical excavators is on the reparations list, and that is a category I war plant. It may be that certain other plants which are to be removed would, after conversion, be capable of manufacturing mechanical excavators. But, owing to the shortage of fuel and raw materials, there is already more productive capacity of this sort left in Germany under the present reparations plan than can be put into production for some considerable time.

Mr. Stokes: Is the Under-Secretary of State aware that I was engaged in negotiating for one of these firms for the production of excavators in order to relieve the pressure here? Judge my surprise when I found that it was scheduled for dismantling.

Mr. Mayhew: This plant, the Weserhütte at Bad Oeynhausen, is in fact a category 1 plant.

Mr. Stokes: That is not the plant with which I was negotiating. Mine was Menck and Harnbrok in Hamburg.

Mr. Mayhew: If the hon. Member will get in touch with me, I will look into that particular point.

School, Dusseldorf

Mr. Edward Evans: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what progress has been made in the Munster Strasse Bunker School, Dusseldorf, towards its completion for school use.

Mr. Mayhew: The normal school, for which the Bunker School was a substitute, has now been repaired and was re-opened on 25th October. The Bunker School has now been closed.

Land Ordinance (Publication)

Mr. Pickthorn: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs wether he will publish in the OFFICIAL REPORT the British Government Ordinance for the breaking up of estates in the British zone of Germany.

Mr. Mayhew: Copies of this Ordinance can be obtained from His Majesty's Stationery Office, and it is accordingly not proposed to publish it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Multilateral Reparations

Mr. Stokes: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs why, in spite of the decision to end multilateral reparations on 27th September, Messrs. Th. Speckbotel, of Hamburg, were informed on 8th October that two lathes would be removed from their factory.

Mr. Mayhew: The delivery of multilateral reparations ended on 16th October, the date on which this decision was announced.

Mr. Stokes: Was it not widely announced in Germany that multilateral reparations would cease on 27th September? In view of that how does my hon. Friend reconcile the two dates?

Mr. Mayhew: I think that 27th September was the date for ceasing searching for multilateral deliveries, but

I think that 16th October was the date on which the last delivery was allowed.

Mr. Henry Strauss: Can the hon. Gentleman say what are multilateral reparations?

Mr. Mayhew: An emergency scheme of stop-gap reparations to the Inter-Allied Reparations Agency.

Petrol Allowance

Mr. Douglas Marshall: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, what is the basic petrol ration allowed to Germans in the British zone in Germany.

Mr. Mayhew: There is no basic petrol ration in the British zone of Germany. Petrol is issued only to persons engaged on essential services.

Mr. Langford-Holt: Could the hon. Gentleman tell us the dollar expenditure on the total issue of petrol for those purposes?

Mr. Mayhew: Not without notice.

Outward Mails (Censorship)

Mr. D. Marshall: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he is aware that delays of post from Germany amount to 21 days, owing to censorship; and will he rectify this matter.

Mr. Mayhew: No, Sir. Mail from Germany is not normally delayed by the censorship authorities for more than 48 hours. I am informed that the average time taken for letters to reach this country is 13 days.

Mr. Marshall: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that letters I have had differ in fact considerably from what he has said, and will he go into this matter if I give him details?

Mr. Mayhew: I am prepared to go into any case which the hon. Member sends me, provided he can give me the envelopes concerned.

Captain Crookshank: Why is it necessary to have a censorship at all in Germany?

Mr. Mayhew: The general question of censorship is under consideration, and it may be possible to make an announcement later.

Oral Answers to Questions — ROUMANIA (BRITISH COMPANIES' EMPLOYEES)

Mr. Keeling: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he will make a statement on the attempts by the Roumanian Government to enforce the dismissal by British oil companies of specified employees.

Mr. Mayhew: My right hon. Friend, in reply to a Question by my hon. Friend the Member for King's Norton (Mr. Blackburn) on 14th July, described how expulsions of employees of oil companies in Roumania were being effected for political reasons. Our Representative in Bucharest was instructed to protest last August about the expulsions of employees of firms in which there were British interests. Since then Roumanian companies, including those which are wholly or partly British-owned, have had to dismiss members of their staff as part of a government plan for redistribution of manpower. All Roumanian concerns appear to have suffered equally from the effects of this plan. The redistribution, which began in mid-July, is still the subject of negotiations between the oil companies and the Government. The latest information is that a new Government Commission has been appointed to carry the compression a stage further.

Mr. Keeling: Will the Under-Secretary of State say whether the oil companies are still being asked to dismiss employees because they are not members of the Communist Party?

Mr. Mayhew: There is no discrimination against British companies over this. The compression that is going on is part of an overall manpower policy of the Roumanian Government. I do not think that the particular dismissals are due to the reasons given by the hon. Member.

Oral Answers to Questions — BULGARIA

M. Petkov (Trial and Execution)

Mr. Keeling: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he will issue a White Paper on the Petkov affair.

Mr. Mayhew: The Press and wireless have given generous publicity to the position adopted by His Majesty's Government in regard to the trial and execution of M. Petkov, and I do not consider that the issue of a White Paper would be justified.

I am, however, arranging for the circulation in the OFFICIAL REPORT of the text of the communication which His Majesty's representative in Sofia delivered, on instructions, to the Bulgarian Government on 25th September.

Major Legge-Bourke: Does not the Under-Secretary of State consider it is a little inconsistent with the protest of the Government that the British political representative, to Bulgaria should have been promoted to Minister immediately after the Petkov affair?

Mr. Mayhew: We made our position perfectly plain. On balance, it seemed wise to us to be properly represented.

Following is the text:

British Legation, Sofia.

25th September, 1947.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,
I have been instructed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to address Your Excellency as follows:—

1. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom deem it necessary to place on record with the Bulgarian Government their dismay at the execution of Nikola Petkov and their condemnation of the conduct of the trial of this gallant leader of Bulgarian peasant resistance to fascism and all forms of political oppression.
2. The Bulgarian Government have been left in no doubt that His Majesty's Government and the people of the United Kingdom have been profoundly shocked by the proceedings against Nikola Petkov which they regard not as a genuine trial by due processes of law but as an attack upon an individual on account of his political opinions. The trial was in fact one more manoeuvre in the general campaign on which the present Bulgarian Government appear to have embarked to establish in Bulgaria a régime controlled by a minority party and to stifle all those who hold other views.
3. His Majesty's Government consider that they have not only the right but also the duty to make known their opinion upon this matter both officially to the Bulgarian Government and publicly to the world. Their concern arises in part from their signature of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe of the nth February, 1945, and in part because they, together with the Governments of the United States of America and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, are responsible under the terms of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria for ensuring its efficient execution both in letter and in spirit. Article 2 of this Treaty pro vides that Bulgaria shall take all measures necessary to secure to all persons under Bulgarian jurisdiction the enjoyment of human rights and of the fundamental freedoms including freedom of expression, of press and publication, of religious worship, of political opinion and of public meeting.


4. This Treaty entered into force on the 15th September last; Mr. Petkov was executed one week later. The accusation against him was that he had incited military conspiracies against the present Bulgarian régime. The evidence introduced in court was clearly insufficient to sustain a conviction. The three judges of the Court and the two State Prosecutors were members of the Communist Party and the Prosecution speeches were, for the most part, political attacks on Mr. Petkov amounting to nothing more than that he had opposed the Government. Three of the lawyers originally selected by Mr. Petkov to undertake his defence were immediately arrested and thus prevented from taking part in the trial. Even then Mr. Petkov was not allowed free and private consultation with the Counsel who finally appeared for him. A full deposition presented by Mr. Petkov was stated in Court to have been returned to him as unacceptable to the State Prosecutor. Pressure had clearly been brought to bear on many witnesses and on the co-defendants and the Court refused to hear certain witnesses on the grounds that their evidence would be without interest. General Popov, alleged to be the leader of a conspiratorial organisation with which Mr. Petkov was said to be connected, and himself already serving a prison sentence, was several times called as a witness but was stated to be physically unfit to appear. General Stanchev alleged to be a leader of another such conspiratorial body was also not brought before the Court although he has already been under arrest without trial for more than a year. The trial was conducted in a blaze of one sided publicity, pre-judging the guilt of Mr. Petkov and designed to blacken his character, and the Prosecutor based himself upon this publicity campaign to claim in Court, and without being called to order, that the people of Bulgaria had called for the heaviest penalty.
5. The above examples, out of many which might be cited, of the manner in which the trial was conducted leave no room for doubt that the proceedings were a travesty of justice and confirm the sinister impression that the Bulgarian Government are determined to extinguish the last vestiges of liberty in Bulgaria. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government Nikola Petkov died for the cause for which he had always fought, namely the right of men to hold and express according to their personal consciences their own political convictions. His execution is yet another example of the use of judicial murder to get rid of people who do not agree with their Government—a procedure which is not compatible with democracy.

I avail myself of this opportunity to express to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Sgd.) J. C. STERNDALE BENNETT.

Fatherland Front Parade

Major Beamish: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on what grounds the British Political Representative in Bulgaria was instructed not to attend the Fatherland Front Parade on 9th September.

Mr. Mayhew: The attendance of the British representative would not have been consistent with the disapproval with which His Majesty's Government viewed the contempt for human rights involved in the trial of Nikola Petkov and the dissolution of the Agrarian Party, which had just taken place. My right hon. Friend therefore instructed the British representative not to participate in those ceremonies.

Oral Answers to Questions — PEACE TREATIES (DEFINITION OF "FASCIST")

Major Tufton Beamish: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he will state His Majesty's Government's interpretation of the word "Fascist" which occurs more than once in the five peace treaties that recently came into force.

Mr. Mayhew: In the Treaty with Italy, the word "Fascist" is used to designate the authoritarian regime which exercised power in Italy from 1922 to 1943, and its practices. In the other Treaties the terms "Fascist" and "of a Fascist type" were used, by an extension of the original Italian meaning of the word, to describe those regimes or organisations in the countries concerned which had collaborated with the Axis Powers. The use of the term to designate His Majesty's Government and their friends had not at that time come into fashion.

Sir Waldron Smithers: Will the Under-Secretary of State also give a definition of what is the difference between "Fascist" and "Communist" in the opinion of the Government?

Oral Answers to Questions — HUNGARY (SHIPS, SEIZURE)

Mr. Thomas Reid: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if the British-owned ships recently seized on the Danube have been given back to their lawful owners.

Mr. Mayhew: I have no record of any British-owned ships recently seized on the Danube. I presume, however, that my hon. Friend refers to certain ships previously in the custody of the United States authorities in Bavaria and the property of the Hungarian River and Sea Navigation Company, which were


arrested at Linz early this year and held in the custody of an Austrian court pending the outcome of civil proceedings initiated by the legal representative of certain British creditors of this Hungarian Company. On 5th May, in complete disregard for the authority of the Austrian court and in violation of the pledged word of the ships' masters, the vessels left Linz and proceeded towards Hungary. So far as I know, these ships are now at the disposal of their owners.

Oral Answers to Questions — PALESTINE (ARAB FORCES)

Mr. Janner: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs under what article of the Mandate, or by what other inter national agreement is the Arab Legion, a force owing allegiance to a foreign Power, stationed in Palestine.

Mr. Mayhew: Article 17 of the Mandate provides that:
the administration of Palestine may organise on a voluntary basis the forces necessary for the preservation of peace and order.
The arrangement whereby part of the armed forces of Transjordan are employed in Palestine under the command of the General Officer Commanding began when Transjordan was still under British Mandate, and has continued since Transjordan became an independent State, without any formal agreement, but naturally with the freely given consent of King Abdullah, which is much appreciated by His Majesty's Government.

Mr. Janner: In view of the delicate position in Palestine at the present time, will my hon. Friend consider the inadvisability of having outside Arab forces in Palestine?

Mr. Mayhew: These forces are perfectly loyal to the policy of the Government.

Mr. Stokes: Is it the intention to clear the Jew forces out as well?

Oral Answers to Questions — MUFTI OF JERUSALEM

Mr. Janner: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether any assurances have been given by the Government of the Lebanon that the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem will be forbidden to

take part in any political activities during the period of his stay on Lebanese soil, similar to those given in respect of his stay in Egypt by the Egyptian Government.

Mr. George Porter: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether any representations have been made to the Egyptian Government regarding the departure of the Ex-Mufti of Jerusalem from that country to Beirut, to take part in the political activities of the Arab League.

Mr. Mayhew: When the Mufti of Jerusalem arrived in Egypt in 1946, His Majesty's Representative inquired, in the course of his representations, whether the Egyptian Government would prevent him from leaving the country, but the Egyptian Government replied that they could not undertake to do this. In the circumstances, no useful purpose would be served by further representations to the Egyptian Government on this point, and none have been made. When the Mufti arrived in Beirut from Egypt on 8th October, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires informed the Lebanese Government that in view of the repeated representations made on this subject, the Mufti's arrival would undoubtedly make a most unfavourable impression on His Majesty's Government. He later informed the Lebanese Government, on instructions, that His Majesty's Government counted on them to restrain the Mufti from taking any action which would cause added difficulty for the British Administration in Palestine.

Mr. Janner: Is my hon. Friend going to leave it at that? In view of the abused position in Egypt, will he not take further steps with the Lebanon as regards this dangerous man?

Mr. Mayhew: We have made our views clear to the Lebanese Government, and they have agreed to do what we have asked—to restrain the Mufti from taking embarrassing action against us.

Mr. Porter: Is my hon. Friend not in agreement that the action taken up with the Egyptian Government in regard to this individual was very belated? Is he aware that I put down a Question when he was on French soil and he could then have been taken into custody and treated as an ordinary enemy alien?

Mr. Mayhew: I cannot remember that, but I think we took quite prompt action with the Egyptian Government, although we were unable to get the guarantee that they would undertake not to allow him to leave Egypt.

Mr. Porter: Is my hon. Friend aware that when I asked my previous Question regarding this man, I was told that he could not be traced, although I stated that my information was that he was on French soil?

Mr. Mayhew: That is another question.

Oral Answers to Questions — POLAND (M. MIKOLAJCZYK)

Lieut.-Colonel Sir Thomas Moore: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether in view of the fate of the patriot Petkov in Bulgaria, and the inability of His Majesty's Government to prevent this judicial murder, he will offer sanctuary to M. Mikolajczyk, the Peasant Party leader in Poland who is in danger of a similar fate.

Mr. Leslie Hale: On a point of Order, Mr. Speaker. In regard to this question, without desiring to express any view on this matter, about which I know nothing, may I ask for your guidance as to why it was ruled impossible for Members on this side of the House to ask questions about Archbishop Stepinac, and, secondly, why it is permissible to put on the Order Paper the expression, "judicial murder," which prejudges the issue and attacks a friendly Power? May I ask whether this Question is in Order?

Mr. Speaker: That is such a complicated point of Order that I could not possibly answer it at short notice. If I had had notice of it I could have given a reply, but the Question, having passed the Table, is, I am certain, in Order.

Mr. Mayhew: His Majesty's Government would certainly adhere in the case of M. Mikolajczyk to the traditional British policy of granting asylum in this country to political refugees.

Sir T. Moore: In view of the fact that we were largely responsible for sending this great patriot back to Poland, will the Government take every step to facilitate his escape—if escape is possible—and his journey to this country?

Mr. Mayhew: I cannot go beyond what I have said.

Mrs. Leah Manning: Can my hon. Friend say why he agrees with the assumption that M. Mikolajczyk is in danger of arrest and judicial murder at the hands of the Polish Government?

Mr. Mayhew: I have not in the least admitted all those implications.

Professor Savory: Will the hon. Gentleman be good enough to give the House the earliest possible information about the safety of M. Mikolajczyk?

Mr. Mayhew: I have no information to give, but I have no doubt that if a Question is put later we will see that a reply is given.

Major Bruce: Will my hon. Friend make it clear that he does not concede the inference contained in the last part of the original Question, and will he also bear in mind that before the war no representations were received from members of the Anglo-German Fellowship with regard to judicial murders in Germany?

Vice-Admiral Taylor: Is not the Under-Secretary aware that every Pole who is opposing the Communist Government in Poland is in danger?

Mr. Mayhew: All this is getting very wide of the original Question.

Oral Answers to Questions — PRISONERS OF WAR (REPATRIATION)

Mr. Skeffington-Lodge: asked the Secretary for Foreign Affairs whether, in view of the recent announcement that the rate of repatriation of German prisoners of war from the Middle East is to be reduced, he will make a clear statement of the Government's repatriation plans.

Mr. Mayhew: The world-wide shortage of deep sea shipping, aggravated by the reduction of His Majesty's Forces abroad, has compelled us, with the greatest regret, to reduce considerably the rate of repatriation of German prisoners of war from the Middle East. This decision, however, in no way alters our determination to repatriate all German prisoners of war before the end of 1948.
For the repatriation of prisoners of war from the United Kingdom, the problem is


less acute, and we have decided to increase the monthly rate of repatriation from 15,000 to 20,000, starting in December.

Mr. Skeffington-Lodge: Will my hon. Friend see that the disappointment which will be quite naturally felt by many prisoners of war on account of the slowing up of repatriation in the Middle East is carefully explained to them, and the reasons for it given?

Mr. Mayhew: Certainly. We shall speed up repatriation again as soon as possible, and as soon as shipping allows.

Oral Answers to Questions — FOOD SUPPLIES

Anglo-Danish Negotiations

Air-Commodore Harvey: asked the Minister of Food what is the progress of negotiations with the Danish Government with regard to food supplies.

Mr. Lipson: asked the Minister of Food if negotiations are being resumed for the purchase of butter and other essential foods from Denmark.

The Minister of Food (Mr. Strachey): I cannot add anything to the statement which was issued when the recent negotiations in London came to an end. That statement is rather long, and, with permission, I will circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Air-Commodore Harvey: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that since that statement was made the Danes have disposed of their next six months' production of butter, amounting to 24,000 tons, including 12,000 tons to Russia, and 5,000 tons to other countries? Why are we so behind in getting what is available in order to feed our people?

Mr. Strachey: I am not aware of those alleged facts. The Danes sold less butter this year to Russia and other destinations than last, and I would warn the hon. and gallant Member about accepting at face value statements naturally put out by the Danish Government in the course of the negotiations.

Mr. J. S. C. Reid: Will the right hon. Gentleman make it quite clear that he is not imputing to the Danish Government a lack of veracity—the most unusual imputation to make against a friendly Government?

Mr. Strachey: Certainly. I am merely imputing that, the statements made by the Danish Government in the course of the negotiations gave their side of the case. There is a British side to the case in these negotiations, which Members opposite show an extraordinary tendency to overlook.

Mr. Eden: This is a matter of some importance. Nobody on either side of the House wants to overlook the, British case, but if the right hon. Gentleman claims that the Danish Government, in stating their case, have misstated the facts, would he tell us in what respect those facts have been misstated?

Mr. Strachey: The Danish Government put out a statement that they had sold a certain quantity of butter to Russia, which is true, but at once it was assumed here that that meant that no butter was left to sell to this country. As a matter of fact, the quantity sold to Russia was less than last year.

Mr. Reid: Would the right hon. Gentleman say whether the Danes were asking for payment in dollars, or were willing to accept unconvertible sterling?

Mr. Strachey: In which transactions?

Mr. Reid: In the further negotiations, which broke down.

Mr. Strachey: These are complicated negotiations, and I think it would be unwise for me to enter into details. We have real hopes that, by one means or another, we shall be able to resume our trading relations and purchases with the Danes, but we are not willing to pay them, at present, prices which, for one thing, would be grossly unfair to our own Dominion suppliers.

Following is the statement:

Representatives of the Danish Government have been discussing in London with representatives of the interested Departments, the basis on which the food agreements relating to butter, eggs and bacon might be renewed, and certain other questions relating to financial and trade relations between the two countries. It was not, however, possible to find a method of overcoming the difficulties arising from the wide discrepancy between the prices asked for Danish bacon and butter and those which the United Kingdom


authorities felt able to offer. In these circumstances, the two delegations agreed that they would have to report to their respective Governments. It is hoped to resume the discussions at the earliest opportunity.

Workers' Rations

Major Legge-Bourke: asked the Minister of Food what extra rations are provided for imported Irish and European volunteer workers and how these compare with the scales allowed to British labour engaged in similar work.

Mr. Alpass: asked the Minister of Food what is the scale of food rations allowed to displaced persons; and how it compares with the scale allowed to our own people.

Mr. Strachey: Workers from Eire, and displaced persons who come to the United Kingdom as European volunteer workers, receive exactly the same ration as British workers engaged in similar work.

Major Legge-Bourke: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there is a very wide impression about that European volunteer workers are receiving 3s. 6d. worth of meat ration every week, as opposed to 1s. worth for our own people, and can he give an assurance that that is not the case?

Mr. Strachey: Yes, Sir. I very much value the hon. Gentleman's collaboration in dispelling this rumour. The workers concerned, I repeat, receive exactly the same scales of ration as British workers doing the same work.

Sir William Darling: Is it not the case that Irish and other volunteer workers using industrial canteens do in fact get 3s. 6d. worth of meat?

Mr. Strachey: They get the allowance of the industrial canteens, whether they are British workers or displaced persons.

Mr. Skeffington-Lodge: asked the Minister of Food whether he will make arrangements for village blacksmiths to qualify for the same food rations as are granted to agricultural workers.

Mr. Strachey: Travelling blacksmiths in rural areas are granted the same special cheese ration as agricultural workers on the certificate of their county agricultural committee. Village blacksmiths habitually working at or close to their homes can take

their mid-day meal at home and do not, therefore, qualify for the special cheese ration.

Potatoes

Major Legge-Bourke: asked the Minister of Food if he will make a full statement on the potato situation for the next six months.

Mr. Strachey: I hope to be able to make a statement on the potato situation shortly.

Major Legge-Bourke: Will the right hon. Gentleman do something to stop what happened after his right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary made his statement about potatoes, because that caused a complete run on the market and, in view of the uncertainty as to whether there is to be potato rationing, can the right hon. Gentleman give some statement to clarify the position?

Mr. Strachey: I cannot make a statement this afternoon.

Mr. Butcher: Can the right hon. Gentleman indicate any date prior to his assuming office when there were potato queues in October?.

Mr. Drayson: Can the right hon. Gentleman say from which Minister of the Crown we can expect a statement on the potato position?

Mr. Strachey: I should imagine that I shall be called upon to make the statement.

Tea (Government Purchases)

Mr. Walter Fletcher: asked the Minister of Food the percentage of the tea crop of India and Ceylon, respectively, purchased by His Majesty's Government in 1946 and January to June, 1947, and the average price, respectively, in 1946 and in the first six months of 1947.

Mr. Strachey: The information required by the hon. Member is not immediately available, but I will circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT as soon as possible.

Mr. Fletcher: Is the Minister satisfied both with the quantity he has obtained and the price he now has to pay?

Mr. Strachey: No, Sir, I am never satisfied as to quantity or price.

Milk Allowance (Babies)

Mr. Quintin Hogg: asked the Minister of Food why he has found it necessary to cut the babies' milk ration.

Mr. Strachey: The milk allowance for babies up to 12 months old has not been reduced. The reduction in the allowance to children between one and five years of age was made in preference to reducing other priority or non-priority allowances on the recommendations of our medical and nutritional advisers.

Mr. Hogg: Without going into, an argument on whether a child of 12 months is a baby or not, will the right hon. Gentleman explain why, if the official explanation given is the true one, he did not have the wit to have manufactured baby foods made up at the time when the cows were yielding larger quantities of milk?

Mr. Strachey: The shortage of milk this year is due to the drought, and that, I confess, I was not able to foresee.

Mr. Hogg: Does the right hon. Gentleman realise that for some time previous to this year it would have been possible to manufacture milk, without cutting the allowance to young children?

Mr. Strachey: It would have been possible to do so by cutting the non-priority allowance further, but our medical advisers preferred this course.

Sugar (Jam-making)

Mr. Vernon Bartlett: asked the Minister of Food why his Department allows to jam manufacturers more than 3 lb. of sugar to 1 lb. of fruit.

Mr. Granville Sharp: asked the Minister of Food why, in view of the fact that the jam-making housewife normally uses 1 lb. of sugar for 1 lb. of fruit, factory jams made to the specifications of his Department use 3 lb. of sugar for every 1 lb. of fruit.

Mr. Strachey: The average amount of sugar allowed to jam manufacturers is 2 lb, to each lb. of fruit. They used about 1½ lb. before the war, and still do where the particular fruit is plentiful, but with scarce fruits such as strawberries and raspberries they are allowed to use more. Otherwise, there would not be nearly enough of these kinds of jam to satisfy the public.

Mr. Bartlett: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that even in the spacious days of Mrs. Beeton a housewife made jam on the maximum basis of 1 lb. of sugar to 1 lb. of fruit, and why should there be this extraordinary discrepancy?

Mr. Strachey: I have endeavoured to indicate that it is to eke out the quantities of fruit, such as strawberries and raspberries, which are scarce.

Mr. Bartlett: Would it not have been wiser both from the Government and the national point of view to give those householders prepared to make jam this extra allowance of sugar?

Mr. Strachey: There have been no fewer than three bonus issues of 1 lb. of sugar each.

Mrs. Corbet: Can my right hon. Friend say in what way it is eked out—with marrow or with turnips?

Mr. Strachey: It is eked out in this case with sugar.

Mrs. Corbet: It cannot be.

Ice-Cream Licence (Roydon)

Mrs. Leah Manning: asked the Minister of Food why a licence to manufacture and sell ice-cream has been refused to Mr. R. E. Jeffrey, of Roydon, Essex.

Mr. Strachey: Mr. Jeffries is to be given an allocation of ingredients to enable him to manufacture and sell icecream. No licence is required.

Fruit and Vegetable Marketing

Mrs. Manning: asked the Minister of Food whether, in view of the success which has attended the recent marketing of horticultural products directly from producer to consumer, he will undertake a thorough investigation into the distribution of perishable foodstuffs in this country, with a view to the elimination of waste and the undue profits of middle men.

Mr. Strachey: A start has already been made by the Fruit and Vegetable (Marketing and Distribution) Organisation which has been set up by the Minister of Agriculture, the Secretary of State for Scotland and myself. I am glad to say my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food has become Chairman of the Organisation.

Queue Priority

Mrs. Manning: asked the Minister of Food whether he will extend the queue priority now accorded to expectant mothers, to cover a period of two months after the birth of a child.

Mr. Strachey: I have given this suggestion very careful consideration but I have reluctantly concluded that it is impracticable to extend the formal queue priority document beyond the simple definite case of expectant mothers.

Mrs. Manning: Is my right hon. Friend aware that a woman who has just had a child is very often in a desperate situation if she has to stand in a queue?

Mr. Strachey: I have very great sympathy with my hon. Friend's suggestion. As a matter of fact a good many shopkeepers give this privilege to women who have just had a child, but it is very difficult to extend the actual queue priority document. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why?"] Because the expectant mother is in a simple category. She has a different ration book, which she can produce. If the category is extended beyond the expectant mother, we come to the category which includes invalids, and many other people, and we should have to establish how long the mother needs priority after having had her child. This question of queue priority is a very difficult one.

Mr. W. Fletcher: Would it not be perfectly simple to stamp the original document to show an extension of two months, and so get over all the difficulties?

Canteens (Meat Allowance)

Sir William Darling: asked the Minister of Food if he will reconsider the 2½d. per meal meat allowance to industrial canteens as compared with the civilian ration allowance of 1s. per week; and what action he proposes to take.

Mr. Strachey: The meat allowances to all canteens were recently cut in common with the domestic ration. I do not propose to make any alteration in the ratio between allowances to industrial canteens and those to other establishments.

Sir W. Darling: Arising out of that answer and in view of the Government's policy of fair shares for all, how am I

to explain the matter to a woman who gets 1s. worth of meat a week and whose husband gets 4s.1½d. worth through his industrial canteen?

Mr. Strachey: The worker in question must be in an employment which carries the category A industrial canteen ration, which means that he is in very heavy industry and is therefore entitled to it.

Sir W. Darling: But his wife says that she is working a seven-day week and he is only working a five-day week. She gets 1s. worth of meat for working a seven-day week while he gets 4s. 1½d. worth for working a five-day week.

Mr. Strachey: If hon. Members think that heavy workers in vital basic industries should not receive something extra in their industrial canteen, we simply cannot agree with them.

Mr. Baldwin: Is the Minister aware that the men providing this food do not get the opportunity to use a canteen and have to be content with 1s. worth of meat a week?

Mr. Strachey: They get the extra cheese and extra bread ration.

Hon. Members: But not meat.

Oral Answers to Questions — SOAP RATION

Distribution, Somerset and Devon

Mr. Bartlett: asked the Minister of Food whether he is aware that people in Somerset and Devon have not been able to get their ration of soap for many weeks; and if he will make inquiries designed to improve distribution.

Mr. Strachey: We have had no complaints of this sort from Somerset or Devon. If the hon. Member will send me any which have reached him, I will gladly look into them.

Fishermen

Mr. Bartlett: asked the Minister of Food whether he can now see his way to granting fishermen an extra soap allowance.

Mr. Strachey: No, Sir, not in the present severe shortage of oils and fats.

Mr. Bartlett: Is the Minister aware that fishermen, more than any other members


of the community, have to wear very thick clothes, and if they send woollen jerseys to the laundry they probably do not come back for a long time and then may have shrunk, and it is necessary that they should be washed at home?

Mr. Strachey: I realise the difficulties, but I am afraid that if we started on an extra soap ration for these categories, it would be very difficult.

Oral Answers to Questions — UN-BRITISH ACTIVITIES

Sir Waldron Smithers: asked the Prime Minister if he will set up a Committee of this House on Un-British Activities, on the lines of the Committee on Un-American activities, a copy of the House Report of which has been sent him, set up by the House of Representatives under Public Law 601.

The Lord President of the Council (Mr. Herbert Morrison): I have been asked to reply. No, Sir.

Sir W. Smithers: May I ask the Prime Minister, who is in his place, if, in view of the rapidly increasing menace of Communist infiltration, he will come out into the open and introduce a Bill to outlaw Communists and sequestrate their funds; and have a "show down" before it is too late?

Mr. Morrison: As the hon. Gentleman knows, I have been asked to reply. The answer is still "No, Sir." It seems to me that the other political parties can take care of the Communists. We are not afraid of them, and I cannot understand why the hon. Gentleman is, and why he should exclude other subversive influences from consideration.

Later—

Sir W. Smithers: On a point of Order, Mr. Speaker. May I call your attention to what has happened and ask for your guidance? I put down Question No. 45 to the Prime Minister. The Question covered the subject of Communist infiltration, which is the root cause of most of the trouble in the world today, and it was answered by the Leader of the House, with the Prime Minister sitting next to him. Is that not likely to create an impression abroad that the Prime Minister is afraid to answer the Question?

Mr. Speaker: That is hardly a point of Order, but I presume that the Question was handed over to the right hon. Gentleman the Lord President of the Council who, no doubt, went into the matter very carefully.

Oral Answers to Questions — ARMAMENT CONSTRUCTION

Mr. Christopher Shawcross: asked the Prime Minister whether, in view of the refusal of the Departments concerned to give any information, on security grounds, he will propose a Secret. Session of this House to discuss the allocation of steel and other materials in short supply to the construction of warships, armoured fighting vehicles, aircraft and other weapons and warlike equipment for the Armed Forces, and the employment of manufacturing plant and civilian labour required therefor.

The Prime Minister (Mr. Attlee): No, Sir.

Mr. Shawcross: Will the Prime Minister say how this House can carry out its most important business of controlling expenditure and looking after our military and economic security when knowledge of these essential facts are denied to it?

The Prime Minister: That can be discussed on the Estimates.

Oral Answers to Questions — CIVIL SERVICE (ALLEGATIONS)

Mr. W. J. Brown: asked the Prime Minister whether he is satisfied that the Civil Service is faithfully carrying out its duties in implementing the policy of the Government; and whether he will publish the evidence in his possession of any attempt by that Service to sabotage Government policy.

The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir, I am entirely satisfied. An allegation that certain civil servants were sabotaging the Government was, however, recently made in a speech by the hon. Member for Bexley (Mr. Bramall), and my right hon. Friend the Financial Secretary to the Treasury has asked that particulars in support of it should be submitted so that the charge may be inquired into.

Mr. Brown: I am much obliged to the Prime Minister for what he has said. Will he impress on his colleagues and back


benchers generally the unfairness of attacking public servants who, in the nature of things, are people who cannot exercise the right to reply?

The Prime Minister: I think that applies to everyone. Civil servants should be attacked only through their Ministers, and it is the job of the Ministers to reply.

Mr. Hogg: Are we to understand from the Prime Minister that the hon. Member for Bexley (Mr. Bramall) had this information in his possession and had not taken it up with the Department concerned before he made his very serious allegations in public?

The Prime Minister: It is obviously impossible for me to answer that question.

Mr. Marlowe: Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether any inquiry on these lines would cover the question of whether the present Minister of War when Minister of Fuel and Power was let down by his experts?

Major Bruce: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that no such inhibitions about expressions of opinion seem to have been operative in the case of certain prominent gentlemen connected with the Planning Board of His Majesty's Government?

Oral Answers to Questions — BASIC PETROL RATION (DEPUTATION)

Mr. Lipson: asked the Prime Minister if he is aware of the widespread surprise and regret caused by his recent refusal to receive a deputation of responsible motoring organisations to discuss the abolition of the basic ration; and if he will now reconsider his decision and express his willingness to meet the deputation.

The Prime Minister: The decision to abolish the petrol ration was taken by the Government only after the most careful consideration and in view of the paramount necessity for saving dollars. I did not consider, therefore, that any useful purpose would have been served by my receiving a deputation from the motoring organisations. In so far as these organisations wish to discuss in detail the operation of the Government decision, it would be more appropriate for them to approach the Minister directly concerned and I understand, in fact, that my right hon. Friend,

the Minister of Fuel and Power, will receive a deputation from them tomorrow.

Mr. Lipson: Is the Prime Minister aware that the lives of a great many people are affected by this decision and it did seem to some of us like lack of sympathy to refuse to receive a deputation? Are the Minister of Fuel and Power and the Cabinet prepared to reconsider the matter after further representations?

The Prime Minister: That is exactly the danger of receiving a deputation. One may give them a false idea about changes that are to be taken. On the general question which the hon. Member put to me, I receive a great number of requests to receive deputations but my time is limited. I endeavour to see those where detailed questions are discussed, but general questions of Government policy are not suitable to be dealt with by a deputation to the Prime Minister.

Major Guy Lloyd: Will the Prime Minister advise the people of Scotland, who are very indignant about this basic petrol ration, to avoid making representations to him but rather to go to the Secretary of State for Scotland to make their representations?

The Prime Minister: No, Sir. I think the correct thing would be to see the Minister of Fuel and Power.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Is the Prime Minister aware that a statement has been made that the enormous sum of £30 million a year is spent on petrol for the Armed Forces and will he consider a further reduction?

The Prime Minister: That matter was taken up some time ago and a very close inspection was made into the use of oil and petrol by the Armed Forces. Reductions have been effected.

Sir Patrick Hannon: Is the Prime Minister really aware of the intense resentment felt throughout the country at the action of His Majesty's Government, and, as he is now responsible for so much in the way of continuity of production and maintenance of output, could he not take into consideration the dislocation of industry which is bound to follow from the abolition of the petrol ration?

The Prime Minister: I have taken all these matters into full consideration.

Oral Answers to Questions — AGRICULTURE

Buckwheat Crop, Suffolk

Sir W. Smithers: asked the Minister of Agriculture if he will make a statement concerning the ploughing back of part of a crop of buckwheat in Suffolk, valued at £2,640; and who bears the loss.

The Minister of Agriculture (Mr. Thomas Williams): I would refer the hon. Member to the reply that I gave to the hon. Member for the University of London (Sir E. Graham-Little) on 24th October. I am not aware of the grounds for the statement that the crop was valued at £2,640, but any loss sustained will be borne by the grower.

Sir W. Smithers: Is there any appeal against ridiculous decisions by the agricultural executive committees which result in losses to the farmer over which he has no control—the decision may be against his advice—and has the farmer any means of recovering those losses?

Mr. Williams: This happens to be sub judice. The case will ultimately go to the court and the farmer will have ample opportunity of stating his own case.

Sir W. Smithers: May I ask what kind of court?

Mr. Williams: A police court.

Implements and Machinery

Mr. Turton: asked the Minister of Agriculture whether he is aware of the serious shortage of plough points; and what steps he is taking to remedy the situation

Mr. John Morrison: asked the Minister of Agriculture what steps he is taking to increase the number of plough shares which are in very short supply.

Mr. Osborne: asked the Minister of Agriculture if he is aware that about 500 tractors have been standing idle in the Lincoln area for lack of ploughshares; and if he will take immediate steps to increase the supply.

Mr. George Jeger: asked the Minister of Agriculture whether he is aware that the shortage of ploughshares is retarding food production; and whether he will take action to increase the rate of manufacture of these implements.

Mr. T. Williams: My Department has for some weeks been assisting the manufacturers to increase their output. As a result of these combined efforts, there have been very substantial increases in output of the shares and points that are scarcest, although it will still take time for supplies to catch up fully with demand. Supplies coming forward from the main suppliers of Ransome type shares, together with a new source of supply that has been arranged, are now nearly twice as large as a few weeks ago, and further production capacity is expected to become available later. New capacity has also been found for the production of shares for an imported plough, which were particularly scarce owing to slow deliveries from overseas.

Mr. Turton: Surely, these steps were taken far too late and if they had to be taken, they ought to have been taken long before autumn began? Why were early steps not taken to deal with this matter?

Mr. Williams: We were not aware that the drought was going to last so long and the land was going to be so hard.

Mr. Baldwin: Is the Minister aware that the impression is abroad that too much of the steel allocated for machinery manufacture is going towards making new machines rather than spare parts, for which there is a great demand?

Mr. Williams: I do not think that is the case.

Major Legge-Bourke: asked the Minister of Agriculture, if he will make a statement on the present situation regarding farming implements; and what steps he is taking to ensure that farmers are able to obtain adequate supplies to meet the call for increased production.

Mr. Derek Walker-Smith: asked the Minister of Agriculture whether he is aware that serious delays have arisen and are likely to arise in food production owing to the difficulty of obtaining agricultural machinery; and what steps he proposes to take to improve this situation.

Mr. T. Williams: I am fully aware of the importance of increased supplies of agricultural machinery. Manufacturers have made plans for substantial increases in output, and I shall continue to do my best to help them in implementing these plans. Steel allocations have recently been much


increased, but it is bound to take a little time before the effect of these larger allocations is seen in greater output of tractors and implements. Our own resources for agricultural machinery are already larger than ever before; but some special types of machines must still be imported to supplement them, and we are obtaining as many of these as oversea suppliers can let us have.

Major Legge-Bourke: In view of the enormous tonnage of agricultural implements which were exported last year, can the right hon. Gentleman give an assurance now that no home produced implements will be exported until such time as British agriculture has sufficient implements to carry out the 20 per cent. increase in production?

Mr. Williams: No, Sir. I believe that the allocation of steel given for agricultural implements during this fourth quarter of the year is nearly double what it was in the third quarter of the year, and we shall be able to meet both our home demands as well as continue our export drive.

Mr. Walker-Smith: Is it not a fact that Government action in this matter generally, and in the allocation of steel in particular, is another case of too little, and too late? Is it not rather discouraging that the Government are always acting too late?

Mr. Williams: No, Sir, that is one more figment of the hon. Member's imagination.

Mr. Hurd: Is the 2 per cent. allocation of steel for agricultural machinery to cover the requirements of the export market as well as the home market?

Mr. Williams: Yes, Sir, and if it is of any interest to the House may I say that the output of agricultural tractors for the second quarter of this year is three times the number in the full year 1938 and the allocation for the fourth quarter is twice as much as that of the second quarter.

Mr. Hurd: How much is for export?

Mr. De la Bère: asked the Minister of Agriculture whether the Government will give an assurance that they will give every encouragement and facility for the development of the mobile garages to look after farming machinery, and to provide a specialised garage service for mending and

repairing breakdowns to agricultural machines, and to prevent them taking place.

Mr. T. Williams: Yes, Sir, in suitable cases, where mobile units are provided in association with repair facilities of the normal type and are likely to be operated by qualified persons with knowledge and experience of both engineering and farming requirements.

Mr. De la Bère: When the right hon. Gentleman says "Yes," it sounds very convincing, but will he tell us the form this action will take? Sometimes the Government pay lip service to these matters, and nothing further happens.

Mr. Williams: The hon. Gentleman is by now aware that when I say "Yes," I mean "Yes."

Mr. De la Bère: Is it not the case that the right hon. Gentleman promised there would be no further exports of agricultural machinery and that he immediately altered his mind?

Mr. Turton: asked the Minister of Agriculture what quantity of steel during the current year has been allocated for the production of agricultural' machinery and spare parts.

Mr. T. Williams: As the hon. Member will be aware it has not been the practice to disclose the actual quantities of steel allocated for a particular purpose, but I can say that the allocation for agricultural machinery this quarter is nearly double that of the last quarter, and is in fact estimated to be as much as the industry is likely to be able to use, having regard to other limiting factors.

Mr. Turton: Owing to the Government's mismanagement, has not the time come to publish the figures?

Mr. Langford-Holt: While agreeing with the Minister that two times x is 2x, will he tell the House what the unknown quantity is?

Mr. Williams: The known quantity is double what it was last quarter.

Prisoners of War

Mr. Turton: asked the Minister of Agriculture whether German prisoners of war, who wish to become civilianised and to remain in agricultural employment, are now permitted to do so.

Mr. T. Williams: Yes, Sir. German prisoners of war are already permitted to apply to remain, after their repatriation date has become due, as civilian agricultural workers in farm billets up to the end of 1947. It has now been decided to extend the scheme to 1948, and also to permit certain Germans to volunteer for employment as civilian workers with war agricultural executive committees. Details of the new arrangements will be announced as soon as possible.

Mr. Turton: Is the Minister aware that the attitude of the different war agricultural committees varies in different counties? In some counties all these applications are accepted and in some all are being refused. Will the Minister circularise his committees to secure uniformity of treatment and application in the several counties?

Mr. Williams: I can assure the hon. Member that the county executive committees have been circularised and they do know what new regulations have been made.

Mr. Langford-Holt: Is it the Minister's policy to allow Germans who have been repatriated, but who apply to come back to this country to rejoin the industry, to return?

Mr. Williams: That matter is at present under consideration.

Eggs (Hatcheries)

Mr. Collins: asked the Minister of Agriculture the number of eggs used for hatching purposes by accredited and non-accredited hatcheries during a 12 month period to the latest convenient date, and what restriction there is on the price that may be paid for eggs purchased for hatching.

Mr. T. Williams: I have no information as to the number of eggs used for hatching purposes by non-accredited hatcheries during a twelve-month period, but statistics show that an average of approximately 20 million eggs per annum have been sold to accredited hatcheries in England and Wales by accredited breeders during the last few years, and the total eggs a year used for hatching is estimated very roughly at 55 million. There are no restrictions on the price of hatching eggs.

Mr. Collins: In view of the large number of eggs involved, is my right hon. Friend satisfied that some tightening of the regulations is not required in order to secure the maximum availability of eggs through the normal channels?

Mr. Williams: I do not quite see what restrictions we can apply to this particular difficulty.

Mr. Collins: By looking into supplies to non-accredited hatcheries.

Mr. Collins: asked the Minister of Agriculture if he is aware that late-hatched pullets are comparatively weak and infertile; and if, in order to utilise limited supplies of poultry food to the best advantage, he will institute a close season for hatcheries from May to August.

Mr. T. Williams: I am aware that the view is widely, although not universally, accepted that late-hatched pullets are economically of less value than those hatched in the early months of the year, but the enforcement of a close season for incubating eggs would be impracticable.

Sir W. Darling: What is meant by the expression "comparatively infertile"?

Pig and Poultry Rations (Permits)

Sir W. Smithers: asked the Minister of Agriculture whether, in view of the necessity for increased production of food, he will now instruct war agricultural executive committees to issue permits for rations for pigs and poultry even though the applicants did not keep them in 1939.

Mr. T. Williams: No, Sir. I am afraid that supplies of feeding stuffs are not yet sufficient to provide rations for pigs or poultry kept on holdings that are not registered as having maintained this type of stock in 1939 or 1940.

Sir W. Smithers: What has keeping pigs in 1939 to do with keeping pigs in 1947? Is the Minister aware that if I kept a pig for which I have the facilities, I could get plenty of rations without depriving anyone else if only the coupons were available? When the Minister has appealed one day for increased production of pigs, why is it that the next day he does all he can to stop it?

Mr. Williams: The hon. Gentleman is once again suffering from a delusion. The


Minister of Agriculture, the Government and, I believe, Members in all parts of the House, want to see our livestock increased, but we fully recognise that it can be increased only so far as breeding and feeding stuff supply permit.

Mr. Assheton: Is it not time that this particular restrictive and monopolistic practice was brought to an end?

Mr. Williams: Does the right hon. Gentleman regard it as monopolistic to provide commercial producers of pigs and poultry with all they want for production having regard to their 1939 position?

Mr. Assheton: Is it not monopolistic and restrictive to prevent people from coming into a business unless they were engaged in it previously?

Mr. Williams: As the right hon. Gentleman is aware, we must, in order to distribute the available supplies of feeding stuffs, first make provision for those who were commercially producing in 1939, and we can only widen the basis where there is a greater quantity of feedingstuffs available.

Mr. Collins: If the available supplies were spread more thinly, would it not mean less, not more, pig meat?

Mr. Williams: Very likely.

Feedingstuffs, Norfolk

Mr. Dye: asked the Minister of Agriculture what steps he is taking to relieve the acute shortage of feedingstuffs in Norfolk due to the prolonged drought, in view of the fall in milk production and the need to fatten both cattle and sheep this winter.

Mr. T. Williams: Available supplies of rationed feedingstuffs are insufficient to compensate farmers adequately for the loss of home-grown feedingstuffs caused by drought, which has been widespread. Special additions to the cereal reserves for distribution at the discretion of the county agricultural executive committees have, however, been made in Norfolk and other eastern counties where supplies of homegrown feedingstuffs have been much reduced as a result of the poor sugar beet crops.

Mr. Dye: Does not my right hon. Friend remember that in the early part of this year, as a result of appeals from him,

very large quantities of hay were exported from Eastern counties to Northern parts of England? Is it not a fact that there has been good hay production now in those areas, and could not supplies of hay be made available for the Eastern counties?

Mr. Williams: I entirely agree with the first part of the supplementary question of my hon. Friend, but I am afraid that with the supplies that were available, all we could do was to increase the discretionary allowance of various counties.

Mr. Dye: Could not my right hon. Friend allow farmers to use corn and barley this year from their own farms?

Mr. Williams: Nobody would have been more pleased than I to permit that, but it was not possible.

Flood Damage (Great Ouse Area)

Mr. Dye: asked the Minister of Agriculture whether he has decided what financial assistance will be made available to the internal drainage authorities in the Great Ouse Catchment Drainage, whose districts were flooded during the early part of this year, and to the owners of land whose drains were blocked and can only be cleared at great expense.

Mr. T. Williams: As announced in my statement to the House on 24th March, an increased rate of grant of 75 per cent. is payable to enable flood-damaged internal drains and farm ditches to be restored. My hon. Friend will be aware of the provisions of the Agriculture (Emergency Payments) Act, 1947, in respect of flooded land put under crops, and of the special payments through the Agricultural Disaster Fund, from a sum made available by the Lord Mayor's Flood Distress Fund, to occupiers who were unable to crop their land because it was cleared too late. In addition, it was clear that some internal drainage boards, whose districts were substantially inundated with the result that crops could not be grown this year, would have difficulty in collecting drainage rates, and I have agreed to make special arrangements to overcome their difficulties.

Major Legge-Bourke: Could not the Minister circulate in the OFFICIAL REPORT the information to which he has referred?

Mr. Williams: I think the hon. and gallant Member is aware that that is already embodied in HANSARD, following a statement that I made here.

Oral Answers to Questions — WHITE FISH INDUSTRY

Mr. D. Marshall: asked the Minister of Agriculture when he will set up a White Fish Commission.

Mr. T. Williams: I am afraid I cannot add anything to the answer I gave to a similar Question from the hon. Member on 28th July last.

Mr. Marshall: Is the Minister aware that he is constantly giving me the answer that he is giving active consideration to the matter? Will he now tell me what "active" really means?

Mr. Williams: It means active consideration.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Proceedings on the Motion for an Address in reply to the King's Speech exempted, at this day's Sitting, from the provisions of the Standing Order (Sittings of the House) for one hour after Ten o'Clock.—[Mr. H. Morrison.]

Orders of the Day — KING'S SPEECH

DEBATE ON THE ADDRESS

[FIFTH DAY]

Order read for resuming Adjourned Debate on Question [21st October]:
That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty as follows:
Most Gracious Sovereign,
We, Your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in Parliament assembled, beg leave to offer our humble thanks to Your Majesty for the Gracious Speech which Your Majesty has addressed to both Houses of Parliament."—[Mr. Blyton.]

Question again proposed.

3.33 p.m.

Mr. Keeling: It will take me only four minutes to finish the four-minute speech I began on Friday afternoon. I am very sorry that the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Mack), to whom I gave notice, is not present. In his speech the hon. Member pronounced Petkov guilty of the crime for which he was executed. I was saying that that view was not shared by His Majesty's Government, who were represented at the trial, and who in the protest which they sent to the Bulgarian Government after the execution said that the trial had been a travesty of justice and the culmination of the Government's campaign for silencing, and in this case murdering, all those who did not agree with them. The hon. Member for Oldham (Mr. Hale) objected to the word "murder" at Question Time today. That was the word used in the Government's Note. In my opinion anybody who applauds the condemnation of Petkov attacks the principles of liberty, of the rule of law and of national independence for which Petkov died.
The hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme claimed that when he was in Bulgaria last month he received a welcome from the people which was without parallel in the entire history of the Balkans. He also said that no man had ever done more to raise the prestige of Britain in the Balkans than himself. We have more important things to discuss this afternoon than the achievements of the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme in the Balkans, but as I was a witness of his actions in Sofia and actually stayed in the same hotel, I should just like to put this on record. It is quite true that as the hon. Member walked the streets he was cheered, but the applause was led by a bodyguard or claque, supplied by the Bulgarian Government, which surrounded him. On 9th September, after the condemnation but before the execution of Petkov, there was a great procession in Sofia in which all wage earners, under pain of punishment, were compelled to march.

Mr. Orbach: How do you know?

Mr. Keeling: I was there. As the Under-Secretary mentioned in reply to a Question today, the British political representative, now the British Minister, absented himself from the celebrations under instructions from the Foreign Office. The seat of the British political representative at the saluting point was occupied with great deliberation by the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme, who on Wednesday last declared himself a loyal supporter of His Majesty's Government. If that was loyalty, I think His Majesty's Government would have preferred the hon. Member to abstain from loyalty. If that was raising the prestige of Britain, God help Britain. The hon. Member also claimed to be a friend of the Bulgarian people. He is mistaken. The Bulgarian people reject the friendship of any man who applauds the condemnation of Petkov—perhaps the best loved man in their country. No man who, like the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme, is a friend of the Bulgarian Government can be a friend of the Bulgarian people.

GERMANY

3.37 p.m.

Sir Ralph Glyn: In August last, by the direction of this House, a

sub-committee of the Estimates Committee visited Germany in order to prepare a Report which is being considered by the House today. It is necessary to draw the attention of the House to the very large sums which are involved in administering the British zone and in looking after and paying for the necessary Forces of occupation. It amounts to something in the nature of £140 million annually. The sum is so large at this time of our present financial stringency that it seems necessary for this House to accept and consider a Report which attempts, at any rate, to point to some of the things which have led to this very great expenditure.
The first thing to realise is the background of the position now in Germany and how it has been brought about. There is no doubt at all that the quadripartite system has broken down completely. It is necessary to recall the various things that were laid down, and they are summarised in the Report: first, that during the period of occupation Germany should be treated as a single economic unit; secondly, that certain German administrative departments, headed by state secretaries, should be established; thirdly, that the essential commodities should be equitably shared between the zones so as to produce a planned economy throughout Germany and reduce the need for imports, and that the proceeds from current production and stock should be available in the first place for the payment of imports, thus ruling out the taking of reparations from current production; finally, that the removal of capital equipment should be completed by 2nd February of next year.
That was what was laid down, and there is no doubt at all that owing to the difficulties that have arisen, of which the House is fully aware, it has imposed upon those responsible for administration in Germany a most difficult task. I would make one plea, and that is that the great majority of those in the Control Commission are working long hours, treating this matter as one of great importance, and giving of their best, and it is wrong and mean for irresponsible people to make contributions to the newspapers which are very often without any foundation, which depress the morale of our own representatives out there and do not encourage the right type of people to join the Commission


sion at the very time when we want the best we can find. There are hard cases, and the Committee were informed when we were there of two men who had finished their time with the Commission, had received definite appointments at home in industry and, when one article appeared in, I think, a Sunday newspaper, the prospective employer said: "If you belong to people like that, we will not employ you," and they were not given the positions. That is a terrible situation, and today I hope the House will realise that if they are public servants—and, after all, we are responsible for the way they are treated—they cannot answer back. It is high time that we took a line here and showed our disgust at these perpetual underhand attacks, which do nothing to improve British prestige and certainly hamper the work of the Commission.
The other difficulty we saw was the task of the bi-zonal arrangement and how to fit in the so-called British and American zones. That is a new situation and it means that we ought to look at this situation from a new angle. The methods of the United States are not quite the same as ours, and it is of the greatest importance that the bi-zonal arrangement, with its centre at present at Frankfurt, should be a success. There is, however, this added difficulty, which we ought to remember, that some of us on that Committee felt that although we could not agree with all the policy which was being carried out, it was not our task to make a report on policy. This Report now before the House deals with the way in which the policy is being interpreted and administered, but I think this House ought to appreciate that if there are constructive ideas at the back of the United States and ourselves to help Germany to get on her feet, we have to adopt them and go forward on those lines, and refuse from now onwards to be parties to a policy of pure revenge and the creation of a chaotic situation which will make the task of any administration on behalf of the Allies in Germany almost impossible.
The conclusions to which the Committee came are set out in the Report on page 25 and, with the permission of the House, I will deal briefly with one or two aspects of the administration to which I think the attention of the House should properly be drawn. We found that there was nothing

in existence in the British zone to supervise local expenditure properly; by which I mean how the money, or rather the goods which the money has purchased, are being distributed. It is absolutely vital that there should be a proper organisation set up under Treasury Rules and Orders so that there shall be a check on the way in which these large sums are spent. I exclude from that, however, the expenditure on the three Services, and it is right to say that all the evidence we have had from the British Army of the Rhine, from the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy shows that the control of expenditure by the three Services is excellent and that the administration is extremely good. In regard to the C.C.G. the problem is more difficult and more complex, but that, surely, is all the more reason why there should be a proper organisation on the spot set up to check this matter thoroughly and to root out anything that is wrong.
With regard to the set-up of the Control Commission, I should say one word because this check of the expenditure deals with the present method and the organisation now at work. One can express it, to the House in the simplest way by saying that it is a vertical organisation, a functional body or division which works from Berlin and through Frankfurt, and down to the zones in a vertical direction. Then there is a lay-out or horizontal organisation with the Regional Commissioners and their staffs, going right down to the Kreisoffizier who is a British official, working right down to the smallest unit of the German civil organisation. Incidentally, those Kreisoffiziers do not get many pats on the back, but there they are working quietly right through the British zone. Unfortunately, we did not have time to visit many of them or the groups, and, indeed, we had no time to see them actually at their work, but all the evidence we had showed that when you get the right type of British official in the Kreis or in the Kreis groups, and he gets the confidence of the Germans around him, he is making an enormous contribution towards helping the people in Germany to recover their position and to look at things in the way we hope in future they will look at them. Those men are isolated, and they must have—I hope they will have—the encouragement of this House to realise that, although they are not often seen and seldom heard of, we


realise the great work they are doing day in and day out.
The divisional or functional organisation is something that has come down to us from the original military occupation. Then it was necessary to have, under strict military rule, controls working straight down from the top. Inevitably, however, there comes a point where the vertical meets the horizontal and there is the danger of a collision. Somebody has to make up his mind as to which is to be the future organisation on which we shall rely to ensure that British and Allied administration shall be carried out properly. To my mind, and I think to the minds of my colleagues, there is no doubt that the regional organisation is the one on which we should rely, but that depends entirely on the regional commissioners and their staffs being highly competent people, most carefully selected. It is rather ridiculous to assume that some British official with not much experience should go and talk to the Germans as if they were never any success in business and really knew nothing about it. That is not the fault of the individual, but of the method of selection of those who should be charged with these functions, and I think we ought to look very carefully into the type of person who is being chosen. As the Committee recommend, we ought to see that such people who are specialists are seconded from the Civil Service, or from industry, so that we can have the pick of the very best, and that they will not suffer in their position or chance of promotion or pension by being chosen.
Some of us on the Committee had the opportunity of going to Germany on a similar task last year. There is no doubt that in comparing last year with this the general attitude in Germany seems to be one of increased sullenness and disappointment. In those circumstances, it is all the more important that they should have great respect and regard for those charged by this House and by the Government to carry out these very onerous tasks. I am quite sure the future lies in showing friendship to the German people and helping them, rather than by sitting side by side in everything and having a parallel organisation in developing trade and industry which is irksome to a German who really knows his own business, expensive to the taxpayer here, and gives a futile idea of our own methods

for European recovery in the economic and commercial field.
I therefore emphasise this point, which I think is the most important of all, that numbers do not matter; what matters is the quality. If we get the quality right, we must be prepared to pay a salary for which they can work, quite apart from Civil Service scales. Either we are going to do the job properly, or not at all, and if we are not going to do it at all, let us come out of the country; but if we do that, we throw away the fruits of victory and disappoint the Germans who rely entirely on us to the exclusion of every other country to help them get on their feet again and to go forward. Surely this is a very great opportunity for this country. Let us seize it with both hands. There is of course criticism as to numbers. It is very easy to be critical on numbers, but I think it is a fact that the Commander-in-Chief and the Deputy Military Governor, shortly to assume command, are very fully aware of these things, and they are combing the organisation. I will not detain the House with details, but we make certain recommendations as to how we think considerable economies can be made.

The question of agriculture is of most tremendous importance. One matter which caused us a good deal of difficulty is the new agrarian system. It may be right, or it may be wrong to cut up a number of the large estates. It may be thought that those people who are large landowners are potential supporters of future Nazi organisations, but what matters at this moment, whatever general policy may be, is to do nothing whatever which will reduce the amount of food Germany can produce from her own soil. It is surely obvious that if there are mechanical means and large fields a better economy can be gained by mechanisation of large areas than of small. I think the test of the matter must be, at this time, what system is going to produce most food in Germany, because otherwise it will mean an extra burden on the British and United States taxpayers who have to bring the food into Germany. We should also pay attention to the fact that Germany before the war was not only able to produce all the agricultural machinery and fertilisers and the rest which she wanted for her own economy, but exported them on a considerable scale. Of all the follies I think the


greatest would be to prevent German manufacturers producing ploughs and machines which are wanted for increasing food production. That ought to be a very high priority.

As the House knows, the production of coal is entirely tied to food; the two curves go together. As will be seen from the Report, an extraordinary thing happened to us when we met the trade union members of the mining industry in Essen. We fully expected to hear from them all kinds of things about conditions of employment, and so forth, but what they felt most keenly about was whether it was possible to work some barter system, to work one extra shift to get more potatoes. It is absolutely necessary that the scales of food for the coalminer should be maintained and everything done to increase food production in Germany and to stop the business of knocking off early in various works so that people can go foraging in the districts around the towns. That is bad for everyone, and appallingly bad for production. I found in one shop in Essen that they were working, with a quarter of an hour's break, from seven in the morning to quarter past three in the afternoon. That cannot lead to high rates of production.

The problem of displaced persons is a tremendous burden on the British taxpayer. Above all things it is a human problem of a very acute and agonising kind. There is a different administration in the British zone where it is in the hands of the C.C.G. from the American zone, where it is in the hands of the I.R.O., and what will happen under the bi-zonal arrangements I do not know. I am certain that proposals can be agreed between the British and United States zones terminating this business and they should be announced as soon as possible. I know it is difficult for the Government to make an announcement, but I believe that it is our business as hon. Members of the House charged with the task of inquiring into expenditure to point out that at the moment the system lends, itself to operations on the black market. We should lay it down that certain comforts, and luxuries possibly, could be given to these people. On the face of it that is all right, but what actually happens is that the value of

cigarettes on the black market is so tremendous that it pays these persons to remain as D.Ps. with comforts provided by the Allies, rather than to do some honest work or to go back to their own countries.

I do not think it is realised what a tremendous contribution this country has already made in this matter. We are not inclined to blow our own trumpet very much, but in this case we must do so and in the Report it is pointed out that we have looked after no fewer than 170,000 if we include the Poles, as we are entitled to do. If, however, every country in the new world as well as the old were to make anything like a pro rata contribution the matter would be settled. I hope it will be possible to lay down a definite time limit after which there will be no one in the categories of D.Ps. and that it will be forbidden to select only a particular group of males and that a cross-section will be taken. Incidentally, I think it was a mistake—there may be reasons which I was unable to ascertain—for us to have laid down that we will take the men but not their wives or mothers. The men who have accepted such conditions are not the best ones. The decent type will say "No, I will go with my wife—or my mother—or not go at all." To say that their wives and mothers cannot go with them is wrong. It is fair to say that I certainly got the impression that the contribution of the Ministry of Labour as a Government Department towards the problem in Germany, has been better and higher than that of any other Department. They did make promises that womenfolk of the men who came here would be allowed to join them within a certain period. Unfortunately, when we were there we were told that that date had passed, and that the men were now anxious because their womenfolk had not come, and that they were wondering what would happen. There ought to be no doubt about a thing like that. I hope it will be possible for the Department to consider the proposals of a constructive kind made in this Report, and try to solve this matter.

A word on monetary reform. The whole of the German economy is completely upset because there is no foreign exchange department. We have put off this matter time and again, and it is absolutely necessary, first of all, to have an inquiry into internal prices in Germany and the


quantity of consumer goods available there, and then have some inquiry to see how we can fix a proper exchange value for the mark. We have always been thinking in terms which I hope may yet be accomplished of a fusion of all the zones in Germany. That probably sounds too Utopian now, but at any rate, supposing that does not happen, there is no reason why an inquiry should not now be made to solve the monetary situation and exchange position at present so unstable. Without that we shall not be able to build up the exports, and until we build up the exports, the continuing burden falls on the British taxpayer. That is the long and short of the whole matter.

There is one other matter with regard to the social and educative side. There has been appointed a man of very high principle, and a man who, I believe, will make a wonderful contribution to the British effort in Germany. I refer to Mr. Birley, who has given up a very high position in this country and shown himself to be a real crusader. He deserves all the support he can possibly have. In this Report several paragraphs are devoted to this educational problem, and I hope that the Government may, at any rate, do one thing—let us see to it that there is a free interchange between the two countries. It ought to be possible for British teachers and professors to go to Germany easily without all these restrictions, and ridiculous passport regulations, which take so long that the occasion of the lecture has long gone by when the lecturer gets there. Surely what we want to do is to strike the imagination of the Germans and try to make them see what it is in British education that really matters.

It may be that the final and lasting thing which we can do to Germany is to bring her round to the point of view and outlook produced by a free democratic type of education. The universities at the moment are undoubtedly suffering from having a very old group of professors, with also younger men in the faculty who are trying to attain positions so as to make their views felt. Mr. Birley and people like him, by going out there and getting to know German teachers, can make this fusion between the old and the young much more easily accomplished, and can do something, I am convinced, to transform the outlook of the German Hitler Youth

type into something new and better. That is the great topic—the youth of Germany today, and what they are to be. The period of our stay in Germany should be measured and matched by the time it will take, by influence and example, to transform the disappointed, wondering, puzzled German youth today, being without discipline, which is the only thing they really understand, and having all sorts of doctrines put to them and not knowing what to believe. It is that leadership of German youth today which will make the character of Germany in 25 years time. Surely we should attach the greatest importance to that problem, and we should dedicate the services of our best people to helping forward its solution.

I wish to say a few words about the Services. There is a great responsibility resting upon this House. It has been laid down that these young men shall go out there and do their training. That may be quite all right, but there have been Debates in another place, and the matter has been mentioned here, in regard to the moral difficulties which confront these young men when they go to Germany. It is quite impossible to prevent these things from happening altogether but it is more than possible and, indeed, right to see that the condtions under which they serve are such that there is ample recreation, that there is as little scattering of the Forces as possible, that there is the concentration that is so necessary, and that every thing is done to encourage those things that are healthy and sound from a physical point of view. The out-of-balance condition of the sexes in Germany has to be remembered, and it is not often appreciated how this creates psychological factors which are unique. It is no use condemning people, and one comes to take things as one finds them, but it would be a profound mistake if certain proposals for reducing the amenities for troops in the British zone were carried out. That would seem to me to be the worst form of economy. I trust that the Foreign Secretary will use his influence with the other Departments concerned to see that these facilities are extended, if anything, and that they are fused into what is required by the Germans themselves.

One of the greatest mistakes which was made in the war by E.N.S.A. was that of


always thinking that Service men liked vulgar things. They too often played down to them instead of playing up. I am convinced that it is fantastic to shut the few opera houses that remain and not have German operas, plays, concerts, etc., and instead have some futile, third-rate music-hall show put on which prevents that other better music being heard. That indicates that the atmosphere is wrong, and that we have taken a wrong direction. We cannot go on forever having Germans treated as being different from other people. We should bring them into our way of thought and life and help them along, and one of the best ways of doing that is to show that we have cultural ideas which are capable of appreciating opera and that we are not only anxious to see some other third-rate show. In regard to the troops it is also very important that we should remember that whatever we may spend on the C.C.G., the basis of our position in Germany is the efficiency of our Forces to carry out their duties, and especially in a country like Germany, we cannot afford to rely solely on National Service recruits. We should have a few seasoned troops there, to show that we still have power and authority. I should like to see some Marines with the Chatham Division band go over there.

We should be proud of what we have done—proud but not boastful, because there is a difference. The Germans told us that they had nothing but the highest regard for the way in which the occupying Forces had behaved. The one thing they would hate would be to see anything done which would mean a reduction in these Forces which would weaken the confidence which we must give those in authority if they are to do their duty. I believe that Germany is likely to be a plague spot in Europe unless we hasten forward some solution. The solution can be found by giving confidence to those who carry out their tasks on our behalf out there, and by being determined to be held back no longer by those fetters which are imposed on us by the views of other people with whom we have little sympathy and which are imposed as a relic of the Potsdam Agreement. Let us make up our minds boldly to go forward and carry through our own ideas, with the United States if the others will not

come in. Above all, let us carry through those principles in which we believe and on which the Germans look to us for help.

4.12 p.m.

Mr. John Hynd: I welcome, as I think the House will welcome, the opportunity for this Debate on the German situation at this juncture. I wish to compliment the hon. Member for Abingdon (Sir R. Glyn) and his colleagues on the Select Committee for the admirable way in which they have sized up the situation in Germany in the course of what must have been a very brief visit, and I congratulate them on putting their finger on the proper spots. The House will welcome this Debate even more because of the fact that whilst, for two years now in Germany and other quarters we have been putting forward heroic efforts to try to overcome the problems of that country, so far we have succeeded in achieving nothing but the maintenance of a very low standard of living in a country which, but for our efforts, might have fallen into complete neglect and possibly into political and social death. That and the destruction of what I hope are the last remnants of Nazi influence is about the sum total of the achievements of these two years of hard struggle.
The immediate reasons for the failure are pretty well known. There is the world shortage of food which has affected Germany more than any other country because Germany has been last in the queue. There is the colossal incomprehensible destruction of German towns and German industry. There is the tremendous and growing despair, to which the hon. Member for Abingdon has already referred, of the people in Germany due to these conditions, due to the perpetual hunger and the cold, the crowding together under sub-human conditions of accommodation. These are now having their inevitable effect. It is not now a question of discussing whether or not it serves them right. That is beside the point.
What we must consider are the political, economic and social repercussions of the situation, not only upon our own country but upon the whole of European economy and the future of world peace. I have referred to the immediate causes of the situation—the immediate causes of our failure to achieve success in Germany.


The ultimate causes have already been referred to by the hon. Member for Abingdon. These ultimate causes are simply that the Allies themselves have failed to put into operation the conditions upon which they agreed when they undertook the responsibility for the occupation of Germany. I am particularly glad that the Select Committee has emphasised that fact. In passing, I may say that I am also glad that the Select Committee has made such a point of defending generally the conduct and integrity of the Control Commission staff. I hope that their Report and the comments made by the hon. Member for Abingdon will prevent this Debate from being bedevilled and sidetracked into that old controversy. But the fact remains that all our efforts have been rendered useless by the failure of the Allies themselves.
I think the House will appreciate now—I think it is generally accepted throughout the country, and, at least, it has disappeared from our newspapers—that the food problem in Germany is real, that there is a fantastic shortage of food, and that there has been a prolonged undernourishment of practically the whole of the population though, incidentally, the situation has changed somewhat now that the black market is getting a bigger hold with the collapse of faith in the currency to which the hon. Member for Abingdon referred. Undoubtedly, there are more and more people in Germany who are beginning to live fairly substantial lives while still more are sinking deeper and deeper into despair. With another winter coming upon us, with a third winter with no hope and no apparent prospects, I question whether they are likely to survive.
Industry is stagnant, despite the improvement in the production of coal. The fact is that there is a shortage of food, and of manpower. Such manpower as is available is so under-nourished as to be to produce only to the extent referred to by the hon. Member for Abingdon. The factories are not turning out the necessary machinery and equipment to enable the mines to go forward full blast and to get somewhere nearer the 400,000 tons daily production which they had pre-war. Agricultural implements are not being produced in sufficient quantity because of the shortage of steel arising from the shortage of coal and food. Industry remains

stagnant. A great deal depends on transport. For example, the distribution of the accumulating coal stocks at the pit head, which this winter will be of little use unless transport is available, is another difficulty. Transport appears to be in a decline because the machinery, manpower, coal and food are not available to enable the rehabilitation of locomotives and trucks. The agricultural industry, upon which the indigenous food supplies depend, is suffering from the same factors—shortage of machinery, manpower, coal and agricultural implements, in addition to fertilisers and seeds.
The question of consumer goods is most important in this picture. Consumer goods are suffering from the same shortcomings as are afflicting every other industry. The result is that no incentive is offered to the worker to earn wages, which are of little value, or to the producer, the industrialist, to put his factory into production, because he cannot pay his way and cannot acquire for money the raw materials and machinery which are necessary. Therefore, the black market is taking control. All this is mainly due not to the world food situation but to the failure of the Allies themselves to implement their own undertakings and obligations. This is taking place in a country which possesses tremendous resources which, indeed, are largely concentrated in the British zone. It is taking place in a country which possesses people of great genius who are being thwarted, starved and deprived of the necessary authority, perhaps necessarily in an occupied country though probably not to the extent to which it has gone in the last two years. They are, therefore, a people who are unable to apply their genius and resources to the raw materials available to them. We must ask ourselves, therefore, how much longer this is to go on.
I pay tribute to the remarkable patience the Foreign Secretary has shown in past meetings of the Foreign Ministers. I also wish to pay unstinting tribute, as a member on the back benches, to the representatives of the British Government on the Control Commission in Berlin. But we are now, I feel, reaching the point where we can test whether our patience has been justified or not. The Foreign Minister's Conference resumes next month, and it is right that we should


make every possible effort to try to ensure success in reaching agreement between the four Powers for the implementation of their undertakings in regard to the administration of Germany. We must make every effort, but, if we are to judge from past experience, if we are to judge from the growing disunity, indeed hostility, which has been shown amongst the United Nations from day to day, I think the chances of success are few, if they exist at all.
I want to ask the Foreign Secretary a few questions, but it is obvious that my right hon. Friend cannot answer specifically now the kind of questions which I am going to ask, but I do ask them, nevertheless, in rhetorical form and hope that he will take note of them. In the event of failure to reach agreement with the other Foreign Ministers at the Conference next month, have we got our plans prepared and ready to put into operation for the administration of a Western Germany, because that is the only apparent alternative? I wish, as do most hon. Members, that there were some other alternative, because I fully realise that the splitting of Germany, which means further splitting Europe, will have grave reverberations, which will spread throughout the whole world, resounding for many years in bitterness and in anxiety for all the peoples of the world. I realise that that would be a calamity, but I also realise that it would be no less a calamity if the present situation in Germany, and, therefore, in Europe, were to be allowed to continue.
I think we must be prepared for the alternative that must face us in the event of the breakdown of the Conference. Have we, for example, in conjunction with our American colleagues, prepared an emergency food policy? Food, it has been generally agreed, is the basis of the whole problem, and it is quite clear that, whatever provisions may be made under the Marshall Plan for Germany—and these will not come into operation immediately—if, as the Select Committee point out in their Report, there is to be any increase in the output of farm implements, mining machinery and the production of consumer goods, on which all these other things so much depend, there must be an immediate improvement in the food situation, which necessarily depends primarily on increased imports.

If the question is asked where the food is to come from, I think the answer is that there is only one substantial source from which it can come. The Americans are in this as much as we are. If we are pouring our pounds down the drain in Germany, the Americans are pouring uncounted dollars down the drain in Germany, and will have to continue doing so as long as the present situation exists. Is it not possible for our American friends to invest food in Germany in the hope of a return in the early restoration of the German economy, and, therefore, a saving of future dollars? The other aspect of the food problem is that of German indigenous production. The difficulty here arises in the production of agricultural implements, which is dependent upon steel, and, again, on coal. The Select Committee, in Appendix IV of the Report, state very clearly that the restoration of German agriculture requires increased supplies of fertilisers, high quality seed, farm requisites and machinery. It has been pointed out by the hon. Member for Abingdon that, if we are to solve this food problem, which is the most immediate and urgent of all, we must produce as much as possible in agricultural implements as can be produced from the available industrial recources of Germany at the present time. It will not be done, of course, if we educe those resources now.
Then there is the question of the conversion of currency. How far have we prepared plans for currency reform, whatever kind of Germany may result from the Foreign Ministers' Conference—whether a unitary Germany or a unitary Western Germany? I know the efforts which this country has made in the past few years to achieve that; I know that, so long as there was still the possibility of German unity, or the possibility of getting agreement on the Potsdam conditions, it would have been futile to try the conversion of currency in one part of Germany, but, if we are faced with that position following the Foreign Ministers' Conference, are we ready and have we the plans ready now to apply an immediate currency conversion scheme, either for the whole of Germany or for the Western zones?
Whatever the importance of the food situation, I would like the House to place even more emphasis on this question of currency conversion, which is at the very


foundation of the administration of our zone in Germany today than is given in the Select Committee's Report. I know all the difficulties. We can bring in the food, produce the goods, establish a Ger man administration administered by Germans, but, if there is the tremendous inflation that is always the inevitable result of these conditions—

Sir Arthur Salter: Will the hon. Gentleman allow me? Would he inform the House whether there is at present an agreed limitation in the number of notes that may be issued by the different occupying Powers and are convertible into German currency?

Mr. Hynd: If the right hon. Gentleman will permit me, I should prefer that question to be answered by those in authority, and not by me. I am now asking questions, not answering them. Unless we get this conversion of currency, both for internal purposes—for fixing the value of the mark—and for external purposes, there will be no incentive for the workers to produce or to establish a satisfactory export policy. The question of a German central authority also immediately arises in this context. Whatever may be the result of the Foreign Ministers' Conference, there must be, as soon as possible, a properly elected German central authority, whether for all Germany or for the Western zones, which will have real responsibility to its constituents, and which could take over real responsibility for a large number of those matters which the Control Commission would have been only too glad to hand over to the Germans before now if such an authority had existed. In the absence of such a properly constituted and responsible authority, a large number of our measures are likely to meet with but little success. That has already been demonstrated by the results of the bi-zonal agreement of last year, which failed in some of its main purposes simply because there was not the necessary political backing.
The great question which is agitating the minds of all thinking people is the question of the level of industry and the present dismantling policy which is going on. I want to ask the Foreign Secretary whether he is now satisfied that the present assumed level of industry, based upon an 11,500,000 tons steel production, is anything more than a mirage, anything more than a bare statistical calculation

made in Berlin or London? I know, and I hope it will be reported in Germany, that this country has made a tremendous contribution towards destroying the old conception of the German level of industry—the impossible conception that existed last year and into which we were forced as a compromise pending the continuation of our efforts for its modification. I think that is now being generally understood in Germany, but I very much question whether the 11,500,000 tons of steel production is, in fact, a realistic assessment of what we propose to leave in Germany after the present quota of factories and plants have been removed.
I want to say again that I am not concerned here with the question of the justice of reparations, or otherwise. It is not a question of how much damage was done by Germany in other countries, or what these countries' needs may be; it is a question of practical politics and economics. I have never been able to understand the economics of putting 2,000 men at work for twelve months—2,000 man years—dismantling a rusty old steel factory, breaking it up, marking up the parts, packing them up into crates, and sending them to some other country, where it will probably take two or three years to rebuild the factory, and when, in four or five years' time, someone will have an out-of-date and rusty factory, whereas, if we had left it in Germany producing steel, we should probably have been able to build in the same time, and without any loss, a new, modern, well equipped up-to-date factory.
I have no time to go further into that particular aspect, but I want to put my own feelings on record. I know that our Allies are involved; I know that, possibly, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary would like to wash his hands of the whole unsavoury business. But a lot of Allies are clamouring for these reparations. Is it too much to ask that those Allies should be persuaded to consider the position? After all, they have, for nearly two years, been pursuing the fiasco of Brussels, of bidding and bartering, and attempting to get this or that out of Germany without, apparently, any prospects of immediate results. Whatever may be said in answer to Questions in this House, it is true that some of these factories are busy at the present time making those very things for which the Select Committee says that Germany is starving.


They are repairing locomotives, making trucks, mining machinery and equipment, agricultural implements, and, incidentally, using the manpower that is available in that constructive way, instead of in a destructive way.
My hon. Friend the Member for Uxbridge (Mr. Beswick) asked a Question this afternoon about a particular air raid shelter in Berlin which had been used for hospital purposes. I do not know this shelter, but I do know the use to which such shelters have been put. It may be that an air raid shelter is a useful thing in the case of war. But there is no immediate danger, I think, of the British zone going to war against us, and, even if there were a war, the air raid shelter would be at the disposal of our own forces in Germany. Therefore, there is nothing to fear at the moment. Such places are being used for a useful purpose. I, personally, have had to intervene to prevent great blocks of modern offices from being destroyed for the sole reason that they had been offices which served some armaments works.
That is the picture, and I hope that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary will pay close attention to the question of the dismantling or destruction of so called "war potentials." It is no good telling us that the dismantling" work will be undertaken by only a small proportion of the German workers. In that regard, the figure of 1 per cent. has been bandied about. Taken over the two zones, that figure may be correct, but there will be no dismantling in Bavaria or in the greater part of the two zones. This 1 per cent., or some 30,000 or 50,000 workers, will be in a few towns in the Ruhr, and will represent an enormous proportion of their manpower. It also represents a very serious threat to the morale of the people upon whom we depend so much.
I understand that a concession has been made, to the extent that we are allowing those factories at present in useful production to complete their current orders. By doing that, are we not, in fact, admitting that these factories are necessary? Why should we stop them at the orders already on the office desk when there is a long queue of no less urgent orders clamouring to be carried out, and on which our success in Germany so much depends? I am satisfied

that this is false economy. This is a very difficult and important problem to discuss at this juncture. I am far from wishing to exacerbate German opinion and the feelings which must be experienced by the many thousands of German workers organised in trade unions—which are, after all, a child of our own creation—who are expected to carry out this job. They are the only ones who can carry it out. But I cannot see how a big job of this kind can be satisfactorily carried out under present conditions in Germany, and in view of the lowering of morale which must be created by these operations. It can only be done with German co-operation, and there are many reasons why the Germans should co-operate.
Having said that, I should like to make this appeal to the German trade unions and to other responsible German representatives that, whatever may be the final decisions on these matters, and to whatever extent they may be made in cooperation and consultation with the German authorities, they must realise that any attempts to oppose, to sabotage, to delay or to go slow, or to take even more serious steps, can only have the most drastic results on the whole of the German people, because, in the delicately poised position of German economy today, any failure of the workers to put in of their very best, or any breakdown of machinery or of social order can only mean mass starvation. The distribution of even the small ration available today depends on the efficient working of every piece of the machine.
Therefore, whatever may be the final outcome of this, it is essential that the Germans should co-operate. But are they being given sufficient opportunity to cooperate as much as they could? I do not believe they are, and I do not believe that it is possible for them to be given that opportunity until we have responsible German administrations covering either the whole or part of Germany as soon as may be after the Foreign Ministers' Conference. I suggest that we should get on with dismantling the real war factories. There is no difference of opinion about that, and there is plenty of such dismantling to be done in the next few months. We should concentrate whatever forces of labour we may wish on that particular job, but, by the time the Foreign Ministers' Conference is over, we


shall know where we stand, and whether we can set up a responsible German authority. Let us then get together with them, and tell them that this readjustment of German industry has got to take place. I can assure the House that they themselves agree with that. There must be a readjustment of German economy, and we must get them to agree to the dispersal of the population that will be necessary, and to the readjustment of industry and the plants that can best be spared. It may not be perfect, and it may, perhaps, be even unjust. It may be that they owe us a lot more. But we have to achieve success, and we can only achieve it with their co-operation.
I would have liked to say quite a lot about the purposes of the big operation at present going on with regard to forbidden and restricted industries. I want to say this much, that there is no truth in the suggestion that British policy in this respect is influenced by the question of German competition with British trade. I hope that fact will be reported in Germany. Having said that, I would further say that our whole policy has been clouded, in my opinion, by an exaggerated fear of what is known as "war potential production." I cannot see that we can prevent any country with a seaboard from having a mercantile marine. I also cannot see the sense, in present food conditions in Germany, of trying to prevent fishermen in Germany from taking the boats that could be made available for fishing in the deeper and more distant waters beyond the already overcrowded North Sea fishing grounds. Fishing boats themselves do not constitute a fleet, and the country is badly in need of the services of such boats and men as are available. I do not know whether clocks and watches are still regarded as war potential. I believe that roller bearings, synthetic oil and rubber, of which Europe stands in need today, are regarded as war potential. So are locomotives. Everything from rolling stock to cotton shirts can be regarded as war potential.
We must be realistic about this matter. We are approaching the situation two years too late. I believe that if we had tackled the problem on a realistic basis two years ago, it might have been possible to achieve something. Is it realistic to try to build up a democratic Germany, to encourage German trade

unions to build themselves up on the lines of British trade unions, is it realistic to try to dictate policy to them in this fashion today and, at the same time, deliberately restrict instead of increase production, of which the Select Committee has told us so clearly and so rightly Germany is in such desperate need? We have declared in the Moscow Declaration that our purpose is not only the de-Nazification and demilitarisation of Germany, but the establishment of a German democracy which will be able to take its place in the ranks of the democratic and peace-loving nations. I can assure the Foreign Secretary that in Germany there are real democrats. Not all Germans are Nazis. Those who are taking that democratic stand at the present time, however shallow it may have been at the beginning, have now committed themselves, and they are our best guarantee against a resurgence of Nazism or German aggression, for it is they who have most to fear.
I conclude by echoing the words which have been uttered by the hon. Member for Abingdon. If we are to succeed we must, above all, realise that there are in Germany people who are anxious to be our friends and that our job now is to encourage and not discourage them. Given their co-operation, we can succeed. With their hostility and growing bitterness, which are being engendered by the continuation of the present situation, we can only fail.

4.42 p.m.

Mr. Emrys Roberts: I find myself in some difficulty in following the hon. Member for Attercliffe (Mr. J. Hynd), as he has spoken with such firsthand knowledge and authority and particularly as I want to refer to some of the matters which he has covered in detail I would like to refer to the proposal to dismantle over 600 factories in the British and American zones, and to record the foreboding and fear with which my hon. Friends and I on this bench view that proposal. The hon. Member for Attercliffe has stated the arguments in detail, and it is barely necessary for me to do more than say how much I agree with all that he has said on the subject. There are, however, certain questions which I would like to put to the Foreign Secretary.
First, I would like to know what exactly is the purpose of this dismantling,


because there seems to be some confusion. Is the object one of security or of reparations? There seem to me to be two entirely different objects. If the object of dismantling is one of security, then it seems to most of us that, in view of the present conditions in Germany further security measures are not necessary. As a result of the policy of unconditional surrender, the bombing of Germany and the devastated condition of Germany, which has been seen by those Members of this House who have visited the country, it is perfectly clear that from the point of view of security and dissuading Germany from making war, there is no reason for further dismantling of German production. As to the other reason—reparations—I think the proposal is directly contrary to our interests and those of Germany. Surely, we should proceed on the principle that reparations should not be forthcoming until Germany is again solvent and productive. So long as a policy of dismantling is pursued, Germany will continue to be insolvent and a charge on the British taxpayer. I would like an answer to the question whether the purpose of dismantling is for the sake of security or reparations. It seems to me that by neither approach can it be justified.
I recognise that when we speak about this matter in the House, it behoves us to speak with some restraint in view of the foreboding and gloom which the proposals have caused in Germany and the general difficulty of obtaining co-operation from the Germans at the moment. The hon. Member for Abingdon (Sir R. Glyn), who spoke with authority after his recent visit to Germany, referred to the prevailing German attitude as being predominantly one of sullenness—a sullen-ness which I believe has been aggravated and deepened by these dismantling proposals. Every responsible German leader has condemned these proposals in very sweeping terms. German leaders, who naturally look to us and to the Western Powers for co-operation, have spoken in the strongest terms about the dismantling proposals. For example, Dr. Schumacher, President of the Social Democratic Party, went so far as to say that in its psychological consequences, the dismantling proposals meant the torpedoeing of the Marshall Plan. Similarly, they have been criticised by Dr. Adenauer, President

of the Christian Democratic Union, and by one member of the Economic Council, Dr. Kaufman, who went so far as to call the proposals a diktat. We have heard that word used in other senses before now. Dr. Kaufman said that the total amount involved in the plan of August, 1947, was imposed and not agreed by negotiation. All over Western Germany I think that about eight Prime Ministers and ministers of economics have protested.
The Germans have had 14 days in which to discuss the question of the particular factories to be dismantled, but they have had no chance of negotiating the general level of the dismantling proposals. Therefore, I wish to ask the Foreign Secretary whether he really thinks there is any chance of reconciling the opinion of the German leaders to these proposals. With some authority, I say that there are some things which one cannot explain to a nation. I think any Welshman in this House can understand what I mean. There are some things imposed from" outside which can never be explained to a nation. At this moment, when our chance of establishing a solvent, productive and peaceful Germany are hanging in the balance, we shall not be able to explain this proposal to the German leaders of public opinion or to the German people. If it is persisted in, it will remain for years a bitter memory that will militate against co-operation between a peaceful Germany and the British people.
It is very difficult, as the hon. Member for Attercliffe pointed out—indeed, it is almost impossible—to understand the selection of some of these factories for dismantling. For example, soap-making factories are included. When I was in Germany a year ago I was shown a commodity which was said to be soap. The piece I saw was about half an inch thick, two inches long by two and a half inches wide. It was gritty material. It was supposed to represent the soap ration for a German for one month. On any sane approach how can the inclusion of soap-making factories in the list of factories for dismantling be justified? Other factories for dismantling are those making chains and conveyor belts.
I have particulars here of a factory in Wuppertal, an old established factory which makes chains and bolts and nuts. About 90 per cent. of its production of chains is in the shape of conveyor belts


for the German coal mines. It has been all along one of the difficulties with regard to the equipment of the German coal mines that they have not been able to get conveyor belts, and at the present time their supplies are only 50 per cent. of their requirements. How can the inclusion, in the plans for dismantling, of an old-established factory making conveyor belts for the coal mines be justified? This factory was bombed during the war by the R.A.F., but such was its importance to the German coal mines that it was repaired and put in production again. Yet now that factory has been listed for dismantling. Another complaint was mentioned by the Mayor of Bochum last week, when he said that the extent of dismantling to be undertaken was announced without clear indication of what exactly was to be dismantled.
If Europe is to come through the next few years, if this country is to come through the economic difficulties of the next few years, we shall need all the resources of every part of Europe. We shall certainly need all the coal and all the steel that Germany can give us. Before the war, German coal mines used about 800,000 tons of steel. Their present allocation is only 300,000 tons. Yet steel plants are among those which are to be most heavily dismantled under the level of industry plan. How can we expect maximum production from the coal mines of the Ruhr, which are crying out for steel, for there is a great shortage of steel in the Ruhr coal mines—how can we expect that maximum production when we have limited steel production to 65 per cent. of existing capacity? Round up with the production of coal is its transport. The hon. Member for Attercliffe referred to the requirements of steel for locomotives, rolling stock, and permanent way. The railways are some of the most important consumers of steel. On that approach, too, it is impossible to justify the dismantling of steel plants.
There is much more to be said, but other speakers will, no doubt, further explore other aspects of these proposals. Unfortunately, this House was not sitting when the level of industry plan was published in August. I think it needs to be justified in very great detail to this House. We need a very full statement from the Foreign Secretary on the level of industry plan. On the information before us it is impossible not to feel that it is one of the most significant steps that we have taken to

alienate the co-operation of the German people. In Germany there are new governments, very fragile governments, taking the first precarious steps in democracy. They need all the backing and help we can give them. We have put their ministers into a tremendous difficulty by the publication of this plan, and, unless there is urgent reconsideration of it, it may jeopardise the existence of those newly founded democratic governments. I know too well that the revised level of industry plan is an improvement on the proposals of March, 1946. I know that it is said that it is meant to imply a greater concentration and less dispersal of German industry. Nevertheless, as the "Manchester Guardian" points out in a leading article today:
The proposals for dismantling are concrete and immediate. The plan for recovery is vague and remote.
It would have been better if the proposals had been put forward in conjunction with concrete, positive proposals. I say, let the Government reconsider the plan—with our Allies, because, after all, we and the United States of America are formidable participants in these reparations. Let us reconsider this level of industry plan again. If we fail to do that, let us, at least, work out as soon as we can concrete recovery proposals. I know the difficulties facing His Majesty's Government, difficulties not of their own creation; but I think that those are two conditions we must fulfil if we are to make Germany solvent, productive and peaceful and a contributor to European recovery.

4.57 p.m.

Mr. Alex. Anderson: Like the hon. Gentleman the Member for Abingdon (Sir R. Glyn) I was a member of the sub-Committee of the Select Committee on Estimates that visited Germany last year and this year to report on expenditure by the Control Commission, and I feel that I must subscribe to his opinion that between last year and this year there has been very little sign of improvement in Germany, and, indeed, very definite signs of positive deterioration. There is more in Germany than mere sullenness. There is a feeling of complete hopelessness, a feeling that there is little prospect of ever improving or even maintaining their very low material scales. Inevitably, also, in the minds of the German people there is a


tendency to put the blame for this lack of quick recovery at the door of the occupying Powers. However unfair or unjust that may be, we must, at least, admit that such a tendency is natural, and we must take the utmost care that we, as an occupying Power, do nothing which will give colour to such an accusation.
After reviewing the position of Germany today, I think that we in this House and in this country should remember one or two fundamental changes that have taken place in the last four or five years. First of all, when we talk of Germany, we are accustomed to think of the Germany of 1938, 1939 and 1940, that sprawling State which spread over the whole centre of Europe, which had a very high industrial potential, and which had an economy, even then, which, while not quite balanced, was very nearly a balanced economy. Today, Germany, even if we unite the four zones, is a dwarfed, truncated Germany, which has less economic value. It can no longer feed itself, and it is no longer capable, apart altogether from dismantling of factories, of anything like the level of industry which it then possessed.
Secondly, in this Germany we have been given the British zone to control; and in the British zone we have problems of a complexity and difficulty which obtain in no other of the zones. Our British zone is very highly industrialised; it contains the great seaport of Hamburg, the third biggest port in Europe; it contains the great industrial area of the Ruhr, and if the Ruhr is the heart of industrial Germany it is also the dynamo of Western Europe, and anything which affects the Ruhr affects the whole economy of Western Europe. It is a zone which has suffered more from war, in damage and dislocation, than any other zone in Germany. It is full of displaced persons and refugees who have fled to it from the rest of Germany. Today, it has the worst balanced economy in Germany. Prior to 1939, this North-West German zone imported from Eastern Germany 900,000 tons of bread grains and wheat crops: today such an import is completely non-existent.
In our approach to the British problem in the North-West zone, and to the difficulties of the Foreign Secretary in carrying out a British policy, we should also

remember that in the North-West German zone we are a British agency carrying out a quadripartite policy with which very often we are not in sympathy, and that we have not a free hand to take the course we should like to take. That means we often have to indulge in compromise, because our actions are not governed by purely economic considerations; we have to take into account political implications of the greatest gravity. Until we have made up our minds what is to be the ultimate position of the residual Germany, it is impossible to have a coherent and consistent approach to the German problem. Our problem in Germany today, as I see it, is first of all to restore German economy to such a level that Germany can live as a decent and a useful member of the European comity of nations. That is our very first problem. Secondly, as far as we possibly can, by influence and direction we must so change the German approach to life that we can get a more democratic and a more truly peaceful outlook for the Europe of the future.
In the few remarks I intend to make, I should like to deal first with the instrument with which we are trying to do that—the Control Commission. We are trying to achieve that through a small body of people who were hurriedly put into Germany in 1945, and who have had various vicissitudes since then. We are trying to influence a Germany which is gradually resuming the control of its own activities, and it seems to me a most elementary thing in the conduct of the Control Commission that, as so many absurd functions must presently disappear, and as the numbers of people in the Control Commission run down, when we are no longer directing but only influencing Germany, the quality of those remaining should improve. Therefore, to begin with, we shall be forced back upon certain mechanical means in seeing that we have the proper staff.
First and foremost, we require a careful selection. It was admitted to us in evidence that there had been a very great improvement in the quality of the material during the last year. However, I suggest that there should also be a re-selection board for those whose functions in Germany end, and who are transferred to another section of the Control Commission. Our people in Germany require


a reasonable standard of living, a reasonable standard of wages, and a real security in the job they are trying to do. Nobody can expect a person of quality in this country to sacrifice the hopes of the future for, at most, a three years' contract with the Control Commission. No matter how difficult it may be, I believe it is the duty of this House to insist upon an attempt at some form of integration of those working in Germany with the Civil Service at home.
Next, we should give to those people who are our servants in Germany reasonable protection against malicious and untrue attacks. Everywhere we went in Germany we found the greatest indignation at many of the attacks that have been made upon the Control Commission staff and the Armed Forces in Germany. I do not contend for one moment that the Control Commission staff is perfect; far from it. I have no doubt that, in ability and in conduct, they approximate to the ability and conduct of any other body of people. I find they do not resent being criticised; they have nothing but the highest praise to give to the regular journalists who write from Germany about the Germans; but I believe they have a legitimate grievance against the hordes of itinerant scribblers who visit Germany for a weekend, who palpitate through the Northwest zone at I do not know how many miles per gallon, and then come back to this country and, when they have become properly dehydrated, write of the luxury and immorality of the people who have been their hosts and given them every hospitality.
I have a boy in the Armed Forces in Germany, and I resent bitterly the suggestion that British boys and girls, and British men and women, are doing those things in the Control Commission which are alleged against them. It just is not true. These men and women are the servants of this House and this country, and they should get some protection. I believe that half the criticism arises from ignorance in this country of the work these people are doing and the important task they are trying to carry out, and it might be an excellent thing to arrange for regular broadcasts to this country, given by those at the top of the Control Commission, in order to explain their work and their difficulties.
Failure to do that will have three effects upon our staff in Germany. First and

foremost, we shall destroy the morale of the people we are asking to carry out distasteful tasks. Secondly, we shall discourage recruiting of the best type of people for the Control Commission. Thirdly, we shall put an undue penalty on the many decent people who have done good work out there, but who will find service in the Control Commission in Germany is a handicap and not a recommendation when applying for a job at home. We must pay particular attention to the quality and conditions of our staff if we are to set Germany on its feet again. It will not be easy; it will be very nearly impossible.
As was said by the hon. Member for Abingdon, the only thought in the mind of the German today is food. It is pitiful and pathetic to find such an obsession with the absolute necessities of life in a civilised community in the twentieth century. There are only two ways in which Germany can get food. One is by an increase in the productivity of Germany itself. Here again, it is no use burking the fact that in the North-West British zone we have an area which is not of high fertility; even if the most intensive cultivation is carried out, and even though we utilise to the full supplies of machinery, manures, seeds and that sort of thing, we can make only a small inroad into the needs of the German population for food. German food, especially for the new Germany, must be purchased by her exports, which brings us immediately to the question of the new level of industry, and the dismantling and demolition of certain factories in Germany.
I contend there is a good deal of nonsense talked about the dismantling. There are a whole lot of people who have been shedding crocodile tears about the tragedy of the dismantling of works in Germany, but who have not a tear to shed over the dismantling of works on the Clyde, in Motherwell, in Jarrow, and in the rest of Britain. We must face up to the position that there is, and has been, a definite war potential in Germany which quite easily could be isolated, and, secondly, a type of industry which has a potential use for war and for peace. There cannot be the slightest objection to the destruction or dismantling of the 500 A1 category plants, which were built for war purposes only, and have never turned out any articles for civilian use. They are an excrescence on the German economy,


and there can be no justification for them. Secondly, there are considerable numbers of factories which have a potential for war and for peace, and naturally such of these factories as can be preserved should be preserved, provided they can be immediately used in the German economy. We have heard a good deal in this Debate about the bitter protests coming from Germany in regard to dismantling factories. Did anyone expect they would not protest? They are bound to protest, and the more we show weakness on our side, the more protests there will be. It would be a crime for this House to weaken the hands of the people in Germany, who, once a decision has been made, have to carry it through. It is a very distasteful job, and they do not want criticism in regard to dismantling—

Mr. Stokes: If we do not agree, are we to keep silent?

Mr. Anderson: I cannot imagine the hon. Member keeping silent, even if he happened to agree. The position we must face is this. A level of industry for Germany has been fixed. I do not know whether or not it is a statistical figure, but I know that it has been fixed on the 1936 level, and the 1936 level of industry in Germany was not a bad one. I know also that when these plants scheduled for demolition or dismantling have been removed, there will still remain a very much larger industrial capacity than the Germans will be able to utilise for the next 10 years. All the evidence we received was to the effect that there was a sufficient surplus capacity, and that Germany's capacity could not be reached for 10 years. I believe that Germany's industry will gain more by concentration than it will lose by the removal of these plants and machines to regions where they can be more rapidly used. The best we can do is to submit that this is the finish of the dismantling programme, and, having taken the decision and published it, stick to it and strengthen the hands of our people who have to carry the programme into effect.
I wish now to say a few words on something affecting our long-term policy, namely, education, if such a thing can be done by the people of this country. I believe that in the re-education of German youth we have an opportunity to turn the

country from war to peace. It will be a long-term job, and it will require patience and devotion. I agree that we have an idealist to try to carry out the work, and he will need the utmost assistance that can be given him by the Press and the people of this country. We require more than interchanges. It should be made possible for specialists in education to do a tour of duty in Germany to help in reorganising German education.
In this connection, I would mention that there is a desperate shortage of books in Germany. We are suffering from a shortage here, but the whole of German education is being frustrated by the lack of textbooks and exercise books. I assure the House that more paper is being used here by football pools than is used by the whole of Germany. Surely, it should be possible for every child in a British school to send an exercise book to Germany. The books could be collected and transported to Germany, and such a scheme would be a gesture as well as a real contribution towards German education.
In conclusion, I would say that while we have not had complete success in Germany, we have at least done a good job within the limits prescribed to us. I believe that future historians will pay tribute to what has been done by this country, in the midst of her own needs, to help the defeated enemy.

5.17 p.m.

Mr. Nigel Birch: The hon. Member for Attercliffe (Mr. J. Hynd) made the most devastating attack I have ever heard on the policy for which he himself was responsible for two years. Unfortunately, the scales have fallen from his eyes not before but after leaving Damascus. In those dreadful words of his, we are two years too late. I should like to speak in terms of my proposed Amendment to the Address which appears on the Order Paper, namely:
that Your Majesty's Government are pursuing a policy in Germany which is morally wrong and disastrous in practice.
The Select Committee in their Report state at the beginning of their conclusions:
The burden of supporting Germany in peace is proving as irksome as the burden of defeating her in war.
"Irksome" is not, I think, a very happy word. Those who have lost relatives, friends and comrades-in-arms find


it rather more than irksome. I am bound to say that now, while in peace we are doing things in Germany which are morally wrong and things which are politically dangerous, and while we are spending £180 million to permit these crimes and follies, I find the situation something worse than irksome.
I will speak first about de-Nazification, arrestable categories and so-called militarists. It seems to me that we are proceeding in Germany on the principle that two wrongs make a right, and that we are copying some of the more disgusting things done by Nazis and Communists. I do not believe that people in this country really know what is going on. The Foreign Secretary, when speaking on Germany in this House on 4th August, in the course of some not very well-knit remarks, said this about de-Nazification:
I am now told that it is wrong to de-Nazify. According to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Kensington (Mr. Law), I should not put these people out of office. I should allow them to go on. But they were under the Nazis. They had the very highest offices in the State."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4th August, 1947; Vol. 441, c. 1094.]
We all agree that Nazis who had the very highest offices in the State had to go. I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman did not wish to mislead the House but could he really have known what the figures were? By 1st August this year, 1,949,000 people had been examined and 334,000 had been dismissed from office; 23,000 were in concentration camps awaiting trial, a great majority of whom had been in concentration camps since the end of the war. Only 148 of these have been charged with actual crimes, 490 have been permanently interned as dangerous to the occupation, while, for good measure, the Roy Scouts have been banned. The population of this country is almost exactly double that of the British zone. What we have done there is equivalent to putting 700,000 people out of office here. Surely, there cannot be 700,000 people in the very highest offices here. Let me give an example of what it means. In Hamburg, one-third of the teachers have been sacked, and as a result of that 85 per cent. of those now teaching are over 40. Hitler carried out no purge of teachers whatever, and I cannot think that one-third of the teachers there held the very highest offices. It does not make sense. If we were to carry out this colossal

purge, surely it was vital to see that the rule of law was maintained and that impartial justice was observed.
I would like to draw the very earnest attention of the House to this: Zonal Executive Instruction No. 3, which was issued in March this year, lays down the following provisions as to how the panels which do the de-Nazifying are to be selected, that is, the people who judge whether a man should lose his job and his money, and be turned out of his home. This is what it said:
The first criterion for all members of the de-Nazification panel is that they should be confirmed anti-Nazis; that is to say, they must have in the past given evidence of their positive antipathy to the Nazi regime. Only if it proves impossible to find confirmed anti-Nazis should non-Nazis be allowed on the panel. To a considerable extent a man's poltical views will indicate the strength of his opposition to Nazi principles. In industrial regions German panels and committees must be predominantly, but not exclusively, composed of trade unionists and representatives of the workers' interests; in other regions representation of trade unions must also be provided where possible. It must not be forgotten that the Nazis and many of their sympathisers had as their first object the destruction of working-class organisations, and it is particularly desirable that these organisations should be given a chance to name their oppressors.
It is perfectly right that people should be given the chance of naming their oppressors, but it is not right that somebody who is complaining should also be the judge. Yet that is what is happening. What we are doing is what has happened in people's courts in National Socialist and Communist countries, against which all Governments of this country have most bitterly protested. It is well known that the operation of these panels is grossly corrupt. In Münster, the other day, 39 members of the de-Nazification authority were charged with corruption. It is fairly well known that there is a black market in testimonials from Jews, saying that they have been oppressed, which can be bought for 500 or 600 marks. That is what is going on in Germany. So much for de-Nazification. Now for arrestable categories. As I say, there are 23,000 people in concentration camps, most of whom have been in those camps since the end of the war.

Mr. Cecil Poole: Before the hon. Gentleman leaves the question of de-Nazification, will he tell the House how he would compose these panels? He


will appreciate that they must be composed either of Nazis or non-Nazis, and he does not seem to like the non-Nazis.

Mr. Birch: What is wrong is that somebody who has been in a concentration camp should be put on one of these panels. That is what has been happening. That is what the Zonal Executive Instruction encourages. Now, with regard to arrestable categories. The worst case is that of the Waffen S.S. That was an ordinary fighting formation, and many of its members were nine years old when Hitler came to power. They joined up in the war at 17, and fought all through it. They have been in gaol ever since. Everybody in that formation above the rank of sergeant has been so treated. They are now to be tried for belonging to an organisation adjudged criminal at Nuremberg. The trial turns on the question: Did they know the organisation was criminal? The first question they are asked is: Did you know that the Jews were persecuted? They say, "Yes," and they probably get a small fine or a period of imprisonment. They are sent out either with a permanent criminal record, or as category III men, which means that they cannot vote, their property is taken away, they have to report their movements to the police, and they cannot get any job except breaking stones. It does not make sense to treat like that men who can have had no responsibility whatever for the rise of the Nazis.
A word or two about militarists, and in answer to the hon. Member for Rugby (Mr. W. J. Brown), who seems to want to know what they are, I will explain. The so-called militarists can be dealt with by the Special Branch of Public Safety, in the same way as the Nazis are dealt with. Their money and jobs can be taken away, and they can be immured perpetually without trial. It is laid down in Zonal Instruction No. 54 that a militarist is:
Any former regular officer of the German Navy, Army or Air Force, or any other officer, N.C.O. or man of the German forces, who, by reason of his disposition, past activities, and professional military knowledge, is considered by the military governor as likely to foster or resuscitate the military ambitions of the German nation.

Mr. W. J. Brown: That sounds like a Communist definition of a class enemy.

Mr. Birch: The hon. Member is quite right. It means that anybody can be shut up permanently without trial if the military government does not happen to take a fancy to him. At the concentration camp at Adelheide there are many people shut up for this reason who have no chance whatever of getting out. As a final touch of meanness, all war pensions, even for the old imperial German Army, have been stopped. There are old generals and sergeant-majors over 80 years of age, with their wives, who have no income whatever because their pensions have been stopped. It seems to me that this is 18B with a vengeance. It is the use of the lettre de cachet. Some Members justify this, as the hon. Member for Lichfield (Mr. C. Poole) did, on the grounds that the Nazis are really the gentry. That is untrue. It is damnable to take that line. The Nazis were a cross-section of the people—

Mr. C. Poole: I said nothing that bore the slightest resemblance to that.

Mr. Birch: If I misinterpreted the hon. Gentleman, I apologise. I think the real opposition put up to the Nazis was that put up by the poor old Conservatives. [Laughter.] Yes, that is true. The Nazis were a Socialist party, pursuing the same ecomonic policy, down to the last detail, which is being pursued here. That is absolutely true. If one wants to see what a common man looks like, one has only to look at Hitler. It is impossible to think of any policy more precisely designed to defeat the ends which we have in view than the policy of de-Nazification.
This has a great effect on the German economy. It is doubtful whether there are 350,000 men of any ability in the whole zone. We are left with the inefficient. It seems to me that the hon. Member for Attercliffe now seems to realise, after two-and-a-half years, that by far the most important thing, after all the devastation caused by the war, was to get German industry going again. We on this side, have always said that that was essential. But we are doing more to destroy than we are to build. It is true, as the hon. Member for Attercliffe said just now, that food is not everything. Food can be had for goods or hard currency. I would like the Government to tell us how many tons of Dutch vegetables rotted this summer because the Germans had not the goods to send for them. Food can be had all right if one has the goods.
The reason why there are no goods is because of the paralysis of the whole economy. The main reason is that we have been waiting all the time for an agreement with Russia, which we must very well have known would never come. There have been far too many marks about and we have tried to meet the resulting inflation by high taxation and insane price-fixing. Coal costing 30 marks per ton is sold for 15 marks; milk costing 25 pfennigs a litre to produce is sold for 15 pfennigs. The fixed price of fertilisers is 50 per cent. of the cost price and one-seventeenth of the price in the black market. What happens when we do that? What happens is inefficiency and corruption. The whole machinery is corrupt in Germany, including practically every single civil servant. No business man has any incentive to produce; the workman has nothing to go for and, therefore, he barters and goes out foraging in the countryside. The whole civil service becomes rotten. I say to hon. Gentlemen opposite that this is full of lessons for us here.
I want to say a word about factory removal. I hope that anyone who speaks against the removal of factories will not be accused of stabbing the Foreign Secretary in the back—a form of attack to which he is a martyr. I would point out that in the last Debate my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley (Mr. H. Macmillan) made a clear declaration on this point, to which I wholeheartedly subscribe. He said that we must accept that Western Germany requires more industrialisation and not less. Therefore, factory removals and reparations must stop at once. I wholly agree. The Prime Minister, in his letter to the right hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. C. Davics), said something rather misleading. He said that there was no question of beginning to dismantle; it had been proceeding continuously for a long time, and he saw no reason for stopping it at the moment when we were proposing to issue a list of available plant. That is misleading. Up to the middle of May, only seven plants had been removed and only 28 were in the course of removal, while now we are proposing to remove 682. The scale of the whole thing is immensely accelerated.
This operation has been defended on two grounds. The first is that the Germans cannot use the factories any way, and they will only rust. That is not true. A

great many of the factories which are to be removed are now being used. There is the classic case of the Holmag firm which was encouraged to exhibit at Hanover Fair, took large orders, and is now to be removed. One cannot shift people around in Germany. There is nowhere to put them. When you close down a factory, you close down production.
The second line of argument is that the factories could be used elsewhere. I believe that to be complete nonsense. How are they to be transported? One of the paragraphs on coal in the Select Committee's Report points out that if coal production reaches 260,000 tons a day—which is 40,000 tons under the target—there will not be enough wagons to shift it away from the pitheads. If that is so, and if all the wagons are to be used for shifting rusty factories to Russia and not for moving the coal, how are we ever going to get economy going at all? I am not surprised that Lord Pakenham was laughed at, at Dusseldorf on Monday, when he was talking on those lines.
The Committee on Estimates did not mention the most important reason of the lot against it—the devastating political effect. If we want to make Western Germany a part of the Western family of nations, we must pay some attention to what the Germans feel. The trouble is we have stuck to the carcase of a dead policy. The assumption made in 1944 and 1943 was that Germany was the only menace to peace. Does anyone think that Germany is the only menace to peace now? The assumption was also made that there would be continuing agreement among the Great Powers. Does anyone think that there is continuing agreement among the Great Powers? The Foreign Secretary not only staked his reputation on solving the Palestine problem, but also on getting agreement on Germany, and he is going to lose both bets. He will do that at terrible cost to this country and terrible cost to the people of Germany, and terrible cost to Western civilisation. We are weakening all the time. He will never get an agreement with Russia while we are weak. The only agreement which the Russians ever loyally observed was their agreement with Germany in 1939, and they did so because Germany was strong. Now that we are weak, the more we truckle to them the more virulent is their abuse of us.
I regret that the opportunity of the Marshall Plan has not been taken to say that Germany will be helped to live, and that we will bring to an end all the follies which we have carried on over the last two years under the direction of the hon. Member for Attercliffe. I agree wholeheartedly with every point put forward last August by my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and I stick to it. But we have to recognise that we are two and a half years too late. We have weakened in this country mainly because we have had a poltroon as Chancellor of the Exchequer, but also because of the devastating policy we have pursued in Palestine and Germany. I hope that even at the twelfth hour we may repent. If we do not, the verdict of history will be:

Quos Deus uvlt perdere dementat prius.

5.40 p.m.

Mr. Bowles: The Debate so far has concentrated upon Germany and upon two approaches to it. The one is the moral approach and the second approach that of the British Government. I am going to approach Germany for a few minutes from rather a different direction. I have been in Germany. I spent some weeks there in the early part of this year, and I took some time during the recent Recess to go to Poland. It might be of interest to the House—and I am glad the Foreign Secretary is in his place—if I conveyed to the House and to him in particular some of the feelings of that people numbering some 24 million. That was the only country which really had been physically moved under the Potsdam Agreement. The House will remember that the Russians took a good deal of Eastern Poland and under that agreement Poland recovered Lower Silesia, referred to in Poland today as the "recovered territories." They are much more industralised than the territories which she lost in the East.
The House will remember that on 1st September, 1939, Hitler started the war by an unannounced bombardment of Warsaw. The fight for the capture of Warsaw and Poland lasted 29 days and then Poland gave in. Then in 1944, there was a terrible uprising which lasted some 63 days, in which a great deal more damage was done to Warsaw in particular. In 1945, Hitler knew he could no longer remain in Warsaw and he instructed his

troops—75,000 that were left—to raze that city to the ground street by street. The older buildings they incinerated by ordinary fire, and they blew up those more strongly built. It might be important for the House to recollect that the Polish people lost six million of their population during those six years of war. These things might be borne in mind when we speak about the Germans, and about the state of Europe as we view it this distance away. Although we have had friends and relatives lost and cities bombarded, when we remember that Warsaw was 85 per cent. destroyed and all its bridges blown, we can understand something of the feelings which exist there.
It has also to be borne in mind that there was not a Poland in 1913. It was then in occupation by Germany, Austria and Russia, and had been for 150 years. Poland, more or less as it is now, has been fought over by the Russians and Germans for 1,000 years, and how the Poles have suffered it is impossible to understand. They have a very great hatred for the Russians because they remember how the Russians treated them only in the early years of the war, but they have a worse feeling for the Germans because in the Auschwitz concentration camp, which I visited, some 3 million to 4 million Poles, mostly Jews, were done to death in circumstances which are quite impossible to describe, though I will try.
I have been there and it is a concentration camp stretching in all directions. One particular part I visited was where the extermination took place in rather a slow manner. The people were herded into a series of bunks about six feet by six feet, and eight to ten people slept there each night. When it was cold weather there was one brazier with one pail of coal to keep the place warm, The sheds were about the length of this Chamber and when the winter was on, they opened the windows in order to make them quite cold. When the summer and the hot weather came, they kept the windows on the top of the shed shut in order to make it more horrible. In the male urinals there was no water, which added to the unpleasant smell, and in a shed about as long as a cricket pitch where the water was running 10,000 people had to wash in an hour. This will give the House some idea of the impossible task set to the people who were living in this camp


and none of them, of course, survived more than three months. This is something relevant to the question of how Germany is regarded in other parts of Europe outside this country and that is why I mention these facts.
The next part was the gas chamber. I saw the place where the trains came in. If a German officer were killed in Warsaw 200 people, including children, were picked up and taken to Auschwitz concentration camp. There was there a large ferro-concrete building and the people were herded into it. They were offered a towel and a piece of soap. They thought they were going to have a bath with the result that they took off their clothes, but they found they were not to have a bath. Instead, they were shoved into the gas chamber and in ten minutes they were dead. They were taken out of the gas chamber and examined by dental surgeons, who extracted any gold in their teeth to build up Hitler's gold reserve. If any hon. Member has been to Hamburg he will have seen hundreds and thousands of rings in that city, the owners of which cannot be traced.
These bodies were burned in the furnaces and this was going on at the rate of 15,000 to 35,000 a day. There is no question about this as we have had evidence given by General Hesse—not the man who came over here—and he admitted that he gave orders and knew that 3 million people were done to death in that camp. Since then more records have come to light and the figure is nearer 3½ to 4 million, as I have said. Apart from that, those bodies which could not be burned in the furnaces were burned on large piles which were set alight with oil and petrol. I understand it could be smelt many miles away. I saw human bones, about the size of the nail on one's finger, on the floor of the building where people had been burned to death. Then to my horror—and I think the House will agree with me—I saw one or two charabancs coming into the camp with girls between 13 and 18 years of age who were sight-seeing. When I went back to Warsaw I protested to Ministers—whose names the House will forgive me for not mentioning—and I told them that this would be intolerable in England. One Minister said, "You must understand that we cannot let our people forget." I said, "You are a Communist," and he

said, "Yes, we are Communists but we can't forgive the Germans about this." I said, "If Germany becomes Communist would you feel the same?" and he answered, "If it were a Communist Germany perhaps we would have a little more kindness." The real answer is that the Poles are Poles first and Communists and Socialists next, but they are Poles, and, remembering their history, the House would do well to make some allowance for the. point of view of these people.
The Minister then asked, "What do the people of England think of Poland?" I answered that I did not know. I certainly did not know very much about Poland myself. I said, "I think they regarded Poland before the war as the cesspool of Europe and a Ghetto for the Jews. I think they now regard you as a puppet State of the Soviet Government." He said, "Why do they think that?" I said "I suppose it's because you always seem to vote the same way and to abstain at the same time as M. Vyshinsky." He said, "And you always seem to vote the same way as the United States." I asked him," Why do you not, for instance, take part in the Marshall Plan? "That is the position. I am glad that the Foreign Secretary is here. I will try, in one long, political sentence, to sum up what I believe the viewpoint of the Poles is. They have a more balanced territory. They want peace primarily. They want their Western frontiers maintained. They are very concerned about the position of their Western frontiers. This is where Russia, alone of the three signatories to the Potsdam Agreement, has said, "We' will support you in your Western frontiers." Mr. Marshall has said that Germany may have to have some back. The Foreign Secretary has said that this is a matter to be settled at the November Conference of Foreign Ministers. However much we dislike this Agreement, the Western frontiers are now a fait accompli. I said that the British Government, and other Western Governments would not seek to change those frontiers by force. I said that I believed that was the opinion which would be current in this country.
I want the House therefore to realise what the position is. The Poles have taken over the mines, and the iron and steel works in Lower Silesia from the Germans. They are running them, but whether efficiently or not I cannot


not tell, because I am not a mining engineer or a steel worker. The Poles are proud of their efforts and they do not want to be disturbed again. They are frightened that under the Marshall Plan—this is a point I want the House and the Foreign Secretary particularly to understand—they may suffer. I will tell the House why the Poles have not come into that plan. I do not think they are dictated to by Russia. That may seem a strange thing to say, but I believe it to be true. They are trying to do in Poland what we are trying to do in this country, stand on their own feet and not be dependent upon American capitalism. They are frightened of the Marshall Plan, which is presumably designed to set all European economy upon its feet again, and German economy in particular because it is the centre of European economy. They visualise American capitalism using a rearmed, revived and rehabilitated Germany for an attack against the Soviet Union, in the course of which attack Poland would, naturally, be overrun again.
That is a view which anybody who has been there recently will agree is the correct one. I did not go there with the hon. Member for Gateshead (Mr. Zilliacus) or anybody else. I went by myself, and I went exactly where I intended to go. I was told by a Polish Minister, two days after I arrived, "Go exactly where you like. I don't want you to go back to England and say you only went where you were permitted to go." I went down a coal mine. I stayed with the coal miners in one of their holiday camps at a place called Landek, which is five miles from the Czechoslovakia frontier. These camps are not just ordinary camps. They are the old, country summer resorts of the German capitalists and barons now taken over by the Polish Government, for which they paid no compensation, naturally. They did it when the territory was seized under the Agreement. I saw an example of the kind of culture which is going on. If we were to take some of our bigger mansions which various earls and dukes find they cannot sell at a reasonable price and use them, as Himley Hall may be used, for holiday places for the miners of this country—[Interruption]. I certainly think that place might be used.
The Poles are a proud people. However many times they may have been conquered they have never ceased to speak Polish, even though it was verboten to do so for 150 years under the German occupation. I had no preconceived ideas in going to Poland, and I am speaking to the House in a completely objective way. I beg the Foreign Secretary to realise that there are 24 million people in that country, which is the only one in Europe that is exporting coal. I believe that this year the Poles are exporting eggs to us. Russia is helping Poland by paying half the cost of rebuilding Warsaw and by giving them a bridge across the Vistula. Poland may be able to contribute a great deal, not only to the feeding of Europe but to some extent in other directions as well. I believe there is a trade agreement with Germany at the present time.
I realise that the Foreign Secretary has a tremendous job. He has to meet the other Foreign Ministers next month. He has obviously not had an opportunity of staying a fortnight or more as I did in Poland. He has not had time to stay there more than a day on his way elsewhere. With a longer stay one can get some better idea of the situation. I am not criticising my right hon. Friend at all in saying this. The Poles are worried. They feel that my right hon. Friend should come down on the side of the Soviet Union and support those Western frontiers, and that Mr. Marshall might do so also. That would give satisfaction to that country, which is making a brave effort to rebuild itself.
I remember one afternoon seeing a crowd of people being handed picks, axes and shovels. I asked, "What is this?" The reply was, "Rebuilding Warsaw." I said, "These people look like professors, school-teachers and artists." That is what they were. The President, the Prime Minister and the Chief of the General Staff all take their turn in rebuilding Warsaw. We might not agree with some of the ways in which they are doing it, because we do not understand those people very well. They give some preference, not to the building of workingclass houses in all that desolation, but to the rebuilding of places like churches. Hitler said, "The Poles have no culture, and we will first of all start on their professional, and educational centres, their monuments,


souvenirs and churches." We can therefore understand why the Poles want everybody to realise that they are a cultured nation. That is why they are giving a higher priority to the rebuilding of churches, museums, monuments, palaces of kings, etc., than we would. I think that is ridiculous in a Socialist society, but after a short time you begin to understand.
The Poles are terrified of German rearmament and revival. I daresay they will be watching this Debate. They may not be able to understand why there is so much sympathy—rational sympathy—exhibited by hon. Members on all sides of the House with the Germans. They have been hit worse than this country. I thank the House for listening to what some hon. Members may think to be slightly irrelevant matter. I doubt whether it is irrelevant and I ask the House to say that it is not. It is a contribution from another point of view to the Debate. I hope that the Foreign Secretary, whom I am delighted to see in his place, will bear in mind some of the things which I have said.

5.59 p.m.

Sir Peter Macdonald: I was very glad to hear the speech by the hon. Member for Nuneaton (Mr. Bowles), after his return from his travels in Europe, and to hear that he has enjoyed himself. I wonder whether, during his stay in Poland, when he seems to have met leading Polish politicians, he met Mr. Mikolajczyk, or whether he has any information about that gentleman's whereabouts.

Mr. Bowles: I will endeavour to explain. I did not see Mr. Mikolajczyk. I was down in the Southern territory until Monday. I came back on Wednesday. I was asked by a Cabinet Minister of the present Government whether I had seen him, and I said that I had not. I realise that it was a pity that I had not done so, for it would have made my tour a little more impartial, but I am perfectly certain that I could have done so. All the stories in the Press about what is happening to him must be creating suspicion against the Polish Government.

Sir P. Macdonald: I will not pursue this any further. I just wanted information. There seems to be very serious doubt as to the safety or the whereabouts of that

very great Polish politician, for whom we in this country should have and do have a very high regard. I will return now to the subject of this Debate, Germany, and the various questions that have arisen out of the Report of the Select Committee of which I had the honour of being a member. I was very interested to hear the speech of the hon. Member for Attercliffe (Mr. J. Hynd), who was at one time respoftsible for the affairs of Germany in this House. The views which he expressed today have little resemblance to those which he expressed from the Front Bench when he was responsible for German affairs.
One point has been raised to which I must refer, and that is the question of the level of industry and the policy with regard to the dismantling of factories—that has been dealt with by various people—and the question whether or not it is morally right. I maintain that it is morally right, and I therefore join issue with the hon. Member for Flint (Mr. Birch). I did not meet a German when I was there who disagreed with that, though they did disagree on its political expediency at the present time. I agree that, after two and a half years, to get out a list of the factories to be dismantled, at a time when we have partly handed over responsibility for government to the German people, when we have handed over the police to the German people, at the beginning of what promises to be another very severe winter, and at a time when the Germans do not know whether they will be able to maintain their low food supplies, is the stupidest thing we could do from a political point of view. On the other hand, not for one moment will I allow charges to be made, as there have been in various newspapers and in this House, against the Control Commission for the responsibility of this policy. The Control Commission are carrying out the policy of Potsdam and Yalta.

Mr. Stokes: And Quebec.

Sir P. Macdonald: Quebec, too. At any rate, it was a three-Power policy. It is agreed on all hands today that that policy is completely obsolete. We all know why. One party, Russia, has completely disavowed it. Russia has taken the line she generally does when she occupies a country. She annexes the country. That is what has happened with Germany. Russia


has no intention, and has had no intention for a very long time, of carrying out the policy of Yalta or Potsdam, and, what is more, she had done and is doing everything possible to prevent the setting up of a Western German Government. The sooner that is recognised the better.
The Foreign Secretary is in a very difficult position, but he can have no illusions about Russia's intentions in Germany today. Mr. Marshall has no illusions and our French friends have no illusions. It is just as well that the Foreign Secretary should recognise the fact and get on with the job of creating some form of central government for Western Germany. Otherwise the present chaotic conditions, which everybody abhors, will be bound to go on indefinitely. The responsibility for the policy of dismantling factories which is now being carried out should be placed where it belongs, on the shoulders of the Foreign Secretary and not on the Control Commission who are carrying out his policy. I am convinced that most of the people we met in the Control Commission are quite conscientiously carrying out this policy. They are very conscientious people. They are carrying out this policy which they dislike and which many of them, if not all, think is from a political point of view wrong.
I, therefore, hope that the Foreign Secretary will realise that a decision must be made now, and it must be a decision not only by this Government but also by the American Government as to what policy shall be pursued in future. There are all sorts of rumours, and there are many voices in America on this subject. Two hundred American Senators and Congressmen visited Europe this year. Most of them went to Germany. Many of them are publicly expressing their disapproval of the policy, and I have no doubt that when they go home, they will prevail on their Government to disregard this policy of dismantling factories, and we shall be left carrying the baby. If the policy breaks down, as it may easily do, our prestige will suffer.
I hope that a decision will be made now by the Foreign Secretary, backed up by Mr. Marshall, whether to go on with the policy, to postpone it or to withdraw it altogether. That decision should be made now and it should be realised that it is a united policy. Whatever policy is decided upon, this House should support

it. From the moral point of view there is no doubt whatsoever that Germany should pay reparations. No German I met denied that. After all, it is not our policy. It is an Allied policy. The Commission that went round selecting the plant for dismantling had representatives from all our Allies, some of whom identified and claimed plant that was stolen from their countries during the German occupation. They felt they had a moral claim to such plant. If we now throw over that policy after it has been decided upon and revised, they will rightly consider that they are being let down by us, because most of this plant is in our zone.

Mr. Stokes: Would the hon. Member tell the House how many plants have been allocated?

Sir P. Macdonald: I am told they have all been.

Mr. Stokes: No. A very small minority.

Sir P. Macdonald: I know that some have been allocated. I was interested to see in the Prorogation Speech the statement:
My Ministers have persisted in their efforts to establish true democracy in Germany … and have encouraged a gradual transfer of powers to the German people.
I want to know how far that is true. I admit that we have encouraged free elections in Germany. We have encouraged elections for a candidate instead of a list, as in totalitarian countries, and in that sense we have tried to see that there were democratic elections. We have encouraged the setting up of Landa Governments and Kreis governments, and in that respect we have tried to establish democracy. We have also handed to these people services such as the police force and the administration of justice, but how far are justice and law being observed today in Germany? It is a fact, which we were given in evidence, that over 80 per cent. of industry in Germany today is carried on in the black market. Why is that? We were also told that it is recognised by everybody in Germany that most of the industry is being carried on in the black market, that this breach of the law is recognised and supported in most cases by the police themselves.
That is a serious state of affairs and why does it exist? Obviously because the economic laws of Germany have not


been given proper consideration. What is happening? In most cases we have handed over industries to the German people, but to what extent have we handed over control of these industries? Mostly we have handed them over in theory but not in practice, and if you consult any German engaged in industry today, he will say that he is controlled and frustrated at every turn and is completely unable to get his industries started. That is largely due to the policy of this Government. In this large establishment of the Control Commission there is one department called the Governmental Sub-Commission which has been set up by this Government for the purpose of instructing the new Germany in the new democracy, and it has from the outset tried to socialise German industry.

Mr. Skeffington-Lodge: Quite right too.

Sir P. Macdonald: Well, they have not been very successful, and that is why today there are all these controls and the frustration that goes with the nationalisation of industry, which we have in this country. That is why industry has been driven into the black market in Germany as it is here.

Mr. Stokes: Oh, no.

Sir P. Macdonald: My advice to the Foreign Secretary is to bring these bright boys home. That Department of the Control Commission is composed of young men from universities and elsewhere, none of whom have any experience of industry at all, who are trying to teach the Germans democracy and how to run their own industries. The Germans one meets say that they are sick to death of these people, because all they do is to attach a bureaucracy to them which strangles their industry and prevents them from getting on their feet and off our backs. I urge the Foreign Secretary to consider that matter seriously, because it has been the cause of a great deal of the delay and frustration in getting German industry going and also because we are asking America to take over 85 per cent. of our own cost of occupation in addition to her own, and she will not tolerate that ideology attached to any schemes of German rehabilitation.

Mr. Stokes: Did not the hon. Member come across anybody during his visit who could have told him that even the

Americans are now convinced that a real condition of the resuscitation of industry in the Ruhr, admitted by Germans of all classes, is the public ownership and control of German heavy industry.

Sir P. Macdonald: We went to the Ruhr and we tried to get the facts of that situation. We were told that the miners and the trade unions were convinced that the policy of nationalisation and public ownership was the policy they wanted and we tried to get at the facts. We were not at all convinced that that was the policy they wanted. For instance, we interviewed leaders of the trade union movement and we expected that the first thing they would tell us would be that what they wanted was the nationalisation of industry. Not at all. As' the hon. Member for Abingdon (Sir R. Glyn) said in his speech, when we asked them what problem they had to put before us, they said, "We have the great problem of food and we want to be allowed to work an extra day a week. We already work six days a week for eight hours a day, and we want to be allowed to work on Sunday in order to produce coal which we can barter for potatoes." There was not a word about nationalisation, and I do not think that is what is uppermost in their minds.

Mr. Skeffington-Lodge: Is the hon. Member aware that the political parties which are allowed to function in the British zone of Germany are unanimously in favour of the nationalisation of industry of the Ruhr? What has he to say to that?

Sir P. Macdonald: I did not see any unanimity about it.

Mr. Skeffington-Lodge: The hon. Member may not have seen it, but it is a fact.

Sir P. Macdonald: But I know that people engaged in industry are not unanimous about it.

Mr. Skeffington-Lodge: The workers are.

Sir P. Macdonald: And they will tell you that the system we have tried to pin upon them of nationalisation has led to frustration. Many of them will also tell you that they were better off under Nazism than they are today, because then they had a certain amount of freedom. Although they were told what to do, they were free to run their own industries. They are not today.
Another question which has been raised today is that of the agrarian policy, the breaking up of German estates. Although I agree that it amounts to a very small percentage of the total agricultural areas of Germany, the fact remains that any change in agrarian policy at present is bound to lead to dislocation of agriculture and may dislocate food production. That was in the mind of the officer responsible for food and agriculture when we saw him. Later we were told that the ordinance had only just been published and that considerable time was allowed for carrying it out. I have not seen the ordinance, but I think that any policy which may possibly dislocate food production- at present should be put in cold storage for at least five years and then reviewed. Otherwise, Germany will not produce even the amount of food she is producing today.
I am quite satisfied that the Control Commission are doing a very good job under very difficult circumstances, but they certainly are in need of a policy. They have been working for the last two years under the greatest difficulty because there has been no policy from a high level. It is essential that the Foreign Secretary and Mr. Marshall should decide as soon as possible—no doubt they will have to wait until the November Conference—and should get French agreement as far as possible to a bi-zonal or tri-zonal policy which should be put into practice without delay, in order that the economy of Germany can be put on its feet.

6.21 p.m.

Mr. Corlett: I wish to confine myself to one aspect of our policy in Germany, that is the question of re-educating Germany. There are some who believe that is an impossible thing to do, and I must admit that I have been sceptical but I believe it is a policy which we have to try. The hon. Member for Abingdon (Sir R. Glyn) paid a very well deserved compliment to Mr. Birley and I wholeheartedly endorse it. When I opposed Mr. Birley's appointment, in a typically British way he discussed the question with me and asked me to go over to Germany and investigate things for myself; which I did. I came to the conclusion that we cannot expect to be successful if we leave this matter of

re-educating Germany entirely to the Educational Department. They cannot do it by themselves but must have assistance from the other Departments.
We set them an impossible task if we allow other Departments of administration to do anything in Germany which nullifies the work of the Educational Department. It may be of course that the question of dismantling industry will have a very serious effect on our attempt to re-educate Germany. I do not know whether it will or not, but I do know that military tattoos are not the things likely to help Mr. Birley or his Department in re-educating Germany. It should be definitely laid down that the question of re-educating Germany must be the concern of all Departments concerned with the administration of Germany. We cannot leave it to the good will of individuals, but we must be quite certain that everyone plays his part if we are to be successful. It is indeed a very difficult task to re-educate a country, but it is an even more difficult task to do it in an occupied country because there must be conflict repeatedly. The task is made more difficult still since Ordinance 57 was accepted. I do not wish to discuss the merits of Ordinance 57. That is settled, but we must be absolutely clear in our minds that it has made the task of our Department of Education in Germany infinitely harder.
We have now handed the whole question over to the Germans themselves. Before that, the Department selected those Germans who were to do the work, and naturally they selected the people they thought best fitted to carry out the policy. They could also decide what policy the German officials should carry out and could supervise it and make absolutely certain that it was carried out. Now they can do none of these things. They cannot select officials, decide the policy or supervise the policy. All they can do is to advise and suggest, but the Germans can please themselves entirely whether they accept any of that advice or those suggestions. That will make the task of our officers on the ground very difficult. Some of them have a very large area to cover, all kinds of institutions to visit, administrative officers, heads of departments and the staffs of different schools to see.
We are asking them to do a completely impossible task in the circumstances. I tried to do it myself and I know how hopeless it is. They may be able to see administrative officials or the heads of the schools, but it is completely impossible for them to get to the individual classrooms where the individual teacher is in contact with the individual child, and it is there that the question of the future of Germany is largely going to be settled. There are not enough of these officials to do the jobs, yet with our limited resources I cannot see how we can afford to have more. They ought to be trebled, though I cannot see how we could possibly do that. What we can do is to give them sympathy and encouragement, and wish them Godspeed, but we must not expect results.
At the headquarters, whether in Berlin, Dusseldorf, Hamburg or Kiel, it is a matter of quality, and there we must make absolutely certain that those appointed to headquarters staffs are people with good academic qualifications, wide experience and a real desire to get on with the job. People lacking in educational qualifications should only be appointed in exceptional circumstances. I have had to make some criticisms of certain appointments elsewhere. I feel that in those posts we must have people with the qualifications to speak to the German experts on equal terms, for their job is to discuss problems with German officials who know what they desire in the educational world. I do not see how any of our officers can discuss with high German officials educational problems, unless they really know their subject. Perhaps the German attaches too much attention to the expert whom he sometimes venerates almost as a god, but he will not take much notice of a person who does not really know what he is discussing, though he will gladly listen to the expert. In the main, I am satisfied that on headquarters staffs we have the right type of officer. I spent many hours discussing with these officers what they are doing, I felt satisfied that we have in the main people who are enthusiastic and experienced and competent in their jobs.
I am, however, worried about other matters. I am not too certain that we have any real educational policy in Germany. We use the word "re-education," but what does it mean? By itself it is meaningless, or has too much meaning.

All the Allies are re-educating Germany—I sometimes wonder what kind of Germany is going to appear at the end of it when all four Allies have had their way in re-educating Germany in their own way? I do not know what policy any of them have, but I am satisfied that, whether we agree with the Russians or not, they have a policy; it may be a dangerous policy, but they know what they are aiming at in their zone. They are not vaguely talking about re-education. They know what is their aim and policy, and that everybody in their service will carry out their policy.
I am not at all satisfied that we have ever seriously thought what our policy should be, or that we have decided who should be responsible for the policy. What we are doing is simply following in the usual British way, any sort of policy that may come along. Like Topsy, our policy has "just grow'd." That is understandable, and I do not think that anyone is to blame. When we went to Germany we set up an educational branch but gave it no power; it was a branch of another branch, it had no direct approach to the head of the zone, and it had no power to determine policy. It could only make suggestions to another branch as to what our policy should be, and it could never be sure that what it wanted was really pressed. We remedied that later by appointing Mr. Birley, who has direct approach and can see that his policy is carried out. But at the moment we seem to be trying to cover the whole educational front, and the result is that we are really not getting far in any direction. We are trying to cover the whole field—universities, secondary schools, vocational schools, elementary schools and youth clubs—with totally inadequate staff, and the net result is, inevitably, somewhat disappointing.
That is a dangerous situation, but there is another more dangerous one, one on which I am sure we may have a great division of opinion here. I sense a feeling amongst some of our people that the re-education of Germany will come by our concentrating mainly on the intelligentsia, the 10 per cent. of the German people in the universities and the secondary schools. This I regard as a completely fatal point of view. Were we very happy about the German university outlook to Europe or its own people? Did the people in the German universities ever


give the German people a real lead towards sanity? Did they ever come out of their ivory towers and play their part in developing the Germans on tolerant lines—making them good Europeans? Very rarely indeed. When appeasement was at its height British universities refused unanimously to accept the invitation to Heidelberg because they were so aghast at the German university attitude during the Nazi regime. Those in the German universities have rarely played a helpful part, a part which would have helped the Germans to feel and to accept individual responsibility.
We have no proof that if we develop or concentrate mainly upon the universities that they will do better today. There is the same type of professor, older, with the same outlook, with little idea how to help Germany to adopt a tolerant outlook. He is much more likely to be a great danger. We have no certainty that we can do very much with the universities which will save Germany. The same applies to secondary schools, because there, as in the universities, the method of recruitment is the old method, and in both the curriculum is narrow and academic. It is also wrong to encourage the German masses to look for leadership from the universities, for it has so often been their great tragedy that they have left it to someone else to make their decisions, to tell them what they should do, to tell them where to march and how to act. I have made suggestions that we should have a British lecturer inside each university. But if the universities are to be helped, it will not be so much by a large permanent headquarters staff as by sending over university lecturers of repute, who will not make a flying visit but will stay there for weeks, or perhaps a term, and establish real contact with the people there.
I would concentrate, not entirely, but mainly, on the 90 per cent. of the German people whose whole education lies in the elementary and vocational schools. If we can save them, we can save Germany. They are the children who will matter. We must use our limited resources to see that we concentrate as much as we possibly can on those children. Anyone who goes into those schools can see that the teaching there is much more concerned with the making of good watchmakers and architects than of making good

citizens. Something has to be done to give them a wider outlook. It is there we should concentrate the resources which we have. In this country we learned long ago that the place to secure real reform was in the elementary school because there, in spite of large classes, we do try to teach Johnny and not arithmetic. This is a fundamental difference in teaching methods. The universities and secondary schools in Germany are subject bound—they deal with subjects more than with individuals. It is in the elementary schools that we should get down to the individual child and teach him to stand on his own feet and think for himself, to be tolerant and not to accept uncritically other people's opinions.
We have to hand in Germany at this moment a wonderful opportunity in the British families educational scheme. We have some really splendid schools, staffed by English teachers for English children. These schools are on the spot available for German teachers and authorities to see what we mean by our way of life. I have visited many of those schools and discussed problems with the teachers. They have our equipment and our methods. They bring German teachers in, they go out to German schools and show the Germans exactly what we mean by our system of education. We also have a magnificent secondary school at Wilhelmshaven which in some respects is a pioneer in secondary education. We may have the strange position of the Education Act, 1944, being first fully implemented, in some respects, in Germany. If we have to concentrate I believe we should concentrate mainly on the 90 per cent. of the children who go only to the elementary and vocational schools. But I do not want the devoted service of our Educational Branch to be wasted. I wish it to be effective. This, I believe, can only be fully achieved if we turn down the idea that Germany can be saved by saving the intelligentsia, and instead accept the view that she will be saved by concentrating such resources as we have mainly on the ordinary children.

6.39 p.m.

Mr. Richard Law: It is something of a relief to turn away from the grotesque irrelevancies of the Government's domestic programme, and to concentrate our attention, if only for a


few hours, upon a problem that is certainly relevant, that is desperately immediate, and, I fear, may be tragically decisive for the future of Europe and for the future of the civilised world. I say that the German problem is decisive for the future of each one of us, because it seems to me—and I think it seems to all of us, wherever we sit in this House—that unless we can heal this running sore on the body of Europe, there is no hope of peace in our time, and little hope even of decent prosperity and comfort. The German problem is certainly a challenge, but in my judgment it is also a deep humiliation. Two years after victory the most complete and overwhelming that we have ever known, we stand today utterly defeated by this problem. I dare say there are many hon. Members who do not agree with me, but I believe that Germany is a greater threat to the peace of the world today, over the long future, than she was in 1921, two years after the Armistice. We have occupied her completely, as we did not do in 1919; we have absolute control over her activities, which we did not have in 1919, and with it all we have earned neither loyalty nor respect, nor even fear.
I think there could be no more striking commentary on the situation in which we find ourselves today than an item in the newspapers over the weekend reporting an incident in Germany. It reported how the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, in explaining the policy of His Majesty's Government to the political leaders of Germany, was greeted with "cynical and derisive laughter." I am not saying that in criticism of the Chancellor of the Duchy, a Minister for whom I have great respect, but it is a striking commentary on the depths of contempt into which we have fallen in Germany, and on the policy which has been pursued there by His Majesty's Government during the past two and a half years. Only one commentary could be more striking and that, if he will allow me to say so, was the very lucid speech of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Attercliffe (Mr. J. Hynd), who paid us the compliment on this side of the House of repeating almost verbatim every criticism of his own administration that we have made for two years past. He must have been paying more attention than he seemed to do at the time, because it really

seemed today as though he had been learning our speeches off by heart.
When I say that the policy of His Majesty's Government is to blame for the situation in Germany, I would like to make two things clear. First, I am not criticising the Control Commission and the members of the Commission in Germany. I would like to associate myself with everything that has been said this afternoon about that body which, over a long time, has struggled with almost insuperable difficulties and with a lack of policy from London which must have been very disheartening indeed. I would like to make clear, too, that I am not seeking to lay the blame for all our difficulties in Germany upon His Majesty's Government. Clearly, it would be unreasonable to do that. It would be as unreasonable as it would be to blame two years of Socialist misgovernment—if I may borrow a phrase from the jargon of hon. Members opposite—for every detail of the gloomy speech that the Minister for Economic Affairs made in this House the other day. But in both cases, here in this country and there in Germany, it can be said that whatever men could do by their negligence, by their errors of judgment, and by their sheer incompetence, to exacerbate a situation which was always difficult and perhaps desperate, these men have done. I believe that the Government have made many mistakes which could have been avoided in their handling of the German problem.
I would like to touch on one or two of them before I sit down. But first, I would like to refer again to that question of new policy, which may or may not prove to be another mistake. I refer to the dismantling of the factories in the combined zone in Germany, around which a great part of the Debate has concentrated today. I know that there are hon. Members on both sides of the House who regard the decision which has been come to, and which was announced a week or two ago, as being both inhuman and ill-advised. I must confess that it is a matter on which I find it extremely difficult to make up my mind. It is difficult for two reasons: first, the report of the Committee on Estimates has only just been published, and, secondly, so far, we have not had any elucidation from the Foreign Secretary on this subject, which obviously touches hon. Mem-


bers very deeply and which, for better or for worse, is likely to be crucial in our relationship with Germany. I hope very much that when the Foreign Secretary replies to the Debate he will be able to bring forward absolutely irrefutable arguments in support of this course.
Having listened to the Debate so far, I feel the gravest uneasiness about this step which has been taken. I can see that on paper there are very strong arguments for the dismantling of surplus German industry at this time. It is true that this is a matter that has been hanging fire for a very long time. It is true that, for as long as it did hang fire, there would be the maximum uncertainty in Germany and, therefore, it would be proportionately difficult to get German industry geared to its task. That, I can see, is true. Whether it is good or bad, it is true that this decision, in great part at least, is final. On that point I am a little bit dismayed by something which was reported in "The Times" on 17th October, which I take to be the fact. It would appear that this decision, drastic and contentious as it is, is not the final decision, because "The Times" told us on 17th October:
Although precise and almost complete, it"—
that is, the list that was published—
is not quite the final list. It does not include plants in certain industries which were prohibited to Germany under a Control Council plan of March, 1946.
Then "The Times" lists the plants and the products concerned and concludes:
In the meantime these plants, and the surplus plants in the shipbuilding industry, are not included in the list; but their omission does not mean that they will be excluded from reparations. It simply means that a decision is deferred.
If that is a true interpretation of the position, it seems to me that one, at any rate, of the advantages claimed for it—that it is a final decision—does not exist. I can see, too, that if we have decided upon a level of industry for Germany that is reasonable, that will give her a standard of life, allowing for the new circumstances, equal to that which she enjoyed in 1936 before Hitler's war machine got into top gear, there is everything to be said for limiting her industrial capacity to that. Otherwise, it is obvious that, sometime in the future, her surplus capacity may become the same kind of

threat that her industrial potential became in the late thirties before the war. I can see, too, that other countries besides ourselves have a very deep interest in this problem. It is not only the Russians, and I hope that this decision is in no way concerned with any agreement that was reached with the Russians at Potsdam, because, whether we like it or not, the Potsdam Agreement is already dead and finished. Still, we have other Allies besides the Russians, and it may well be that the Foreign Secretary considers himself to be under a strong obligation to met their point of view as well as the point of view of the Germans.
From all these considerations of the problem, I can see that there is a case to be made out for this decision, and I hope that the Foreign Secretary will be able to make it, but at the same time I do not think anybody listening to the Debate can disguise from himself the fact that, however strong the logical case may be, there are certain practical arguments which seem to run the other way. I am not thinking only of the argument that the German political leaders will not particularly like it. On that, I agree with the hon. Member for Motherwell (Mr. Alex Anderson), who pointed out that, whatever we do in Germany, especially from now on, the German political leaders are not going to like it and are going to make the utmost capital out of it that they can. I am not so much concerned with whether the German political leaders like the decision or not. What I am concerned about, and what I feel the whole House is concerned about, is this: granted that this plan of dismantling is as perfect as any paper plan can be, if we get no assurance that it is going to work out in practice any better than any of the other paper plans which the Government have produced in this country, I feel very doubtful about it.
There is, for example, the question of the manufactory at Kiel, to which reference was made the other day. Under encouragement from the Control Commission, it did everything it could to produce German exports, and then, having booked a lot of orders at the Industrial Fair, was informed that it would be dismantled under this plan. There was also the case cited by the hon. Member for Merioneth who spoke earlier in regard to a soap factory that was to be dismantled, and a fac-


tory for producing conveyor belts for the mining industry. Are these things already beginning to happen under the plan? And if so, can we doubt that they will go on happening, and that this plan, so far from producing a final solution of the problem, will be a continuing irritation of the situation, and will eventually be dropped? This is a matter on which the Government must accept the full responsibility. Having listened to the Debate, I must confess the gravest doubt, not about the justice of the plan, but about its practical wisdom in the circumstances of today.
I would like to say one other thing which I hope the Under-Secretary will report to his chief. This decision has been taken, rightly or wrongly; but, if it is to be reversed, let it be reversed now, at once, by the argument of the House of Commons. Let it not be reversed in a few months' time by an argument which always seems to carry more weight with this Government than any other—the terrible argument of events. I am sure that nothing could be more disastrous or tragic than that, in a few months' time, the Government should abandon this policy, not because it is wrong, but simply because they are, in fact, unable to enforce it. That would, indeed, be the end of our influence, not only in Germany, but in Europe, and I think in the outside world.
I want to say a few words about some of the things that struck me in this admirable report from the Select Committee on Estimates. It is quite extraordinary to me, on reading this report, which is not a Conservative Party report but a report of a Select Committee of the House of Commons, that almost every criticism of the Government's German policy that has come from these benches can be found in it. There has been a confusion in the main direction of Government policy in Germany. Instead of our going to Germany to control Germany against another war, we have been there, during the last few years, trying to govern Germany. That is a very different proposition and one that has brought in its trail certain consequences of very great evil.
First, I believe that that policy of the Government of trying to accept the whole responsibility for German life, instead of merely seeking to control Germany against a further outburst of Prussian aggression, has done more than anything else to pro-

duce this "sullen" mood among the German people which was referred to by the hon. Member for Abingdon (Sir R. Glyn) in his admirable speech today, because, as a result of our having this vast and inflated Control Commission, the average German has laid the responsibility for failure on us, instead of putting it on the shoulders of his own leaders and on himself. That is the first evil consequence which flowed from this mistaken policy. The second evil—and it is clearly brought out in more than one section of the report—is that the more we have departed from the controlling, and the more we have gone in for this governing function, particularly where industry is concerned, the slower has been the revival of German industry. The report points out in paragraph after paragraph, that the only useful job that the Control Commission can do now is purely as an inspectorate, and that it has no job whatever to do as an instructor or governess. I would like to read to the House this sentence from paragraph 21 of the Report:
On the side of trade and industry, however, the Germans are better able to assist themselves, and the Control Commission should confine themselves to ensuring that the Germans fulfil their obligations to the Allies. In the last resort, the task of social, political and economic reconstruction can only be successfully carried through by Germany herself.
I believe that to be true today; I hope the Government will act upon it today; and I think it is a very great pity that they did not act upon it two and a half years ago.
Then there is the question of currency. The hon. Member for Attercliffe repeated a criticism this afternoon that he has often heard from these Benches—one which he had never attempted to make before—that the question of currency reform was at the very foundation of our difficulty today.

Mr. J. Hynd: May I correct the right hon. Gentleman? I have, in fact, made reference to that matter before, and have explained to the House why it was impossible to get the desired result until we had a united Germany.

Mr. Law: I very much regret if I misrepresented what the hon. Gentleman said in those days. Of course, I am very glad to hear that I was mistaken about it. But I would like to say a word about those difficulties which he mentioned, as he has


just told the House, while he was in office, and which I very much hope the Foreign Secretary is not going to rely upon for justification of still further delay, when he replies to the Debate tonight. Of course, we all know what those difficulties are; they are all difficulties bound up with the Potsdam Agreement, and the necessity for getting quadripartite agreement before we could proceed. We have drifted away from the Potsdam Agreement on many points of great substance. When we raised the level of industry a month or two ago, that was not a breach of the Agreement, because it had already been broken; but that was a further departure from the principles of the Agreement. I do not see why it has been necessary or should be necessary in the future, to let these vital problems of currency reform wait upon the November Conference. I cannot see why that plan should only be in the pigeon hole; I cannot see why it should not already be in the process of implementation, and I trust that it will be made effective at the earliest possible moment.
My hon. Friend the Member for Flint (Mr. Birch), in a speech which delighted and amused the whole House, drew attention to some of the grosser absurdities of the policy of de-Nazification. I do not wish to go into that again this evening, but there is another absurdity on which I very much hope the Foreign Secretary will be able to give us some reassurance tonight. It is the question referred to in paragraph 16 of the Select Committee's Report, that of the Joint Export-Import Agency. It is also referred to in paragraph 55 of the Report, and it is that paragraph with which I am most concerned. The gross absurdity there is that, even now, when we recognise that it is essential to get the highest possible level of exports from Germany, and when the Joint Export-Import Agency was set up because that was recognised, we are still committed to the crowning absurdity that there is no incentive whatever for the German producer to manufacture for export, while there is every incentive for him to cut down his exports, and to confine his production to the home market or to the black market, as the case may be. It seems to me to be fantastic that, in the light of the present situation, we are persisting in policies of this kind, of demanding one price for German goods

on the world market, and then giving to the German manufacturer a much lower price than he would get if he sold them in the domestic market at home. I hope the Foreign Secretary will see that that matter, in common with a great many other recommendations of the Report, will be looked into and acted upon at the earliest possible moment.
I do not wish to detain the House any longer on these topics, as I know there are other hon. Members who wish to speak before the Foreign Secretary replies. I repeat what I said earlier in my speech, that I very much hope the Foreign Secretary will be able to give a convincing reply to the critics of the dismantling plan, because I must say that, having listened to the Debate so far, I am not at all certain that the Government have not made yet another mistake in their German policy.

7.6 p.m.

Mr. Stokes: I cannot but remind the right hon. Member for South Kensington (Mr. Law) that the views he has just been expressing are not those which he has consistently held throughout this very long controversy—a war which I have particularly waged on this side of the House—on the question of Germany. While I am not prepared to quote what he has said in the past—I have not his speeches with me—I was assured by "The Times" this morning that the right hon. Gentleman was again going to take the opposite view. Therefore, I can only call the matter to the attention of the House, and leave it at that.

Mr. Law: I am sure it was not the intention of the hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes) to hold me responsible for what appears in "The Times." I can assure him that I have no responsibility whatever for that. With regard to the other point he made, I would like him to explain in what respect I have departed from my usual views in this matter.

Mr. Stokes: I can recollect the right hon. Gentleman speaking in a way diametrically opposed to my views in past Debates on Germany.

Mr. Law: Opposed to the hon. Gentleman's views? I thought he meant opposed to my own earlier views.

Mr. Stokes: I will leave it at that. Of course the right hon. Gentleman has no


responsibility for "The Times," but it is fairly reliable, and it predicts what is usually in the minds of hon. and right hon. Gentlemen who are going to speak.
I would like to start my speech by congratulating my hon. Friend the Member for Attercliffe (Mr. J. Hynd) on his very statesmanlike speech. I might even have made it myself. I hope it will be very widely read, and I would like to say in passing that I think he has rendered a great service to the House. It is a long time since I heard a Minister retired from office come forward so soon afterwards and make a useful contribution on a subject with which he was concerned when in office. But my hon. Friend cannot have come to these views in the last few weeks, and, if he held them then as strongly as he does now, I am a little surprised that he did not resign. However, be that as it may. The hon. Member for Abingdon (Sir R. Glyn), who spoke earlier in the Debate, dealt at some length, very naturally, with the Select Committee's Report. I wish to join with him in the views he expressed about the Control Commission. Whether we think them adequate for the job is neither here nor there; the fact is that there are a lot of honourable and capable people who are doing their best under very difficult conditions. I believe that they are being asked to do an impossible task. I, like the hon. Member for Abingdon, decry the irresponsible people who go abroad for a few days and then write a bit of dirt in the public Press, just because the British public like dirt. I think it does us a lot of harm abroad.
The hon. Member for the Isle of Wight (Sir P. Macdonald) seemed to think that the whole of our policy in Germany was breaking down because of the so-called threat to bring under public control and ownership the mines and heavy industry. It makes one doubt a little—and I say this in no disrespect to the Select Committee that went out to Germany—the value of these voyages. I have been there many, times, and I did not find either among the industrialists or the politicians of any party—the Christian Democratic Union, the Liberals, or the Social Democratic Party—or any of the leaders, the burgomasters, and so on, any other determination than that the heavy industries must never again be allowed to come under private ownership. There is no doubt about that. They may not

want the kind of nationalisation which some of us on this side of the House want. Quite definitely they are determined—and I think the Americans understand now—that the heavy industries and the coal mines are to come under public ownership. Let there be no doubt about that.
As the hon. Baronet the Member for Abingdon said, the whole of the German problem turns on food, in the first place. I hope steps will be taken to see that in Germany this year the Control Commission, embarks upon the great freeze-up in January with a proper reserve of food. I went into this matter in some detail with the responsible people who know. I mean the people who do the job—not the "brass hats" who sit in Berlin. I know the figures. At the present level of imports into the combined zones, unless the November and December imports exceed the anticipated amount of 814,000 tons, by 31st December they will be 320,000 tons short of an eight weeks reserve at a 1,550 calorie level. My right hon. Friend the Minister of Food considers it absolutely essential in this country, where we have magnificent transport and means of distribution, to have an eight weeks reserve. It is sheer lunacy to prepare for another three months freeze-up in Germany on anything less. If there is anything less—and I think there will be—we are in for a very serious state of affairs.
I shall not take up the time of the House in emphasising again the general food situation and the food level. The International Red Cross stated in their report that throughout the British zone the level was maintained at about 1,500 calories this year up to March and that after that it fell away to 1,100 on the average—in some places it was lower. One of the worst features of the food situation is the shortage of fats. I know that the crank nutritionist, and even the serious minded nutritionist, will say that fats are not necessary for good diet. They may not be necessary, but they are very nice, and they are absolutely essential for morale. At the present time there is not the slightest chance of having a ration of more than three quarters of an ounce of fats per person per week throughout the coming winter months, assuming supplies come in at a reasonable rate. This being so, why cannot we reverse the decision about the whaling fleet? Before the war


the German whaling fleet used to bring in 100,000 tons of whale oil, which was converted into 120,000 tons of margarine. On the level of a population of 35 million in the combined zones, that would be the equivalent of another two and a half ounces per head of the population per week, which would in effect multiply by four the present weekly fat ration, and would make an enormous difference to the morale and the feeding problems throughout the combined zones. The Report says that according to the observations of the Committee as a whole, there was malnutrition but it was more or less confined to the industrial areas. I beg to differ. So far as my knowledge goes, the whole of Schleswig Holstein is in trouble, largely because of the refugees. The population of Schleswig Holstein has doubled; I think that 47 per cent. of the people living there are refugees. The general condition there is appalling, and it is wrong to assume that malnutrition is confined to the industrial areas.
The Report did not touch very much on the health situation. I would like to emphasise the facts of the situation in Berlin, particularly with regard to venereal disease. It is perfectly tragic. At the present moment 5.35 per cent. of girls between the ages of 15 and 20 have syphilis. That compares with.011 per cent.—in other words, one in 10,000–in 1938. Ten thousand were infected during the third quarter of 1946. That means that it is 550 times more prevalent today than it was in 1938. That is dreadfully serious. Yet the Report said nothing about it. With regard to tuberculosis, the International Red Cross says that throughout the British zone it is ten times higher than it was pre-war. In August, 1946, there were 46,000 contagious cases and 160,000 active. The trouble, of course, is that there are insufficient beds to go round. In Dusseldorf in August, 1946, there were 12,000 contagious tuberculosis cases living at home. In Dusseldorf there are 20,000 people still living in cellars, so that hon. Members will appreciate what it means to have 12,000 contagious cases living at home. I wish something more could be done to bring more hospital relief to these wretched people in the awful time through which they are at present passing.
I do not need to dwell on the clothing and housing situation. Clothing is practically non-existent. I saw in a newspaper

the other day—and I do not doubt its accuracy after all the figures that I was shown during my visit—that there is one shoe per head of the population per annum, perhaps, and about half a shirt. That is about the figure at which indigenous production works out.
My hon. Friend the Member for Attercliffe spoke about currency and taxation. I will not refer to it except to say that something must be done, and done soon, to change the position with regard to taxation on the worker. He is still in the wretched position that, having done a week's work, after he has paid his taxes, if he has a wife and more than one child, he is quite unable to buy the legal rations to which he is entitled. From the figures which have been shown to me, it is a fact that there is nobody in Germany today who can earn more than 2,000 marks a month and keep it. At the Control Commission rating of 40 marks to the £, that means £600 a year. At the proper rate, if one took twelve marks to the £, it would go up to about £2,000 a year. Of course, one can say that it would not very much matter if the people earned more. It would not be of any use to them because the mark is worthless; it is necessary to reform the currency. That is absolutely vital, because until the currency reform is brought in and the mark bears some relation to the cost of production and the price structure, there is no way of cleaning up the black market.
I would like to illustrate how the black market works. The hon. Member for Flint (Mr. Birch) said that de-Nazified Germans are given the job of picking up bricks. The majority of them are far too intelligent to go on picking up bricks indefinitely, so, although I have no firsthand knowledge, I would suspect that a considerable number of them are in the black market in no mean way. I asked one of the leading German authorities on this question of distribution and price levels how the black market worked, because it is not a black market merely in food. It would be a most profound mistake to think so. Food only constitutes about 7 or 8 per cent. of the black market. Thirty-five per cent. of all transactions are on the black market.

Mr. Birch: More than that.

Mr. Stokes: It has been growing steadily. The anticipation of responsible


people is that 100 per cent. of all transactions would be on the black market by Christmas. I would like to illustrate how it works, because it puzzled me at the time. The ordinary worker goes on Friday to get his pay packet, but he is not content to take marks only. If he works in a cutlery factory he wants a few spoons or knives. He wants those for his home. Perhaps he takes some spoons the first week, knives the second week, and forks the third week. By the fourth week they go to the black market. I said, "What about the man who rolls steel billets? He cannot walk off with a steel billet under his arm?" The man replied, "No, he is allocated 20 or 30 lbs. of steel strip; he goes into the countryside during the week-ends and trades it with a farmer for what he can get in the way of food in return." That is clear enough; and, quite simple, everybody does it. "What about the engine driver?" I asked. "I suppose he has a very difficult job from the point of view of black marketing?" The reply was, "Oh, no. His job is the easiest of all. He enters into a league with the Stationmaster of a wayside station, and with the signalman, and the porter, and the guard, and he pulls up by arrangement and they chuck off half the coal in the tender; and he picks up food on the way home again."
What about the farmer? He is the chief person for corrupting the civil service. The farmers have got pretty well all they want. They say in Germany that the farmers have all their rooms laid with Turkish carpets except the cowsheds. The farmer goes to the local municipal official and says, "I want a new cowshed," or a new wing to his house, or a new building. You can see a lot of this new building going on all over the countryside, although there is not much in the towns. The farmer says to the official at the municipal offices, "You sign my permit on the dotted line, and I will see you through next winter." Everything is getting rapidly more corrupt, and unless something is done to put matters right this position will get extremely serious. It is serious now, but it is going to become fantastically disastrous by Christmas.
Now there comes all this talk about dismantling, to take place against this background of little food, no houses, no clothes and civil corruption. Against

that background this question of dismantling preys more acutely than anything else on people's minds. Potsdam laid down that the whole thing should be over by 15th February, 1948; that all the stuff that could possibly be taken away in capital goods should have been decided upon by 15th February, 1946, and carried off in two years. On that ground alone, I should have thought we had good reason for resisting this process, But is a conqueror entitled to take reparations before the peace treaty? There is not yet a peace with Germany. I have had this out with the Attorney-General before now, but he insists we are still at war. I regret that His Majesty's Speech from the Throne did not start with the customary words "My relations with foreign Powers continue to be friendly—except with the Control Commission for Germany."
I very much doubt if we are entitled to take any reparations at all until we have a peace treaty. We have not a peace treaty, and, therefore, legally we are probably quite wrong in taking reparations at all. I have searched round for evidence. I can only find some words of Mr. Lloyd George after the first world war and at the Treaty of Versailles. He said at the time that reparations had nothing to do with the Armistice but belonged to the peace treaty. It depends, I suppose, on what we mean by that absurd phrase, "unconditional surrender." But here we are in this jam, and if we have no other way out of the difficulty than that of the legal objection, we could use that, and say that we must not take any more reparations until the peace treaty is signed. If we could use that way out no one would be more pleased than I.
I want to know who wants this dismantling to go on. I know most of the senior officials in Germany have to say officially that they do because they have got to carry it out. I can understand that from their point of view, but I do not know anybody who, when one gets him on one side, and asks him if he has ever heard of a piece of more arrant nonsense, does not reply, "Confidentially, no." I wrote a critical letter to "The Times" on the subject. When I first went to Germany in 1946, in the Deputy Military Governor's house, the chairman of the economic section came up


to me and said, "I congratulate you." When I asked him on what, he said, "For your remarks in 'The Times'." I said, "That was a criticism of you." And he replied, "Yes, but I agree with all you said." The Germans certainly do not want it to continue, and I am very glad to see that the American Senators are going on strike about it, and I hope they will stir up the State Department when they get home.
I have, however, another document which I think has a bearing on the matter. That is none other than the Morgenthau plan. This document is a memorandum dated 15th September, 1944, and was signed in Quebec by the President of the United States, and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill). I will not bother to read the whole thing, though anyone may see it who wants to. The concluding sentence—the document dwells primarily on the disarmament of Germany—states:
This programme for eliminating the war-making industries in the Ruhr and in the Saar is looking forward to converting Germany into a country principally agricultural and pastoral in its character. The Prime Minister and the President were in agreement on this programme.
It was initialled: "O.K. F.D.R. W.S.C." This is disclosed by an American commentator, who added:
Note: The late President told friends that after the war he planned to publish the secret Quebec agreement in order to make absolutely clear British-American policy regarding the future of Germany.
That is another secret treaty of which we have not been told, despite the efforts some of us have made to get the whole of the secrets question cleared up.
I am surprised that Ministers and others can express surprise that the German people fear that there is something dirty about all this, and that part of this programme is really the result of fear of British and American industrialists of German competition. My right hon. Friend Lord Pakenham seems now to have gone in for indulging in pious platitudes. I very much regret it, because I thought he was with me. He announced the other day at Dusseldorf that he had not come across anybody in Germany who for one moment thought there was anything in that suggestion—that Britons and Americans were fearful of German competition. All I can say is that he does not

appear to have met any of the Germans I know and that there are jolly few who do not believe it.
I am getting a little tired of these people with private lines or public-private lines to God, amongst whom is my right hon. Friend the Minister for Economic "Peacefare." He told us the other day that we all ought to pull together and rejuvenate our Christian principles. I entirely agree with what he says about the performance of Christian duties, but they need to be applied to affairs in his own department which controlled B.I.O.S. and T. Force, both of which operate in Germany under the Board of Trade. I have a docket here which I think is absolutely disgraceful. It is a photostat copy headed "Booty." Apparently, the authorities know that these actions are a swindle. Here is a case of a perfectly peaceful factory at Detmold in Germany making ladies' combs—things they stick in their hair, or comb their hair with. It is a factory which used to export before the war two million pounds' worth of combs. This is an order on the managing director to part with eight machines and two secret processes, which are to be removed. The name of the investigator visiting the factory is that of the managing director of a rival firm at Irthlingborough in England. The man capable of identifying the machines and processes is the managing director in England and the person to whom the Detmold factory's property is to be sent is the managing director of the firm in England.
That sort of thing is going on all over Germany and despite the effort to stop this piece of vandalism by the responsible member of the Control Commission for Germany orders were issued from higher up for the machines to be removed. The vultures have indeed descended on the corpse of Germany. All this level of industry talk is completely cock-eyed: I believe it has been planned in this country, and has little to do with people who are conducting affairs in Germany.
The Report does not say very much about it. It is rather smug. It scrimps over the question of the level of industry, except to say it agrees with what is being done. I am rather surprised at the difference in its treatment of the landlords, on the one hand, and of the workers in industry, on the other. The Report refers to agrarian reform, the


Stripping and cutting up of land. It deems it much more important to continue the de facto management than to change the de jure ownership of the land because of the importance of food. That may be true, but if it is true of agriculture, I know from the knowledge I have of industry that it is of much more vital importance in industry.
With an economy which was really going one might go to the Germans and say—remember they have not been consulted about this question of reparations—"This is quite easy to move, and we are going to take it." But it is ridiculous to do so with the whole place smashed up. What we ought to do is to use every little bit of capacity they have in use and interrupt nothing. It is no solution to tell the people, "You are going to be much better off in ten years' time." That is like the bedside manner of a doctor, or of Mr. Pierrepont when about to hang a man, saying, when he puts the noose round his neck, "Look here, old boy, this won't hurt," but the man is dead when he drops! That is precisely what is happening to Germany.
I really cannot understand what my noble Friend is thinking about in this matter. How does he propose to shift the population round in Germany today? People are living in muck heaps in all the 56 towns which have been, as the result of the Quebec Agreement, bombed to blazes; that was decreed under the Morgenthau plan—for which I do not blame my right hon. Friend, because I doubt if he ever heard of it. How does he propose to do it? How are we going to move the workers from one smashed place and put them down in another when there has been practically no house building up to the moment? In our zone, 1,600,000 houses were completely destroyed; about 30 per cent. I do not want to be misunderstood. Nobody objects—and certainly I have not done so—to the removal of war industries. I am not talking about that element in this packet of papers which I have with me. I do not want to argue about that, because I quite agree that that dismantling should go on. But I wonder who planned this thing, or whether there was any plan at all? I wonder whether it was not some statistical calculation, like a high official in one of the Ministries whom I encountered the other day, when I wanted 39 tons of steel

for an important job and was told I could not have it because there was not any. He said, "My dear Mr. Stokes, you ought to understand that they are all paper boys who do that. When there is no steel there they say there is, and when there is steel there they say there is not." I expect it is the same here. He was a very important civil servant, but I agree that the job is too much for anyone to tackle in Germany.
At Question Time today my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary told me I was wrong about some locomotive repairs. Well, let me tell him that I went into that question very carefully with the transport people in Germany, and they were in despair because as a result of the complete dismantling of Blohm and Voss and the Reichswerke at Brunswick they were going to lose a monthly capacity to repair 30 heavy locomotives; and here they are now, looking in Czechoslovakia and Belgium to find an equivalent capacity for which we shall have to pay dollars! If my hon. Friend wants more particulars I will gladly give them to him. We find the same in regard to ball bearings with factories being pulled down; yet in this country we are simply desperate for ball bearings; I use a lot, and we cannot get nearly enough. Again, the Henkel soap factory at Dusseldorf is being pulled down. Why? Has some soap combine decreed that Germans are not to have too much soap until some unstated future date? It seems a perfectly crazy notion.
Amongst the industrial factories scheduled for scrapping are ten making what they describe as house-building and road-making machinery. The whole place is absolutely' flat, so surely any capacity they have for house and road making plant ought to be maintained in the hope that we shall get it going sooner than is anticipated. At Question Time today I raised the question of three excavating machinery factories. This country is desperate for want of excavating machinery. At the present time we are importing 367 from America and paying 15 million dollars for them: five million dollars short of the cut in the basic petrol ration. What do I find? One of the particular factories is both a war plant and an industrial plant, and it is a category one plant; but the other two are not. I came to the conclusion that we could help the situation here, and in some export


markets, by getting excavators made in one of these factories. So I started negotiations for delivery of 24 machines in 1949 but now the factory is to be pulled down. The whole thing seems to me to be fantastic nonsense and I cannot understand it at all. The Control Commission has at last succeeded in uniting Germany, astonishing though it may be, but, unfortunately, against us. Perhaps there will be a reaction though.
I urge my right hon. Friend to consider five points. First we want a central Government there as soon as possible. I hope that will be done as soon as maybe after the meeting of the Foreign Ministers. Second, the Germans ought to be given an import-export programme for five years, for materials and food, and told they must keep to a certain level of production with reparations, if necessary, to come out of current production. Thirdly, it is urgent that the present system of currency should be reformed. Fourthly, I agree with the hon. Member for Flint, it is high time that de-Nazification was stopped. It says in the Report that it will end on 31st December, yet I am assured by a very responsible person that they have not even received instructions yet, and cannot possibly get it over by Christmas, and it will be another six months or a year until they have completed that particular section of Germany. Finally, I would reduce the Control Commission to nothing more than a handful of advisers and a couple of thousand inspectors, a suggestion which I made nearly two years ago now, whilst leaving the army of occupation where it is.
In conclusion I ask my right hon. Friend this. I know all sorts of evil things were planned over which he had no control at all. In view of the fact that the Foreign Ministers' Conference is about to begin, and in view of the fact that quite obviously there is a general feeling against the practical application of this dismantling scheme which has now been published, can he not say, as my hon. Friend the Member for Attercliffe suggested, that though the dismantling of war plant must go on, the dismantling of industrial plant will be held over for consultation with the Germans after the completion of the Foreign Ministers' Conference. If he did that there would

be a tremendous wave of revival and sympathy with our point of view throughout the length and breadth of Germany and this House will feel well pleased.

7.38 p.m.

Mr. Molson: For a long time a number of hon. Members on both sides of the House have been trying to direct the attention of the House, the Government and the country to the policy behind the Potsdam Agreement and the level of industry plan of March, 1946. I feel that in this Debate we have at least been able to reach a point where the Foreign Secretary will have to yield on those matters of policy. The hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes) has been prominent in this matter for a very long time past; and there has been a considerable measure of agreement between hon. Members of all three parties that the general policy being followed with regard to Germany was unwise and wrong. For a number of months we were unable to obtain a Debate upon this subject at all; for many months the matter was dealt with as purely a matter of administration; and the hon. Member for Attercliffe (Mr. J. Hynd)—who, if I may say so with all respect, has today made a very remarkable speech based upon two long years of bitter experience as a junior Minister—was always put up to reply. When we sought to raise matters of policy, naturally he could refer only to what were his directives—that he had to carry out the policy of Potsdam. At long last, we now have a Cabinet decision which modifies the level of industry plan of March, 1946, and I think the House and the country are indebted to the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Liberal National Party for his correspondence with the Prime Minister. [Interruption.]

Mr. Frank Byers: On a point of Order. Is it not a custom of this House that there shall be accuracy in the speeches made by hon. Members?

Mr. Speaker: Accuracy of speeches on every occasion is something rather novel to me.

Mr. Byers: Further to that point of Order, Mr. Speaker. May I, for the purposes of record, call your attention to the fact that the hon. Member for The High Peak (Mr. Molson) has attributed to the Leader of the Liberal National Party a letter sent to the Prime Minister,


when it was, in fact, sent to the Prime Minister by the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Montgomery (Mr. C. Davies)? That, I think, ought to go in the record.

Mr. Molson: The course of reparations after this war seems to be following exactly the same lines as it took after the Four Years War. Just as those reparations had to be cut down by the Dawes Plan, the Young Plan and other subsequent plans, so now the reparations are being reduced. I regret that the Government, and the Foreign Secretary in particular, are still seeking to carry out a policy which, to judge from the majority of the speeches made today, is obviously encountering increasing opposition and criticism in this House.
In raising the level of industry in the British-American zone, the right hon. Gentleman is making a technical breach of the Potsdam Agreement. So far as this is concerned, he is saying to our Russian Allies that, because they are not carrying out their part of the Potsdam Agreement that Germany should be treated as a single economic whole, we are entitled to modify the terms to which we have agreed. Why is he prepared to go just this far and no further? Why be so illogical as to introduce a new plan which will be abandoned with discredit after a few more months or years and not go the whole way? I beg him to realise that, so far as reparations from the productive capacity of Western Germany are concerned, it is impossible for these reparations to be paid. During the previous war, far less destruction was done to Germany than was done in this war, and yet no net payments by Germany were made at all. American and British money was poured into Germany in exactly the same way as it is being poured in today. Even if it were possible, surely it is undesirable.
I should have thought that the whole situation had undergone a change since Mr. Marshall made his speech, in which he asked that the countries of Western Europe should come together and put forward a plan for their own self-help, and then ask America to do what was necessary to see the thing through. Mr. Marshall said that America expected Europe to do what it could to help itself, and it is to the right hon. Gentleman's abiding honour and credit that he immediately responded to the offer made by

Mr. Marshall. Is not the productive capacity of Western Germany the largest single potential contribution which Europe can now make to pull itself out of its mess? Logically, it was at the time when Russia refused to participate in the conference of 16 nations at Paris that the right hon. Gentleman should have adopted an entirely new policy in regard to the Anglo-American zone. Until that time it had been possible to argue that no sufficient breach had taken place to warrant us building up a Western Germany independent of Eastern Germany. It might be argued, as it has been argued by the right hon. Gentleman, whom I compared, last time I spoke on this subject, to Job, that he would go on waiting until there was a change of heart on the part of the Russians. [HON. MEMBERS: "Jeremiah."] It was Job who showed patience. Jeremiah was the man who went in for lamentations. Today I am the Jeremiah in the House deploring the lack of decision on the part of the Foreign Secretary, and I dare say that all Europe will be Jeremiahs before long.
That potential contribution which Western Germany should make to the resuscitation of Europe is now being sacrificed because, just at this very moment of time, only four weeks before the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the right hon. Gentleman has approved the publication of this long list of plants to be demolished, 25 per cent. of which are to be sent to Russia and to Poland, the two countries which expressly contracted out of the task to which we have set our hands, in response to the invitation of Mr. Marshall, of trying to reconstruct Western Europe.
It is this pathetic persistence in waiting for leave which makes it impossible for us to carry out a currency reform. We have the weighty support today of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Attercliffe, as well as that of almost every other hon. Member who has spoken, that there is no real chance of putting the economy of Germany upon a sound basis until there has been a complete reform of the currency system. I hope the Foreign Secretary will explain how it is that he he is able to reconcile his acceptance of the Marshall proposal, and his courage and initiative in calling together the Council of 16 Nations in Paris, and this extraordinarily wanton act on his part of approving at this time this list of demoli-


tions of factories in Germany. Will he please answer this particular point? Since to a large extent America is now taking over responsibilities in Western Germany, it may, for the purposes of record in the future, be important to know that the policy which is now being pursued—this policy of sabotage in Western Germany—has received not merely the approval of the American administration in Germany, but also the approval of the Secretary of State in Washington.

7.49 p.m.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Ernest Bevin): I wish first to express my gratitude to hon. Members who have spoken for their contribution to this very vexed and difficult problem. I must call their attention to the policy I enunciated on behalf of the Government in the speech I made on 22nd October, 1946. I then outlined the general principles which we were following and which have governed our policy in Germany. They were to ensure that Germany is never again allowed to revert to a dictatorship, or to menace world security by the adoption of an aggressive policy; second, to establish constitutional machinery in Germany aimed at developing sound democratic institutions; and, third, to establish economic conditions in Germany which will secure for her a peaceful economy, and an adequate standard of living. From that we have not departed; it stands today. We have not diverged from the principles I then enunciated. But we have not been free agents in dealing with this problem. I would ask the House to remember that we took over the administration of a zone which was completely smashed, as a result of unconditional surrender which was carried out to its bitter conclusion.
Virtually, we have had the task of building a new State. If we had gone into Germany free and unfettered there are many things we should have avoided, and many things we should have done. But at that time it was a country which had been ridden by Nazism, and we had to face it without a German civil service, without any organs of Government, and with the necessity of removing, by de-Nazification, the senior German officials and industrial administrators who had hitherto been running German political and economic life. If Members of this

House have changed their view in two years I am afraid that the facts do not change with them.
The hon. Member who called attention to our de-Nazification proposals, and their effect on the German civil service, and who ridiculed our position, ought to have had the decency at least to mention the facts. There were 4,000,000 members of the Nazi party in Germany, who actually entered that party, who were indoctrinated in it under the terms of most horrible oaths. That was the situation we found when Germany was defeated. We have had to sift this 4,000,000. There were 370,000–one in 10–who were dismissed, not only from the Government, but from industry and other sources. Any Member who knows what an indoctrinated Nazi or Communist is like, will realise that it was difficult to go through this number and find a way through which was safe for the future. I suggest that our people have done this very thoroughly and very well. We have decided to end this business at the end of this year, and from then the numbers will begin to run down. In view of what Germany was like after the Hitler regime, I suggest that to deal with this problem in 2½ years, for the safety of the future of the world, was a very good piece of work indeed.
I know it is easy to say, "Take risks." I know there are difficulties with Russia, but if we were Frenchmen and not Englishmen we would be worried about the resurgence of Germany. If we were Belgians and Dutch, with the frontiers which they have to defend, this problem would be of very great concern to us in deed. Therefore, I ask Members of the House to look at this problem not purely as Englishmen, but as partners in the comity of nations in Western Europe. It is extremely vital always to keep that in mind. During this period there have been two very conflicting balances; it has been very difficult to decide. I spent hours and hours with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Kensington (Mr. Law) trying to study this problem before the end of the German war. None of the arguments he has put today did he put to me then—

Mr. Law: rose—

Mr. Bevin: I am not going to say anything derogatory: rather will it be in the right hon. Gentleman's favour. When we


arrived at the figures which I will refer to later we did not consider revenge; we did not consider anything vindictive. I am referring now to the Coalition Government. What we did consider was what was necessary for our security, and what would give the Germans a decent chance of recovery. I have not departed, after months of study, from the principles on which we founded the original report which we tried to adumbrate at Potsdam and elsewhere.

Mr. Law: It is true that the right hon. Gentleman and I sat together and came to certain conclusions, but it is also true that at that moment neither he or I, nor any other Englishman, had been inside Germany. We were not aware of the conditions as they have developed, and I suggest that we cannot consider ourselves bound in every detail by conclusions which were come to before the end of the war.

Mr. Bevin: We did not come to it on that basis at all. The right hon. Gentleman will remember that. It did not matter what the conditions in Germany were at that moment; it was what we felt it would be necessary to do. I am encouraged by the Report which the Select Committee have recently published and in which they have adopted, I think wisely, a constructive and helpful approach. I cannot now go into details of this vexed and difficult problem—I hope a non-party one in view of our future security, and the security of Western Europe and the world—but I undertake to study it with great care, as well as the ideas of any other Member for dealing with this problem.
After working out our proposals as a British Government we came to Potsdam. As has already been said, the fundamental principles of Potsdam were that Germany should be treated as an economic unit. There were a lot of difficulties about it; it meant that the whole of the indigenous resources of Germany should be distributed for the German people as a whole, and that there should be a level of industry that would maintain a decent standard of life. I cannot attribute everything to Russia. I want to be fair. The French were very concerned about what were called the central agencies—railways and things of that kind—because of their implications, and the effect they might have on France. One must remember that France was not present at Potsdam She

made these reservations, and the central agencies were never introduced. That was the first thing that went wrong.
Secondly, it was found impossible to introduce the economic unity of Germany. I am not going to try to enter the Russian mind. I do not know what their reasons are or are not; all I can go on are facts. The economic unity of Germany is not established. Current reparations have been taken from the Soviet zone. Plant has been taken from the Soviet zone. What the Soviet zone is like I cannot tell; we get very little information, but the effect on our zone has been terrific. The population before the war was 20 million; it is now between 22 million and 23 million, an increase of 13 per cent.
The other very vast problem which we have to face—and I hope that it will not be lightly passed over when we are criticised for low production—is that the population in the British zone is entirely out of balance. Refugees poured in—elderly people and children, and it is to the credit of His Majesty's Government that they have not turned them back. We have stood the cost and borne the brunt. Some of the best miners and workmen have been either prisoners of war or in mines in France, Belgium, Russia and Poland, or in other forms of industry throughout Europe, and we have—I do not want to use the word offensively—virtually had to build up this industry on a high proportion of what is called "green" or untrained labour. That is the fact which we have to face in the administration of the zone. We have to carry three million refugees in that small zone alone and, as I have said, with an age group disproportionate to productive capacity. I am constantly getting letters complaining at my not taking more. Refugees are in Denmark and they are in other places; but one has only to mention these figures to see how difficult it is to take them. This zone of ours was never self-supporting from the point of view of foodstuffs. It is an industrial zone. It was only made self-supporting by its ability to import from other parts of Germany.
I must repeat what I said in the previous Debate. I could see in Paris in July of last year, with the disagreement, continuing, nothing but disaster staring this country and our zone in the face. I decided, and I was supported by the Cabinet—I am afraid afterwards because


it had to be done in a moment—that it the quarrel about the economic unity went on, then Great Britain would have to take steps to make our zone self-supporting by hook or by crook. I do not quite know how, I confess, but I realised that it could not go on as it was. Therefore, a few weeks afterwards, when the United States offered fusion, His Majesty's Government accepted. I know that the fusion agreement has been criticised, but it was not only with the Control Commission in Germany and General Clay that we had to contend; we had to contend with the United States Congress in getting this agreement accepted. In New York last year, I carried the agreement on the United States and British zones on a 50–50 basis.
What was the position then? I am sure that hon. Members of this House will not accuse me of the droughts. I am not responsible for the failure of harvests, and there was a tremendous failure of harvests throughout the world. The calorie level had fallen to 1,000 and prices were rising. I could not see how we could procure food for this zone at any price, when we entered into this agreement with the United States. In the Debates at that time in this House food was a grave consideration, both for this country and for our zone in Germany, as well as for other countries. We agreed to make the fusion in such a form that the other countries could join. It was so devised that if Soviet Russia or France cared to come in, there it was, and they could be fitted in. Again, we had a great disappointment over payments. If I remember rightly, wheat was running then in the United States at about 1.75 dollars per bushel. It rose to three dollars and the whole basis of calculation of fusion went completely. In addition, we were unable to procure sufficient to carry through the bargain.
Then we had another difficulty. We have been criticised for not bringing the Germans more and more into the political administration of Germany. I say, with all respect, to that criticism that when we did so one of the disappointing results was the handing over to the Germans of the collection of grain and administration too early. I do not criticise it, but the fact was that this problem was handed over before the Germans had secured sufficient competence in administration to be able to

do it successfully. Hence, the second breakdown. We had then to take a good deal of it on ourselves again. We have tried throughout the period to keep the calories as high as we can. What have they been? I think that I ought to emphasise this in order to establish one or two other points in a moment. It is only in the last few weeks that they have reached 1,550 and with the cuts announced in the House last week by my right hon. Friend the Minister for Economic Affairs—I always want to call him the Minister of Economic Warfare and I get into trouble over it—he announced, I believe, 2,700. One has only to mention 1,550 to see how difficult the situation is. With the added rations the maximum for the heaviest worker in the Ruhr does not come to 3,000. It is in the light of that situation that we have to build the new industrial production. Until the food situation is settled our difficulties are going to be very great.
I come to the level of industry which has been the main bone of contention in all this Debate. In the fusion agreement we all decided that there had to be a new level of industry. How did the old level come about? It has already been referred to. The first Morgenthau plan I always thought was disastrous. [Inter ruption.] I am not responsible for the secrets. Secondly, it was—

Mr. Stokes: It was decided by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill).

Mr. Bevin: I do not know that. It was never approved by the Cabinet, so far as I know.

Mr. Eden: It was not.

Mr. Bevin: Not while I was a Member of it. I will come to this question if hon. Members will allow me, because my time will have gone if I do not hurry on. The first draft started with about 4 million tons from Russia—I am speaking from memery now; it can be checked against the exact figures—a low percentage from France and 5.8 from America. My hon. Friend the Member for Attercliffe (Mr. J. Hynd) was instructed to fight—and did so—for the 11 million tons which was the original calculation of the committee of the Coalition Cabinet. From that figure we have never deviated one inch. We


had to get an agreement in order to get things going. When the 5.8 million tons was agreed to it was laid down that, in the event of the achievement or failure to achieve the economic unity of Germany—either way—the whole of this figure had to be reviewed. The issue came up again in Moscow and to my astonishment the Russians then proposed 12 million but coupled with it was the condition of current reparations. I was a little surprised to hear the hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes) say that we ought not to have taken any plant but should have agreed, I presume, to long-term current reparations from Germany.

Mr. Stokes: No, my right hon. Friend misquotes me. I did not say what we ought to have done, but what we ought to do now is have a five-year plan.

Mr. Bevin: I look with very great disfavour on current reparations. Current reparations could not be taken on the present level of industry to which we have agreed. It does not take that into account at all, and if raw materials and food had to be imported in order to provide current reparations, then the United States and ourselves would be in precisely the same position, finding the money to pay reparations. I cannot agree to that policy. That is one issue which has divided Russia and us all the way through. Indeed, I have taken the other line in the name of His Majesty's Government, that if the economic unity of Germany is established and a level of industry is fixed at whatever level it may be, or even without one, the first charge on German economy ought to be the repayment of the money that we have paid to keep the Germans alive during this critical period. I think that is a far greater and more justifiable claim than current reparations.
Therefore, we announced in Moscow that we could not stand on this agreement on the level of industry any longer. If no one else would agree with us the Americans and the British must fix something to work upon. That brings me to the dismantling of plants. One would imagine that we were dismantling the whole of Germany. Originally, the plant that was to be dismantled was to be of two kinds: One of them was war plant and the other was a set of plant, allowed by the Four Powers together, in what were called categories 2, 3 and 4. These included an enormous volume of plant.
I disagreed with that proposal all the way through. At Moscow I did agree, so far as our zone was concerned, that if there was to be an operation on war plants we should get the operation over and done with, because it was stupid to go on wrangling about it any longer. Therefore, we agreed to get the purely war plant in category I dismantled and ready for removal by June 1948. Then I said that if there were to be any further reparations under other headings, due to a new level of industry, they should be tabulated and marked down for dismantling and we should get it over as quickly as we could. I think that was a sound policy.
What is the effect of it? There will be 682 plants on the list, of which 302 are in category I. The balance of 380 is what were originally included in categories 2, 3 and 4, with the exception, as one hon. Member has mentioned, that there are certain reserved plants which are subject to a Four-Power agreement. Decision on them will be delayed until after the Council of Foreign Ministers, in November. The number of persons affected by this dismantling is 50,000, in a population of 23 million. Fifteen plants have already been dismantled and 99 are in the process of dismantling.
Another difficulty arose in this connection. It was claimed by certain Powers that we should dismantle not only plants but also buildings. That is, we should not only remove the mechanism, but the building. I felt it was right that constructions solely adaptable to war purposes should be removed, but where buildings could be converted into residences, we decided, in view of the housing difficulty, that these should not be destroyed. The process of dismantling is going on without destruction of buildings. We are urging that the buildings should be converted into flats—some of them are very good buildings—for residential purposes as speedily as possible.

Mr. Peter Thorneycroft: Would the Foreign Minister be good enough to clear up one point? He mentioned that 50,000 people would be involved. Is that the figure of men at present working in the factories which will be demolished, or is it the number of men who will be required to pull down the factories themselves?

Mr. Bevin: To pull down, 30,000 will be employed, and 50,000 are actually


employed now. That is 80,000 all told. It may be that the same people will be employed for dismantlement.
Reparations policy is, therefore, an integral part of the economic plan for Germany. Reparations are being met from the industrial capacity created by Hitler since 1936 for the purpose of waging war. In our view it is essential to secure that. It may be argued that we ought to do this with this factory instead of that factory. If any special case is put to me I will certainly look into it. I have no objection to that. I cannot know every factory in detail, but if my attention is called to an obvious mistake I will certainly look into the details and see what the facts are. As a general principle that is essential.
At Moscow we had representatives from what is called I.A.R.A., the body representing the Paris Agreement for the disposal of the reparations to the small Allies—not Russia. There were bitter com-plaints at the failure to deal with reparations, both the return of stolen plant and the reparations they thought they were justly entitled to in the Paris Agreement. These were countries like France, Belgium, Holland, Luxemburg, Yugoslavia and others whose industries have been ruined, whose plants have been taken away—do not let us have memories too short to remember What these people went through. The Germans have, after all, waged two wars and these countries have only acted in defence. Why all this tenderness in view of the devastation everybody has suffered? I am forgiving, but I am not so forgiving as that. When they have been raided twice in a quarter of a century by such mighty forces, the people who have been devastated are entitled to consideration, and I ask the House to support me in that task.
The smaller Allies therefore made strong representations that they should be dealt with fairly. I came to a conclusion in that Conference. I am sure any other hon. Member who had been sitting there listening to the evidence would have come to the same conclusion. While the Four Great Powers Conference continued disputing, I said, "Let us get this reparations business over and done with. Fix a new level of industry, say what you are going to do, take the plants, give them to the people who have a right to them,

and then let us start oft clean with Germany after that." The Germans have talked about this. There is no outrage in the German mind about this business. They know the price has to be paid. I hope they will not be discouraged from paying it by the assumption that we are going back on the scheme. What the Germans are entitled to know is, "Is this the end?" That is a reasonable question to put. So far as we are concerned, subject to the reservation of those industries which have still to be decided, I say to the Germans for the purposes of their own economy, "This is the end." If, by chance, some agreement is arrived at which involves current reparations or some other payment—I have already indicated my view as to that proposal—it cannot come out of this level of industry. I hope I have made myself quite clear to the German people on that point. The Germans will, therefore, know their position exactly. I am satisfied that the proposals we have put forward in this plan are fair and can be carried out, and I hope I shall have the support of the House in bringing this very difficult problem to an end.
Reference has been made to coal. It is such a vast subject that it is difficult to deal with it in the time. With reference to coal and transport, I acknowledge that if coal goes up towards 300,000 tons a day we shall have difficulty with transport, but what country has not? America has difficulty with transport at the moment. I think it will be discovered that it will be a very tight fit to get through in this country during this winter. If the coal output goes up, and other production goes up, we shall have to work very, very keenly to. get the full advantage of our transport. There is not a single British colony that is not clamouring for transport, and therefore all over the world transport is short. Added to that, we have had great difficulty owing to the drying up of the Rhine and the awful problem of moving ships on the Rhine during these past few months. I am bound to acknowledge there might be difficulty in transport. May I say, to save going into detail, that I am putting in the Library for hon. Members to see the Report of the discussions and agreement with the Americans on the North German Coal Control. I think the details there will indicate the accomplishment of an amazing task. What was it?
When we entered Germany, in the first months the output was 40,000 tons a day. We had very few regular miners, no houses, very little food. I want to pay my tribute to a very fine technician and manager, a Yorkshireman, Mr. Collins, who has done a magnificent job in the North German Coal Control. So much so that, with all the criticism—I think unwarranted criticism—in the United States, when they went into the facts they acknowledged that Great Britain had done a great job. Production went up first to 238,000 tons, then the food crisis to which I have referred came upon us, and it went back. Up to yesterday it has now been brought up to 256,000 tons a day. That is a great contribution to Europe.
Now I acknowledge that we have not been able to do much with currency. We have to get four-Power agreement on currency. Here again, Russia and ourselves nearly agreed. The difficulty there was the question of where the notes should be printed, and the control [Laughter.] A very important factor. On that, agreement was not reached, but I acknowledge that currency reform must follow very closely either on a breakdown in November or on success, whichever way it goes. We cannot delay it. We have had to provide other incentives. Those incentives have been food packs and a variety of devices which, if this new effort we have made now achieves success, ought to bring us before Christmas to 286,000 tons a day, which will be a big contribution to European recovery.
Agriculture. We planned for a much higher production this year and succeeded, but, again, the weather has beaten us; the drought has set the results back as it has in other countries, but our plan next year is again to try to step up the agricultural plan in Germany so as to bring it much higher, and nearer to being self-supporting, or at least, if we have to go on as a Western Germany, to make it less dependent upon outside importation. Then too, we have reactivated the fertilising plants, brought them back into full use, and in a very short time the output of fertilisers will be as high as prewar, which again is a contribution to the independence of that territory as regards food.
Reference has been made to linking Germany with the Marshall Plan. May I say that nothing would have been more fatal to the Marshall Plan itself than to

have done that. Hon. Members forget that it would have created a situation in Eastern Europe far worse than the present situation. Poland would have said, and rightly said, "You are taking Germany and putting her ahead of all those who fought against her, and placing Germany in a preferential position." I really cannot ignore the opinions of other countries. If one has sat in conferences and listened to the outpourings—I am not talking about the political vindictiveness that comes from propaganda but of the real feeling—of those countries in Europe, one realises that in dealing with Germany it is useless not to take them into account when arriving at conclusions.

Mr. Frank Byers: Following Mr. Speaker's decision on Thursday, might I ask whether I might formally move the Amendment which stands in the name of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Montgomery (Mr. C. Davies) and myself, which states:
But humbly regret that Your Majesty's Government's policy of dismantling factories in Germany will impair European recovery and will prejudice the fulfilment of the Paris plans.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Major Milner): Mr. Speaker indicated that he intended to call the. Amendment in the name of the hon. Member for Hereford (Mr. J. P. L. Thomas) dealing with the Armed Forces.

Mr. Byers: May I refer you to Mr. Speaker's remarks in column 238 of HANSARD:
I have carefully examined the subject matter of the Amendments which have been put down, and I am quite prepared to call Amendments, for a Division if necessary, if hon. Members want to record a Vote. The Amendment down in the name of the Liberal Party would be covered on Monday."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 23rd October, 1947; Vol. 443, c. 238.]
I can see nothing in HANSARD on Friday which in any way suggests that that is limited.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I must remind the hon. Member that Mr. Speaker made it clear on Friday that the Amendment he proposed to call was that in the name of the hon. Member for Hereford and, as the right hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. C. Davies) was in his place at that time and took no exception to that Ruling, I think it met with the agreement of the House.

Mr. Byers: I must submit to your Ruling, but I have to say to the Government that we shall demand a full Debate on this subject.

DEFENCE

8.34 p.m.

Mr. J. P. L. Thomas: I beg to move, as an Amendment to the Address, at the end, to add:
But humbly regret the absence from the Gracious Speech of any indication that the proposed acceleration of release from Your Majesty's Armed Forces is based upon a comprehensive plan which takes account not merely of current commitments but also of the long-term requirements of Imperial security.
I would remind the House of that passage in the Gracious Speech which deals with the acceleration of Service release of the Armed Forces and with defence policy. It tells us that the Government
will accelerate … release … to the maximum extent consistent with the adequate fulfilment of the tasks falling to the Forces.
What the Gracious Speech omits is to give any indication whatever that the allotted tasks take into sufficient consideration either our immediate commitments or the long-term requirements of Imperial security. Hence our Amendment. We cannot help being uneasy in our minds in this matter, which affects not only the defence of these islands but the whole Empire, and indeed our obligations to the United Nations. We are especially uneasy in the light of the Prime Minister's speech on Tuesday last. In that speech we heard for the first time that during the Recess, new plans had been made which almost double the speeding up of demobilisation announced in the Debate on 6th August. In the Debate in August, the Prime Minister in explaining the more rapid run-down of the Forces, gave us to understand that he had personally satisfied himself that it was not possible to release men at any higher rate than that which had been chosen. He described the rate of turnover as colossal, and added:
It is very difficult, without creating chaos, to accelerate this run-down more than within a limited amount at one time."—[OFFICIAL REPORT 6th August, 1947: Vol. 441, c. 1510.]
That was on 6th August. Apparently, it has now been decided, only two months later, to accept that creation of chaos. It is these sudden reversals of decision which so completely destroy the confidence of the country in the Government, and which lower our prestige in the eyes

of the world. We shall not easily forget the Debate on the National Service Bill when, after it had been explained at some length that no shorter period than 18 months conscription could possibly meet our defence requirements and commitments, we were told 48 hours later, that on second thoughts a year would be sufficient.
I should like to make it clear that, in moving our Amendment tonight, we are not necessarily quarrelling about the final figure to which the Armed Forces are to be reduced, but we do criticise these apparent changes of policy and the absence of planning, with all the difficulties that these are bound to entail for the three Services. Is it to be wondered if we ask ourselves who it is who decides these great questions of policy? Is it the Cabinet, or do they receive their instructions, often apparently at the last moment, from elsewhere?
I shall confine my remarks to questions of naval policy, since there are other hon. and gallant Members who are more competent to speak on the Army and the R.A.F. than I am myself. Besides, the reduction in the effective strength of the Home Fleet has thrown into sharp relief the contribution which the Navy is being called upon to make as a result of these new and arbitrary decisions. We are constantly asked from the other side of the House who it is who is threatening us with war. But I should like to remind hon. Members of the responsibilities and duties of the Navy in peace. We are, as has so often been said, a maritime people dependent for our very existence upon our seaborne trade. This means that it is necessary to maintain at sea and in full commission sufficient naval forces to ensure the freedom of unmolested passage of the ships of all nations. There has not always been that freedom. It is not so long ago that merchantmen carried their own armament for fear of pirates. Let us not forget that it was because the Royal Navy was everywhere that piracy became unprofitable.
But above all it has been our naval strength in the past which has so often called a halt to those who would disturb the peace of the world. When, in recent years, that strength has been defied, it has, as the Minister of Defence said so often, been the Royal Navy which has kept open the life-lines of communication to ourselves and to our Allies, while


denying them to our enemies. It has been the Navy's privilege and duty to maintain those life-lines whenever they have been threatened, and it has been to her lasting glory that she has always kept her fleets and squadrons in a constant state of preparedness for that purpose. This, as the Minister of Defence knows so well, has meant unceasing vigilance and at the same time, the continuous practice of the art of seamanship and of naval warfare. This practice cannot be carried out when lying on a mud-bank or when tied up to a jetty. Certain right hon. Gentlemen opposite have not always forgotten—I must be fair to them—these great naval tasks or the success with which they have been achieved. I am thinking particularly of the words of the Foreign Secretary on 7th November, 1945, when he said:
What astounds me about the history of the British Navy is how cheaply we have policed the world for 300 years.
After referring to:
… discussions in this House on Budgets and Estimates …
He added:
Looking back over it, you did take some frightful risks at times."—[OFFICIAL REPORT. 7th November, 1945; Vol. 415, c. 1340.]
What does the Foreign Secretary now say about the dislocation caused by the present sudden cuts? What did the Minister of Defence himself say when he was First Lord of the Admiralty presenting the Naval Estimates of last year? He said:
So long as we live by seaborne supplies neglect of naval defence would be a policy of abandonment and despair."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 7th March, 1946; Vol. 420, c 552.]
So, as I hope I have shown tonight, we have had in the last 18 months these three admirable sentiments from the Prime Minister, from the Foreign Secretary and from the Minister of Defence. But we have had them all separately. What makes them, or who makes them, abandon these sentiments in the Cabinet room? It becomes completely inexplicable that the carefully considered demobilisation plan for the Navy should have been torn up and substituted by a wholesale slashing such as that which has sent the Home Fleet flagship and her consorts to their home ports and to immobility, or worse.
When the Prime Minister announced last August the original speeding up of demobilisation, he proposed the reduction of the total number in the Forces by the

end of next March from 1,087,000 to 1,007,000. The next day the Chancellor of the Exchequer gave the actual figures for each of the three Services and we saw that the planned reduction of the Navy down to 182,000 had been accelerated down to 178,000. This meant that out of a total extra run-down of 80,000, the Navy's share was only 4,000. The Prime Minister told us of his difficulties in arriving at these figures which I have quoted, so it was reasonable for us on this side of the House to assume that in apportioning the run-down between the Services and in sparing the Navy, the special problems involved had been given due consideration. But not at all. Instead of having been given a steady reduction, which allowed for the replacement of released men by Regulars, this sudden slash occurs.
For the Navy, as the Minister of Defence knows well, demobilisation is the most difficult task of all. It needs very careful and very long-sighted preparations. Training and re-training in barracks and establishments have to be intensified, which causes the employment ashore of more Regulars. Men serving on stations overseas have to be brought home and relieved by men on Regular engagements or fully-trained National Service men with a sufficient time still to serve. The large complements of the naval air stations have to be maintained in order that a comparatively small number of aircrews can have the necessary flying practice and can carry out their tactical exercises. The rapid development of naval aviation from the few squadrons and carriers of the prewar days up to the vast air armada which made so distinguished a contribution to victory, has in itself created great problems of demobilisation.
If the war taught us anything new in naval strategy, it surely taught us this: that it is just as important to have command of the air over our sea routes as it is to have command on and under the surface. Therefore, the basic organisation of the air formations must be kept efficient, and this means the maintenance of large establishments in the air stations ashore. Since this organisation will be the core from which a large war potential will grow, the officers and men comprising it must of necessity be mainly Regulars. No doubt, the Naval Staff had all


these problems in mind when they advised against the greater acceleration of the run-down. It was, no doubt, these considerations which prompted the Prime Minister, in August, to talk of the chaos which would result from the release of any more men during this financial year.
What, then, is the cause of these carefully laid plans being thrown overboard? What is the measure of the chaos which has been wrought? We are now suddenly told that a further 70,000 men are to be released, in addition to the 80,000 already planned, and that, of this 70,000, the Navy is to lose 31,000. So we have the October decision for the Navy of 31,000 out of 70,000, compared with the August decision of 4,000 out of 80,000. Whatever we may think about these figures, this sudden change by the Cabinet is no plan. It seems to me to be madness in its lack of foresight.
We have been told that certain ships amounting to three-quarters of the numerical strength of the Home Fleet, are to be temporarily immobilised. But this is not the whole story, either in terms of ships to be laid up or in the effect upon the efficiency of those ships which remain in commission, both in home waters and abroad. What has happened, I would ask the Minister of Defence, to the Portsmouth flotilla? How many ships have been or are about to be laid up or immobilised? It is in these ships, as the House knows, that the training of officers and ratings at the gunnery, torpedo, signal and navigation schools is completed, and without the sea experience under these expert instructors, the high skill required cannot be achieved. What is the position, I also ask, with regard to the training flotillas of submarines based on Gosport and Portland? Are they to be maintained in sufficient strength to provide all the necessary training?
We would not be so critical of the Government in this matter if we could be satisfied that this very rapid demobilisation had been carefully planned, but it is perfectly clear that the Admiralty have been presented with an order and are having to carry it out regardless of the consequences. It takes many months after re-commissioning to gain a reasonable standard of efficiency—many months of patient practice before the men are familiar with all the drills and procedures

peculiar to the particular class of ship they have commissioned, and this sudden decision must mean a far more rapid turnover in ships' companies than can possibly be borne while maintaining efficiency. No doubt, this is partly why the ships of the Home Fleet are going to their home ports. In ships on foreign stations this inefficiency has to be borne in silence. What a monstrous situation to inflict on this great Service.
Reference has frequently been made to a speech by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, in October, 1945, when he suggested a figure of 150,000 for the maximum naval strength. He was relating his figure to the size of the Navy in 1939–a Navy almost entirely manned by Regulars. What has happened since my right hon. Friend made that speech? Instead of the conscript strength containing a large proportion of fully trained and experienced men, the conscripted men are today serving for so short a time that they hardly become seamen at all. There is a vast difference between the number of ships we can man with 150,000 fully trained men and what is possible when nearly half our strength is composed of men on so short a term of service that they are barely ready for active service afloat before their term has expired.
It is obvious that what we have to do is to build up our regular strength and reduce the number of conscripted men serving as quickly as possible. We know that very large numbers of men have to be kept in the shore establishments for training, but is this figure kept at a minimum? That question I should like to ask the Minister of Defence to answer tonight, for hon. Members on this side of the House feel far from satisfied that even with the strength of the Navy cut to its present figure, and with all the jobs that are done ashore, there is not still a great deal of misemployment; misemployment of large numbers of men who might be afloat, and so enable the Service to fulfil its traditional role. I should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman if manpower is the only reason for immobilising the Home Fleet, or is it because of unwillingness to pay for the fuel they would burn; or is it due purely to the shortage of trained men? If fuel oil is not a restricting factor, could not more ships be kept at sea with a reduced manning of some


of the armament, radar and fire control systems?
I now come to a subject about which Questions have been asked in the House during the last week—the way in which the news of these ill-considered and arbitrary decisions about the Home Fleet came to the public. Under banner headlines, on Saturday night, 18th October, the "Portsmouth Evening News" broke the news that the Home Fleet was to be reduced to a seagoing strength of one cruiser and four destroyers, and the story was repeated in no fewer than three bulletins by the B.B.C. that night. The Sunday papers were full of it, but no official statement was made. On the Monday, there was still silence. The Government did not seem to realise how aghast the public were. On the Monday morning, I happened to be travelling third-class from the West Country to London, and there were soldiers in the carriage. The opening comment of these men was, "What are they doing messing about with our Navy?" Out of respect for the feelings of hon. Members of this House, I have substituted the verb "messing" for the one actually used.
The Minister of Defence, whose job it is to co-ordinate the spirit of the three Services, must be relieved to hear that the Army—perhaps it is because of its new Secretary of State—takes naval affairs so very much to heart. Even on the Tuesday, not only did the Prime Minister display complete ignorance of the details of these cuts, but he denied that the figures quoted by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition were accurate. Two days later, the Minister of Defence admitted, on being questioned, that the effective strength of the Fleet would be reduced to the numbers quoted by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition and by my right hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden), and which had been given through the Press and over the wireless to the world.
How was it that no official announcement was made as soon as the full effects of these new decisions to accelerate the demobilisation had been appreciated? If the news had not come out in this way, when did the Government propose to tell the country? Certainly, not on the first day of this new Session of Parliament, or the Prime Minister would have known

something about it. Surely, it was not hoped that grave news of such devastating effect to the fighting efficiency of this Service could be kept in the dark indefinitely. However, the sorry decision has been taken, and the world knows about it. But what we want to know is whether we have yet been told the whole story.
I think it may be for the convenience of the House, and perhaps of the Minister of Defence, if I try tonight to summarise the questions which I feel are worrying not only this House, but the country. The Minister of Defence said on Thursday that, with one exception, all the ships of the Home Fleet would be kept in commission. What exactly docs that mean in terms of delay before they can return to full operational condition? What, may I ask him, is the present strength of the Mediterranean Fleet and all formations East of Aden? The right hon. Gentleman told the House—and we were glad to hear it—that the Mediterranean Fleet must be kept virtually at full strength. But are reductions being planned for squadrons based on the Pacific and East Indies stations? What naval strength is to be maintained on the America and the West Indies station, and also on the Africa station? If there are to be any reductions on these stations, to what extent will they be due to currency difficulties or to what extent to the problems of manpower?
Can the Minister of Defence assure us that the proposed cuts, which so vitally affect the co-ordination of our naval strength with that of the Dominions, have been discussed and accepted by the Dominion Governments and their chiefs-of-staff? To what extent is it proposed that our weakness in any theatre shall be made good by ships from the Dominion Navies? How much further below the 147,000 men fixed for the end of March is it intended subsequently to go, so far as the Royal Navy is concerned? On 7th August the Chancellor gave a figure of 166,000 for the end of 1948. What is now the revised figure for that date? How many of the 147,000 on 31st March will be Regulars, and, again, what will be the Regular proportion of the naval strength in December, 1948? What is the Government's intention in regard to the ultimate proportion of naval personnel which shall be composed of National Service men? How is voluntary recruitment going? The


Army were given their figures since January, 1946, before the House rose, in answer to successive Questions. Can we be told the figures for the Royal Navy? What changes, if any, have been made in our programme—for this is most important—of new construction as detailed in the Estimates last March? Will the right hon. Gentleman give an assurance that there will be no cut in scientific research? I think that is, perhaps, the most important of all considerations.
I consider this list of questions is very necessary. I realise, too, that it is very formidable, and I feel sure that, while the House will welcome the answers which the Minister of Defence can give us tonight, the need still arises for a White Paper, which was asked for by the Leader of the Opposition, setting out in full the present position of the Royal Navy and the future intentions of the Government with regard to the Navy. We are grateful to you, Mr. Speaker, for having called this Amendment to the Address, for I can say quite truthfully that the whole country were not only shocked by last week's decision about the Home Fleet; they were also very angry. The decisions which have been taken and the answers which the Minister of Defence gives us tonight will, I feel, be better understood and better received if we can be assured that when the Navy is finally reduced to its post-war strength, it will be an efficient arm, able to play its full part in the necessary policing of the oceans and in our Imperial defence.

8.59 p.m.

Brigadier Head: I beg to second the Amendment which has been so ably moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Hereford (Mr. J. P. L. Thomas). He has dealt in some detail with the affairs of the Royal Navy, and I do not propose to follow him in that matter except to say that I, too, share the views of his khaki fellow-travellers.
We are today discussing a difficult and very vital subject. Any hon. Member who has listened to this Debate must have realised the almost desperate urgency for economy within the Armed Forces of men, material and money; but against that urgent need for economy, we have to bear in mind the foreign situation, to which the Prime Minister himself referred as one of growing tension. It seems to me that to

balance those two conflicting claims requires qualities of the utmost judgment, foresight and resolution. I think that the placing of this Amendment on the Order Paper does reflect the fact that there are many of us on both sides of this House who are uncertain as to whether or not the right hon. Gentleman who has that responsibility has displayed those qualities. It is easy to find fault with those who have high responsibility; but I think there are many on both sides who have their doubts.
The other reason for this Amendment is to seek information. May I say in passing that we are, on this vital subject of defence, very short of information at the present time. During the war, the withholding of such information was necessary, vital, and understood; but today it seems to me that so much secrecy is not only unnecessary but may be very harmful, because the small pieces of information that have been available to us have, I think, throughout the country dismayed those who take an interest in such matters; and they may also have dismayed those overseas who wish us well. Therefore, I beg the right hon. Gentleman to consider answering some of the questions which we put to him tonight very much more frankly than he has answered our questions in the past.
A further reason, I think, for this Amendment, is because we have been somewhat disturbed in the past by the right hon. Gentleman's actions and rulings with regard to the future of the Armed Forces. We have wondered whether they were dictated entirely with the aim of providing well-balanced, closely-knit Forces, or whether they were dictated to a large extent by political expediency. The right hon. Gentleman may say that this Amendment goes a very long way from the few words in the Gracious Speech which are concerned with the rate of demobilisation. I would say in explanation that we are in much the same position as an archaeologist who, finding just one bone of some much larger structure, attempts by his knowledge of the past and of the subject to reconstruct it. In reconstructing what we can of the future shape of the Armed Forces from the fragment in the King's Speech, we are worried lest its structure should be somewhat misshapen, and though not prehistoric, somewhat out of date.
I have three questions for the right hon. Gentleman in the brief time available. My first is this. Has the Ministry of Defence justified its existence by working out a long-term plan for the shape and form of our Forces in 1950, when demobilisation will have finished and the National Service call-up will have started? Is there a definite plan, and has it been closely knit between the three Services? Is it up to date? Is the shape of those Services as they will be fashioned capable of rapid expansion? Is it capable of playing its part in a modern war? Is that pattern dictated by the rate of demobilisation and by the manner in which the right hon. Gentleman has fixed the period of call-up and the allocation of the National Service men? Surely, it is the first priority that that end should be considered first, and that our Forces should be capable of rapid expansion and fighting in this modern world? If, on the other hand, there is no plan, then I think there is a case for the gravest fears and doubts throughout the House. I beseech the right hon. Gentleman to put our fears in that respect at rest, because there are many of us here tonight who feel that that target has not been settled, and that all we are, planning at the moment is a somewhat mutilated and truncated version of the kind of Forces with which we ended the war. I hope he will be able to prove me wrong in that respect.
My second question concerns the shape of the Forces which we shall have in 1949 and 1950. In passing, I would remind the right hon. Gentleman that many hon. Members on both sides of the House are not at all happy about the somewhat rapid alteration in the period of National Service which was made by himself. That has a very serious repercussion on the future shape of our Armed Forces, and I would remind him that the explanation which he gave immediately after that alteration satisfied very few hon. Members in this House. I think the general impression he gave was that he was indulging in a somewhat ignominious political Caporetto. That may or may not be so, but we have had no further information since the Recess. The only knowledge we have is that the right hon. Gentleman is still with us. That in itself, perhaps, is a subject for congratulation, inasmuch as his achievement is, so far as I know, unique in the military world. He has achieved the

unique distinction after taking part in a somewhat ignominious retreat, of contriving, nevertheless, to remain at his post. While congratulating the right hon. Gentleman on his ubiquity, I should like to ask whether the implications of this step are, on more mature reflection, favourable or unfavourable.
I hope the right hon. Gentleman will forgive me if I make a somewhat brief and rapid summary of the situation as I see it, within the three Services. It seems that the Royal Navy, who are great realists, have summed up their position and come to the conclusion that a National Service man with only one year's service will serve only to clog up their training machinery, and they have therefore taken the bit between their teeth and decided, by voluntary recruitment, to achieve a situation whereby they can dispense with the National Service man altogether. I may be right or wrong, but if they achieve it, so much the better, perhaps, for the Royal Navy.
I feel that the Royal Air Force are in somewhat the same position. Their recruiting figures, though not quite so favourable as those of the Royal Navy, are good. Although they may not dispense altogether with National Service men, it looks to me as though by 1949 or 1950 they might find themselves in a position to have less than their quota. I come lastly to the Army. I remind the House that at the present time the Regular Army has within it about 120,000 men. The target for 1949–50 is 220,000 Regular soldiers; that is to say, through voluntary recruitment the Army has got roughly to double itself. The voluntary recruiting figures for the Regular Army at the moment are most disturbing, and anybody examining those figures can come to only one conclusion, which is that the Regular Army is most unlikely to achieve its target of recruitment up to a strength of 220,000.
I should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman, who is obviously aware of this fact; what steps he has thought out to deal with it. Is he going to adopt a policy of drift, or what does he intend to do? It seems to me that he has three alternatives. Either he can leave the Army under strength, which, as it was announced that the minimum strength was the one on which he had fixed, seems unwise; or he can increase the period of service of the National Service man,


which would be breaking a pledge; or he can, by taking perhaps some of the unwanted men from the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, increase the number of National Service men of one year's duration who are sent to the Army. Of those three courses, I think the most likely is the latter.
Let me now issue one word of caution on behalf of the Army. Suppose that is done, and suppose the Regular Army is well below strength; we will then have a state of affairs of very considerable dilution within the Army. At the present time, with the coming responsibility of the Army to train the National Service men, that would surely be an unfortunate state of affairs. There will be units and formations overseas under strength, diluted and probably lacking that state of efficiency and discipline which the Army would wish. That will not only be bad from the point of view of British prestige abroad, but, even more serious, it is the last thing we shall want from the point of view of the National Service men, who will be young men spending the last part of their service with units overseas away from home. Secondly, how can we have units and formations which can train by themselves and become efficient units fitted for rapid call-up in an emergency? Lastly, will not the cadres which have to train the National Service men, who incidentally will comprise the majority of the youth of England, be so diluted that they will not be able to afford the type of training the Regular Army would like to provide? If these men's time is wasted, instead of their training being a tonic in preparing them for their future lives, it will be a dangerous introduction to whatever careers they may afterwards enter.
I ask these questions because I hope the right hon. Gentleman will give some indication that he has not only considered them, but is well primed with possible remedies. It seems to me that much can still be done in regard to recruiting for the Regular Army. The new Secretary of State for War is here, and I can assure him that if we feel that he will do his best on behalf of the Army, he will have support from hon. Members on this side of the House who have its interests at heart.
My third point concerns something I have already mentioned, and that is the

drastic need for economy throughout our Armed Forces today. I should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman what he has done since he has been in office to ensure that there is the maximum possible use, liaison and co-ordination between our own Forces and those of the Empire. When one considers the magnificent response there has been from the Empire in our economic difficulties, that modern war demands bases spread throughout the world, the need for dispersal due to modern scientific inventions and the immense war effort contributed so willingly by the Empire, it seems that something could be done more closely to co-ordinate and share out the responsibility of defence between the hard-pressed Mother country and the Empire We have heard nothing from the right hon. Gentleman in this respect. Either it means that he is loath to tell us—and I cannot believe that such information will do anything but good—or that nothing has been done about it. If the latter is true, I say that in this respect the years he has been in office have been completely wasted.
I have dealt with my three questions and I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will perhaps be grateful to us for having tabled this Amendment, inasmuch as it gives him an opportunity not only to answer these questions, but to dispose of the feeling, which I think is widespread throughout the House, that he is not planning any long-term policy; that the course he has been steering has not been dictated by an endeavour to build up a well-balanced and closely-knit force, but by a wish so to reduce our Forces as to silence on the one hand the irresponsible yappings of the hon. Member for East Coventry (Mr. Crossman) and, on the other, to avoid touching off the volcanic rumblings of the Foreign Secretary. Let him dispose of these feelings once and for all, and if so, I believe he will in some measure gain our support. If it is shown by his answers that our suspicions in this respect are justified, then I say, for the sake of our Armed Forces and for the good and safety of the Empire as a whole, let him make way for someone more worthy of his high office.

9.16 p.m.

Mr. Blackburn: The hon. and gallant Member


for Carshalton (Brigadier Head) has made many observations with which I am in agreement, but when he referred to the volcanic rumblings of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, I would point out to him that I greatly prefer those rumblings to the gutless rumblings of Lord Halifax before 1939. The hon. and gallant Gentleman also referred to the presence of my right hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellenger). I am sure we all appreciate the contribution which my right hon. Friend has made towards the improvement of our Armed Forces, and the dignified manner in which he has resumed his position as a Private Member.
The hon. Member for Hereford (Mr. J. P. L. Thomas) dealt with the question of the announcement which was made about our Navy. I would suggest that more serious—far more serious—than that announcement was the effect which the announcement about our soldiers had in Moscow and Warsaw, where the hon. Member for Gateshead (Mr. Zilliacus) and his friends were, in Bulgaria, Sofia, and Eastern Europe generally. I have had many people visit me today and they have assured me that the manner in which that announcement was made was calculated to have the worst possible effect. I have no desire to make an attack on the Minister of Defence on this, but I am unable to understand why the proper facts were not put out next day by his Press relations officers. I think the question of Press relations in the Ministry of Defence and elsewhere requires careful revision.
There is here tonight the new Minister for War, to whom we all wish luck. In addition to being Secretary of State for War he is also Chairman of the Labour Party, and he ought to be careful to realise that when he makes remarks which go overseas they go overseas as coming from the Minister for War as well as from the Chairman of the Labour Party. The right hon. Gentleman said something the other day about desiring the Government to go further Left. If he is a member of the Government he ought to be pleased with the way in which it is going, or get out of it. The effect of his remarks was interpreted in a way in which I am sure he did not mean them to be interpreted—that he desired the Government to go further in the direction of the hon. Member for Gateshead. There is nothing more

serious than that any Minister in charge of the War Department or any Ministry should suggest that he has any sympathy with the Communists and the crypto-Communist gang. There is nothing more important today than that Britain should be strong and well armed.
This Debate is of great importance. The Prime Minister pointed out that foreign policy and defence policy are as pects of the same policy. What is the men ace which our foreign policy must be designed to meet? It is the advance of the police State across Europe, that sickening technique of secret police, the torture chamber, and the gallows on Which that great hero, not only of Bulgaria, but of the whole world, Nikolai Petkov, recently died for freedom, and from which we must all pray that M. Mikolajczyk has now escaped. These Cominform or Comintern murderers have attempted to proclaim to the world that our Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary are traitors to Britain. The hon. Member for Hornchurch (Mr. Bing), who will no doubt be speaking later, and who is a personal friend of Mr. Stalin—[Interruption.] I think that it would be better if the hon. Member allowed me to finish my short speech. If these men have so reviled the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary because they have failed to pursue the servile tactics of the hon. Members for Gateshead and Hornchurch—

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Mr. Hubert Beaumont): I would remind the hon. Member that there is an Amendment under discussion. His remarks are wide of the Amendment.

Mr. Blackburn: I take it that it is agreed that defence policy and foreign policy are aspects of the same policy, and I am seeking to make the point shortly that, at this time, it is vital that we should be strong and well-armed. To reply to abuse by telling the truth is of little avail. These grim men of the Politic Bureau understand one thing only, and that is strength. Let us then be strong and of good courage. Let us gather round us the freedom-loving nations, steadfast in purpose to save the world from heartless barbarities, whether perpetrated under the name of Fascism, Nazism or Communism, for they are all members of the same totalitarian family. Over and over again throughout history have the


peaceful Powers invited aggression because they were weak. What would have been the situation in 1935 if we had been strong, resolute and determined to preserve the rule of law? It is, therefore, with much reluctance that I have to submit that the correct policy for this country is to go in the closest possible co-operation with the United States, and with other freedom-loving Powers, in order to see that this deadly advance of totalitarianism is held before it is too late. Let not the death of Petkov fail to have its lesson brought home to all of us in this country. Let his last agony at least teach us the lesson which the agonies of tens of thousands of Germans failed to do in the years before 1939. I believe that Russia does not desire war. I believe that the Soviet Union desires the fruits of war without war itself. That is a most dangerous policy which may well lead to war which they do not themselves desire. If we are strong enough in our defence policy I believe that we may be able to save them from war. I ask for one assurance only from the Minister of Defence. He gave it on the occasion of the last Debate on this subject, but I ask it from him again tonight—that there will be no weakening of our defence which will in any way interfere with the foreign policy of our Foreign Secretary.

9.24 p.m.

Mr. George Ward: In any Debate on the subject of Defence one is, of course, conscious that the amount of information which the Minister can give to the House is necessarily limited by the considerations of security: secondly, one is conscious, I think, that, after all, it is the duty of the Chiefs of Staff, all extremely experienced and able men, to study these questions from day to day and advise the Minister on what they consider to be the best defensive policy. In spite of that we on this side of the House are by no means confident, first of all, that the Minister does not sometimes seek a refuge behind the convenient plea of security; and, secondly, that the advice of the Chiefs of Staff is not sometimes brushed aside and that the Chiefs of Staff are treated with the same disdain as they are certainly treated by some sections of the Left Wing Press, who consider them as a collection of old staff "brass hats"

whose main consideration is to get what they can for themselves regardless of the needs of industry. If we on this side of the House have such anxieties and such apprehensions His Majesty's Government have only themselves to blame, for their record in either direction has not been one exactly to inspire confidence in their ability and foresight, nor has it been one in which decisions have always been taken without political or party pressure.
It is because of these anxieties that we have tabled this Amendment, and it is because of them that I should like to ask the Minister for one or two assurances as regards the Royal Air Force. The first assurance I should like to ask him to give is that, at all costs, we shall maintain an adequate striking force capable of going into action at reasonably short notice. People are still far too much inclined to think of air defence as a battle between British fighters and enemy bombers somewhere between London and the South Coast. That form of our defence is, of course, quite dead and buried, because the interception of projectiles and guided missiles travelling at tremendous speed is clearly quite out of the question. Therefore, our only profitable means of air defence today is by offensive methods. First of all, we have to try to locate the bases from which these missiles are launched and smash them up with a mighty force of long-range bombers. In other words, air defence today is facing the same problem as a company of the army which is being shelled by heavy artillery. Their only form of defence is to destroy the gun itself, because they cannot intercept the shell.
The adequate defence of these islands today must be to maintain an adequate striking force. I understand that even today Bomber Command would find it extremely difficult to put into the air more than a few squadrons if called upon to do so, and any further cuts may well reduce them to practical impotence. I understand that their main difficulty is not so much the overall shortage of manpower as a serious shortage in certain trades. I believe electrical technicians are particularly scarce, and it is not enough to have the pilots, the crews and the fitters if our aircraft remain grounded through lack of electricians. So the second assurance I would ask the Minister to give us is that if any cuts are


to be applied to the Air Force due consideration will be given to preserving a proper balance between the various trades.
May I turn for a moment to the subject of training? I believe that our ability rapidly to extend the Royal Air Force in an emergency and to go into action with the least possible delay depends primarily upon good training. Without it, the whole of the organisation of the Service would become a farce, and very much of the money and the manpower would be wasted. These Services cannot train themselves. Training requires experienced teachers, who are able to impart their knowledge to others. If we have a decline in the number of experienced people in Training Command, the quality of the training will deteriorate very rapidly indeed. I would, therefore, ask the Minister for an assurance that at all costs the high standard of R.A.F. training will not be allowed to deteriorate.
A very valuable contribution to the training of pilots and ground staff can and should be made by the Auxiliary Air Force. This is the ideal solution, because while keeping people trained it does not take them away from industry, since they do the training in their spare time. I understand that the pilots' training in the newly revived auxiliary squadrons has been greatly handicapped by shortage of ground staff. I understand the difficulty, because immediately after war people are trying to re-establish themselves in civilian life. Recruiting will, for that reason, be much more difficult than it was before the war. It is, nevertheless, important that we should use the Auxiliary Air Force as much as possible in this ideal solution. I would be grateful if the Minister could give us some idea how recruiting for the Auxiliary Force is proceeding and what steps he has taken to stimulate it.
I would make one suggestion. This is a long-term policy and not a short-term policy. I suggest that the Minister would help himself greatly to stimulate recruiting for the auxiliary squadrons by stimulating recruiting for the A.T.C. If we get boys into the A.T.C. and get them airminded, when they reach the right age they will swell the ranks of the auxiliary squadrons. If we started now trying to help the A.T.C. as much as possible that would pay very good dividends in a few years.

In my part of the country recruiting for the A.T.C. is made unnecessarily difficult by the shortage of huts for accommodation and by the inability to offer boys the attraction of air experience. The only way to get a boy interested is to offer him gliding or passenger experience. The facilities for this sort of thing do not exist in my part of the country. I implore the Minister to look into the whole question. I think he will find that he can give quite a bit of help.
Finally, I would say one word about staffs. I ask the Minister for one more assurance which is that, in considering the cuts, he will carefully and thoroughly re-examine the staffs of the Air Ministry and of various other Departments. If the axe is to fall, let it fall first on the people who push out the paper, a lot of which is quite unnecessary. I do not want in any way to cast aspersions on staff officers. I was one myself for a time and I know their difficulties and the work they do. Like everything else, it is largely a matter of training, and one well-trained staff officer can do two or three times the work of an untrained officer and everybody benefits because there is not a mass of conflicting and woolly letters to be dealt with by the understaffed units.
In peace time, particularly when the needs of industry are so great, we do not expect a large Air Force. But we do expect a well balanced and highly trained Air Force. We expect a strong nucleus which can be rapidly expanded in time of emergency and which can go into action with the very minimum of delay. Moreover, we expect an Air Force which fits into a clear far-sighted plan of defence as a whole, a plan in which the rôle of each of the three defence Forces is clearly defined and in which the size and strength of each of the defence Forces is in the correct proportion to the others. We expect an Air Force which fits into an Empire, with free interchange of ideas and method of training, and—this is most important—particularly with the responsibility for Empire defence correctly shared. For example, the manning and keeping open of our vitally important reinforcement routes to the near East, Singapore and Australia should not fall entirely on our shoulders. Finally, we want an Air Force which will help to uphold our prestige and influence and which will be worthy of its traditions and its high reputation throughout the world.

9.37 p.m.

Mr. Bing: I am sorry that my hon. Friend the Member for King's Norton (Mr. Blackburn) is not here, but those hon. Members who are familiar with Bacon's essay on truth will remember that there was an equally distinguished politician who, in his day, did not stay for an answer—Pontius Pilate. I do not know if I am one of those "irresponsible yappers" to whom the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Carshalton (Brigadier Head) referred, but if I am, I would like to say of his speech that I am always very pleased indeed to follow in a Debate in which he has taken part. There is always a great deal of very good sense in what he says. Therefore, if I do not deal with any of his arguments I hope he will not think I do not endorse a good many of them.
I would like to turn for a moment to the arguments with which the hon. Member for Hereford (Mr. J. P. L. Thomas) opened this Debate. They seemed to me to savour of the great strategical controversy which convulsed the party opposite on the eve of the war, whether or not the Scots Greys should have their horses. The problem with which we are faced at the moment is: what forces can we afford to have economically?—and having reached that decision: how can we reach that number in the shortest possible space of time? To do that involves considerable disorganisation, but the United States faced exactly that disorganisation in their forces, and it is far better to have that disorganisation than to have the continued and hidden disorganisation of a large force for which we have not the ships to take it overseas, the petrol for its vehicles or aircraft, or the transport facilities with which to mobilise it properly.
I think we ought to look at and try to fit this question of the Forces into the framework of the picture painted for us by my right hon. and learned Friend the Minister for Economic Affairs. For that reason, I think one should start by looking for a second at that expert analysis of the national income in the July bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Statistics. There the authors point out that although our national output increased by 14 per cent., incentive was lowered because of the falling off in consumption and, worse still, our future was jeopardised because there was a nine per

cent. drop in net capital investment. Why was there that? Because there was a 249 per cent. increase in the real cost of defence. That was for last year.
When one looks up last year in the National Income White Paper, one finds that over half our adverse balance of overseas payments was due to military costs. We do not know how much steel is being used in the Forces. This is some more of the information we should have. We do know that of our total petroleum imports of £60 million the three Forces between them have a gross estimate of £32 million for petroleum this year. We do not know how much land these Forces occupy. The White Paper that has been promised us for over a year now has not come out, but we do know, when last we had information in May, that over two million acres are occupied by the War Office alone, the Air Force has 265 airfields, the Navy has another 30, but the Ministry of Supply, not content with the Air Force airfields, has its own airfields and even has its own bombing ranges which it will not share. We do not know how many men are engaged on Forces capital expenditure, but we do know—the White Paper on Defence says so—that almost one-third of the total sum which we hope to save on capital expenditure is being spent by the Forces on works.
We know that transport is our weakest link. We do not know quite the proportion which the Forces use of our transport; all we know is that they are spending this year £73 million on "movements." We can get some idea perhaps of the effect on our communications because there are two figures we know: We know that on telephones alone the three Services are spending, according to my calculations, which I think are correct, £6,250,000, while the total telephone bill of the public is only £22 million. We do not know how many exports are diverted to the use of the Forces because it is difficult to pick them up, but we can pick up one figure. My right hon. and learned Friend said that the exports of aircraft were running at the end of 1946 at the rate of £16 million per year. It is hoped to work that up at the end of 1948 to an annual rate of £30 million a year. Yet in this year the Air Force alone is proposing to spend £42 million on aircraft.
We do not know exactly what proportion of our scientific resources are devoted


to the Forces; we do know that if we could raise the thermal efficiency of the use of coal by five per cent. it would be equivalent to a saving of 50 million tons. We cannot do that because of the great capital expenditure involved, but we think we could do it if we had sufficient scientific resources turned on the problem. However, we know that at least two-thirds, and possibly as much as £60 million out of the £67 million spent on scientific research goes directly or indirectly for Service use. Even worse, we do not know yet the true manpower position. I want to suggest—and I hope my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence will answer this point—that his calculation in the Defence White Paper is an under-estimate by over half-a-million of the number of men who are at this very moment directly employed in Defence.
The Minister's miscalculation can be seen quite clearly now by studying the "Digest of Statistics" and comparing the figures in that with the figures given in the Minister's speech in the Defence White Paper Debate. It is quite clear that he supposed—I am compelled to say quite wrongly—that the only people who were working for the Forces were those people engaged in the manufacturing industry and returned by the Ministry of Labour as directly manufacturing for the Forces. Of course, that total is, on the one hand, far too high and, on the other hand, far too low. It is too high because the many people who make clothing and provide food for the Forces would make and provide those things if they were in civil life. It is far too low because the Forces directly employ large numbers of other people whom my right hon. Friend never seems to have taken into account at all.
The hon. Member for Worcester (Mr. G. Ward) referred to the Civil Service. There are 100,000 of them as against 51,000 before the war, and even then the Ministry of Supply was not counted in. If one goes through the Estimates one will find there are no less than half-a-million men, civilians, who are down for employment in the Services. It is very difficult to know what they are all doing. But one can get an example; the Army has a fleet manned by civilian sailors, called the R.A.S.C. fleet of 2,500, and great numbers of civilians are employed by R.E.M.E. and Services of various sorts. It might well be that some are civil servants and some are foreigners

and some are perhaps no longer employed. I have written down the total from half-a-million to 175,000. My right hon. Friend failed to count his own Ministry, because perhaps it is included in the Civil Estimates; nor are the men employed by the Ministry of Labour on call-up and large numbers of different military jobs—paid for by the Foreign Office—on the Control Office. If one takes those into account it comes to about 60,000.
Then there is civil engineering for naval base services, which is about 60,000. Distribution is not counted, but a man only buys from N.A.A.F.I. because he is away from home, and the number employed in N.A.A.F.I. in August was 33,000. With welfare and everything else, I reckon that at 40,000. Those in the Ministry of Supply who work for the Forces but are not engaged in production, amount to 75,000. This gives a total of 520,000 men my right hon. Friend has not taken into account at all. I am going to subtract the total of those manufacturing for industry, 40,000, making clothing, but that still leaves 2,120,000, which makes defence by far our biggest industry. It is over twice the number engaged in agriculture, and nearly three times those employed in mining. It exceeds by more than half-a-million those employed in all our industries working for export. People have talked about inflation, but here is inflation. Not one of these people is producing anything, but they are all coming to draw from the common pool which others produce. The White Paper of the Minister of Labour made an estimate of £100 million as the inflationary gap, but I estimate that wages are paid amounting to £450 million a year for no production.
If the White Paper is deficient in calculation in that respect, I suggest it is equally deficient in its book-keeping. Quite rightly the Minister has deducted all the services which the various Services provide for other Ministries, but he has not thought of adding the things they get free from the Ministries. They get Post Office service, stationery, and all those things free. He has not added anything for the cost of his own Ministry. It may be only half-a-millon, but he has not reckoned the cost of the Secret Service, which is £2,500,000 and the very heavy military costs borne by the Control Commission in Germany. I do not want to go


into the figures any further, but I suggest that this makes a gross total of £940 million. That seems to me to justify completely, although perhaps in a rather different way, the call for a reduction. It does show that not only could we reduce our Forces, but that we should continue to press these reductions even further.
The strategical argument is as strong as the military argument, because the Chief of the Imperial General Staff himself has told us that we should not be worried about men being brought back from overseas, as they have not got the shipping to bring them back. We have abroad half the number that we have at home, so that if we cannot bring half the people back, how can we send out twice as many? I hope the Minister of Defence will not allow himself to be in any way distracted by the arguments he has heard from the other side of the House, or rather, that the only argument from that side to which he will pay attention is that of the hon. and gallant Member for Carshalton, and that he will give us more facts in a Defence White Paper which, as carefully as the Economic White Paper, sets out what is our true position. It is a very serious time, and we should have fairly and frankly put before this House what is the exact position.

9.52 p.m.

General Sir George Jeffreys (Peters-field): I do not propose to traverse any of the ground which has been traversed by my hon. Friends, who dealt so ably with the conditions of the Navy and the Air Force, but I would say that like everybody else in the Army, and people in general, I view with alarm and horror the reduction of the Royal Navy in particular. Before I turn to the Army, I would urge recognition of the fact that the three Sevices are in fact one—three in one—each being complementary to the others and integral necessary parts of our Armed Forces as a whole. I believe that we have learned enough to look at them in that sense; it is the only sense in which anybody in these modern days ought to look at the general question of our Armed Forces. I would further urge that all experience shows that in times of danger improvisation is both useless and ineffective. If we want peace we must be reasonably prepared for war.
Lord Salisbury, the Victorian Prime Minister, once said, in discussing the functions of the different parts of the Forces, "The Navy cannot climb mountains." It is a trite saying but it is a fact, and it is sometimes forgotten that we cannot do with the Navy alone. Equally, the Air Force can do many things; it can terrify, destroy and intimidate, but it cannot occupy, administer, and still less pacify, and those functions must be carried out by the Army. The great reductions in the Army, and particularly the reductions in the infantry, are deplorable. Napoleon once said, "The British infantry is the best in the world; luckily there are very few of them." I wonder what he would say now. There are very few now, and there will be very many fewer if the present intentions of the Government, as I understand them, are carried out. Only infantry can keep, hold and defend positions and ground, and there is some ground and there are some obstacles which only infantry can traverse in attack. Infantry are also absolutely essential to the occupation, administration, pacification and policing of enemy territory after a war. One has only to look at the conditions now prevailing in Germany, Austria, Palestine and elsewhere to realise the truth of that.
Yet the Government propose to disband approximately half our infantry battalions and, by wholesale releases, render the remainder ineffective. Not only that, but their proposals will leave us as compared with other great Powers, with absurdly and dangerously small Forces. It must be remembered that we have lost the gallant Indian Army—not only gallant but very efficient—which rendered such magnificent service in this and in previous wars. We cannot count on them in the future. They are a very appreciable loss to our armed strength.
Are there not other ways in which economies can be made Surely, there are. For instance, can we not economise in all the Services in staffs, establishments and property not only at home but also in France, Italy and elsewhere overseas? Is a British commander and his staff really necessary in Paris? Unless he has been withdrawn very recently, there is one there. Are considerable quantities of troops at Calais really necessary? I suggest that instead of disbanding Regular battalions, we should make economies on


staffs and establishments, and the Regular battalions doomed for disbandment should be preserved, possibly on reduced establishments but with a high proportion of instructor officers and non-commissioned officers. They should be employed in taking the places of the primary training centres and infantry training centres which, I understand, are to go. Something must take the place of these establishments if they go. There must be primary training and further training. Why should not these Regular battalions be preserved on a reduced establishment to carry out that training? They would be available, on mobilisation, to be swelled to war strength, and they would be efficient instead of being improvised.
Extra pay might, and probably would, have to be given to non-commissioned officer instructors and possibly to all ranks. Certainly, non-commissioned officer instructors are worth a higher proportion than they get now. If we want to get the necessary volunteers, we must prove to the men that it is worth their while financially. Cannot further economies be made in regard to buildings and properties requisitioned and still held by the War Department and, indeed, by the other Service Departments? For instance, in London, quite close to us, the War Office, overflows into Eaton Square, into Hobart House and into various other buildings and houses, though it is two years since the end of the war. The Admiralty still occupies houses and properties on shore remote from the sea, and the Royal Air Force tenaciously sticks to some aerodromes which are now redundant and which should be restored to agricultural purposes. Could not great economies be made in such matters as these rather than in our fighting ships, fighting troops and fighting aircraft?
In 1920, the then Chief of the Imperial General Staff, that very versatile and brilliant man, the late Sir Henry Wilson, said to me that he had been asked by the then Prime Minister to recommend to him the strength and establishment of the postwar Army, and that he had replied that he would do so, but that he would like to know what the Prime Minister wanted the Army for. The Prime Minister had replied, perhaps not unnaturally, that he wanted it for war, and Sir Henry Wilson then said, "Yes, but there are two sorts of war, and it depends what

sort of war you want it for. There are two sorts of war, and the first is successful war, and the second unsuccessful war. Successful war is costly in life and treasure, but unsuccessful war is sure and absolute ruin." Sir Henry told me that himself, and I think it was the sort of thing that he would have said. There was a very great deal of truth in it; I think that it would be much better if these facts were faced now and always by those responsible. Do not let us economise at the expense of the Armed Forces; it is really a penny-wise and pound-foolish policy. If men are required for industry and money is needed for social services, let us remember that defeat means that industry will be ruined and the social services will cease to exist.
Lastly, I feel sure that the Foreign Secretary will agree that armed strength is absolutely necessary for the support of national policy, as no one respects weakness—no nation, great or small. It is further necessary to carry out our responsibilities under U.N.O. If we want attention paid to our representations and to our policy, whether by Great Powers such as Russia or by Powers certainly not great, such as Bulgaria, with whom we have had some exchanges of late—it does not make much difference—we shall not get much attention paid to us unless we are strong and unless we are a nation to be reckoned with in other ways besides words. I saw in the paper recently that the hon. Lady the Member for North Hendon (Mrs. Ayrton-Gould) had said in a speech, I think in Norway or Sweden, that this country was now a second-class Power, and it appears that she said it not altogether with disapproval. I know there are many people in this country who have suggested that we should be safe from aggression if we were a second-class Power, with very little power of any kind. Being a second-class Power did not save Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium or Greece, to mention only a few, and being weak will never save any Power of any kind from aggressive nations.
There is one more thing I want to say. I only trust that we shall not live to see this country once more plunged into war when unprepared. I hope we may not see our little Regular Army offered up as a sacrifice, as it has been twice already since 1914, while the rest of the nation is preparing for war.

10.5 p.m.

Mr. Fernyhough: I listened with great attention to the hon. and gallant Member for Petersfield (Sir G. Jeffreys). We are talking about being prepared, but there is no regard, apparently, to the economic condition of the country. Hon. Members opposite will not make up their minds where the cuts are to be. They have opposed the cut in petrol, in food and in timber, and now they are saying that there ought to be no reduction as far as the Armed Forces are concerned. Quite frankly, it seems to me that as a nation we are faced today with exactly the same choice as Hitler presented to the German people. We can either have guns or butter, but we cannot have both.—[HON. MEMBERS: "We have neither."]—We are having some of one of those two things, but there will be no butter if we are going to have guns and soldiers, sailors and airmen in the numbers that hon. Members opposite would like.
Let us be perfectly clear about the matter. The obvious thing that anyone would do, who really wanted to protect this country in the future and who thought it was in danger of attack, would be to get the men out of the Forces, and to build up our war potential—to get our coal, textile and food productions up to the maximum amount possible, in order to have a really substantial economy. Wars are not won merely by having a lot of men in uniform; they are won by having plenty of coal and steel, and all the other things that enable the struggle to be carried on with effect. As a nation we cannot afford—irrespective of what hon. Members opposite may think—to patrol the Seven Seas. The time has gone when we could afford to do that.
It should be realised what the 1914 war cost us—although we won it—and that, in the last war, we sold £1,200 million of our foreign investments, lost our export trade and have become indebted to the whole world, and are literally bankrupt. Do hon. Members opposite think the danger of war is imminent, because they talk as if it were? I can only assume, as we shall not go to war against France or Belgium or Germany or Japan, that the danger of war is with Russia. But if there is one thing I would like this Government to do it is to make it perfectly clear that, as far as Russia is concerned, we have no intention

of going to war with her, and, furthermore, no intention of letting America use this country as a base for an attack against Russia. I believe that if things like that were said rather than some of the things such as we have heard from the hon. Member for King's Norton (Mr. Blackburn), we should probably get a better understanding with Russia.
Even if there was such a danger, the sensible thing to do would be to build up our economy so as to be in a position to wage war. To do that, it would be absolutely essential that many of the men at present "square-bashing" should be brought back to build up agriculture, and the coal and other industries upon which a successful waging of war would depend. What has to be realised is that every man in the Forces at the moment is, as it were, an import without a corresponding export. To the right hon. Member for Hereford (Mr. J. P. L. Thomas), who moved the Amendment on behalf of Members opposite, I would say that, whatever his point of view may be about grumbling in railway trains, my post bag, which is no different from any other hon. Member's, is proof that the men in the Services are breaking their hearts wanting to get out, and if hon. Members opposite wish to see those letters they can have them at the close of this Debate.

10.10 p.m.

Vice-Admiral Taylor: It is a truism that if we desire to pursue a strong foreign policy, we must have strong Armed Forces behind the Foreign Secretary. In view of the very unsettled state of the world today, it is equally necessary that we should have strong Armed Forces. Therefore, I am quite sure that the whole country must have been astounded by the statement of the Minister of Defence the other day, when he informed the country that before the cuts bringing our Home Fleet down to that Gilbertian position of one cruiser and four destroyers we only had in the Home Fleet one battleship, five cruisers and 12 destroyers. The Naval Estimates have limited the strength of the Navy on grounds of finance. Now it has been limited on grounds of manpower. Originally, the length of conscription was 18 months, but in 48 hours the Minister of Defence changed his mind and reduced it to one year. The country has no confidence in the Government as regards the Armed Forces.
I would like to ask the Minister of Defence how it is possible, with one battleship—the "Duke of York"—five cruisers and 12 destroyers, to have an efficient Home Fleet. For many decades, ever since the late Lord Fisher came home from the Mediterranean in 1902, the main strength of the Navy has been concentrated at home. We now have, as the Minister of Defence has told us, one battleship, five cruisers and 12 destroyers. How is it possible for the officers and men in His Majesty's Navy to be trained in those conditions? What chance has a Commander-in-Chief of carrying out Fleet exercises? What chance is there of enabling commanding officers to have the necessary practice in handling ships when the ships are not commissioned and at sea? It is not sufficient to have 178,000 personnel in the Navy, which is to be reduced in March, 1948, to 147,000. We must have the ships in commission, fully manned, so that the officers and men can carry out Fleet, gunnery and torpedo exercises which are necessary to keep the Navy efficient. It can be kept efficient in no other way.
I would ask the Minister of Defence what gunnery practice is carried out by the "Duke of York"? I am informed that only one turret can be fired in the "Duke of York," and that the remainder are in a state of care and maintenance. To what degree is the "Duke of York" in a position to fight? Will the Minister say whether full crews are provided for all her main armament, and what gunnery and torpedo exercises are carried out by her? We know that no manoeuvres were carried out during the summer. The First Lord referred to the one cruiser and four destroyers as a striking force. What nonsense! What can it strike at? From his experience, he ought to know better than to talk such rubbish. He also referred to battleships, frigates, etc., in the training squadron, as if the British public are to understand that it is part of the Home Fleet. It is nothing of the sort. I understand that the turrets on the two battleships, the "Anson" and the "Howe," are not worked at all. Do they carry out gunnery exercises? I am very concerned in this matter, not only at the cut in the Naval Forces, but because of the impossibility of keeping the officers and men of His Majesty's Navy up to the mark by going to sea.
The Minister of Defence has told the House that in a very short time, should an emergency arise, he will be able to man the ships and that he will have in them a striking force. That is absolute nonsense, and he must know it. The men will not have been trained; the officers will not have been trained at sea; the commanders-in-chief will not have had the opportunity, before the state of emergency has arisen, to practise or manoeuvre a fleet; the captains and commanding officers of the ships will not have been to sea, and will not have had exercises in working their ships; the gunnery exercises and the torpedo exercises will not have been carried out. Let the Minister of Defence ask the experts at the Admiralty how long they think it will take, when he commissions the ships which have been laid up, to have them ready as a striking force. I think he will be surprised at the answer he will get. It will not be a short time. It will take months before they can possibly be efficient as a fighting force. I understand that the next war will be a "press button" war—then our Naval Forces must be immediately ready The Minister of Defence will have to press that button for a mighty long time before he gets any answer. It is all very amusing, but it is all very tragic. We have not got the ships; we cannot train the Navy. If we let the training of the officers and men go down it will take a very long time before the efficiency of the Navy can be brought up again.
There is one other point I should like to make. It is this. [Interruption.] The only answer of Members opposite is to laugh. It only shows their extreme ignorance. But I do not want to waste time by making remarks of that sort. It is of immense importance to the prestige of this country that at this time we should not declare to the world, as the Minister of Defence and the Government are declaring to the world, that we are so down and out than we can have only one cruiser and four destroyers as the main means of defence in the Home Fleet. In addition to that we want to know what reductions are being carried out in foreign stations. The fleets there are small enough, in any case. It is of immense importance that we should show the flag in foreign ports. It is of immense importance to our prestige. It is of immense importance to the furtherance of our trade, and of immense importance as an encouragement to our


people who are pursuing trade in those foreign ports. How much of that is being done now?
I hope that the Minister of Defence will give us some information about that. The public have been kept in complete ignorance of the state of His Majesty's Navy. With the immense personnel that we have at our disposal it is inconceivable how the Government could possibly have been satisfied prior to these cuts that the Navy and the Home Fleet, which is the principal fleet we have got, should be represented by one battleship, five cruisers and 12 destroyers, now being cut down to one cruiser and four destroyers. It is a Gilbertian situation. It is one of which we should be utterly ashamed. The Government had lost the confidence of the country for other reasons before this occurred, but this is the last straw to break the camel's back and complete the lack of confidence of the country in the present Government.

10.19 p.m.

Mr. Shackleton: I think the only really effective argument put forward on the subject of the Amendment was put forward by the hon. Member for Jarrow (Mr. Fernyhough). The issue we are discussing tonight is whether the Government are carrying out a regular plan with regard to the Armed Forces, and I do not agree with either the hon. Member for King's Norton (Mr. Blackburn) or the hon. Member for Horn-church (Mr. Bing), who attacked the Government—I will not say from the Right or the Left, because the attack came from the clouds and through the clouds. What we are discussing is simply whether the Government's policy is designed to make this country stronger in the event of war, or whether it will make it weaker. The actual decline in manpower as a result of the recent cuts is a considerable one, but it is not as large as has been suggested by the speeches of hon. Members opposite. The special form put out by the Royal Air Force merely mentioned that there was a loss of a few thousand personnel. Quite frankly, we must accept cuts wherever we can if we are to maintain the strength of this country.
I am sorry to have to say this after the speech of the hon. and gallant Member for South Paddington (Vice-Admiral Taylor), who was so vehement against the

Government, but I am delighted to hear that at this moment the Navy is to be very much smaller. Against what possible enemy would the hon. and gallant Member suggest we should use a battleship? Does he suggest we should use it against America? Is he not aware that Russia is not a naval Power?—for obviously Russia was the Power he must have had in mind. Personally, I should like to see further cuts in the Armed Forces, but I would prefer them in the Navy. I should like to see the battleships going out of commission, which I think would be an important and definite step towards strengthening our position in the world, for it would then be made apparent to any potential enemy that we realise that a push-button war is not fought with battleships.
A number of interesting suggestions were put forward and questions asked by hon. Members opposite. It was pointed out that we no longer have the Indian Army. I hope there was no suggestion behind that, that the fact that we no longer have the Indian Army was in any way the fault of His Majesty's Government. It was only the decisive action of the Government which prevented us from being engaged in a war in India. However, I will not detain the House on that, because time is short. Suggestions have been made for greater efficiency, and for strengthening the Armed Forces. I hope the Minister will listen to some of the suggestions, but we must realise that at this moment it is vital to cut where we can. The recent cuts have been long delayed; they have been urged frequently from this side of the House in the past year, and I am only sorry the Government did not agree to them earlier, for they might have saved us some of the worst effects of the crisis. However, there is obviously a limit below which we cannot cut, and I think we are beginning to approach that stage now.

10.23 p.m.

Commander Galbraith: I think the right hon. Gentleman the Minister of Defence will have the sympathy of the House when he comes to reply, not only because of the numerous questions that have been put to him, but also because of the attack which was made upon him by the hon. Member for Hornchurch (Mr. Bing). I always have sympathy for one who is not only attacked from the front but is also


attacked from the rear. The House should be grateful to the hon. Member for King's Norton (Mr. Blackburn) because, after all, he did remind us that to be weak is indeed to invite aggression. That is, surely, the lesson of history, and it is surely a lesson which we in this House, after our recent experience, have not forgotten.
I can say quite honestly to the right hon. Gentleman that it was with very great dismay that we on this side of the House—and I am sure the country—learned of the great reductions in the Home Fleet. In fact, what has really happened is that that fleet has ceased to exist, for one cannot possibly consider one cruiser and four destroyers as a fleet; I do not know that it could even be termed a squadron. I think perhaps the words which the right hon. Gentleman used to describe it are the best words of all. He said that it was a striking force. As my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for South Paddington (Vice-Admiral Taylor) has just said, the most striking thing about it is its complete lack of force. The hon. Member for Preston (Mr. Shackleton) and the hon. Member for Jarrow (Mr. Fernyhough) asked who was the enemy that was going to attack us, and whether we were going to fight with the Russians or the United States. The anxiety does not come either from Russia or the United States, or from anyone nearer home. The right hon. Gentleman, in the statement he made last Thursday used the term "if there be any emergency," showing quite clearly that in his own mind an emergency might arise at any time. Looking around the world to-day, who would say that an emergency could not arise at the very shortest possible notice?
The rôle of the Home Fleet, if I understood it aright, used to be that it was a trained reserve, trained to the highest point of efficiency, ready to move to any of our fleets or squadrons in any quarter of the globe, should that be necessary. Should there be any unfortunate incident in the Far East, the Mediterranean Fleet was ready to move at once, and the Home Fleet ready to take its place, and the reserves ready to take the place of the Home Fleet. That is no longer possible. As I see it, the Mediterranean Fleet is confined to the Mediterranean because I doubt whether His Majesty's Government would care to denude that sea at the present moment of the strength that is necessary

to preserve the peace. It is very unfortunate, not only from our point of view, but from the point of view of the world, that the position is what it is today, namely, that our Mediterranean Fleet is tied to the Mediterranean, because, after all, when the British Navy has been strong in the past, it has always been for the stability of the world and when it has been weak, it has always led to instability.
The right hon. Gentleman has been asked to answer a great number of questions. Without wishing to be offensive, may I say that I hope he will answer them openly, because whether he meant to or not—and I am sure he did not mean to—the statement he made last Thursday was most misleading? The ships which the right hon. Gentleman mentioned are, I understand, quite incapable of going into action for months. Battleships are training squadrons, and aircraft carriers, at least in some cases, have no aircraft on board, and their hangars are used as classrooms The impression that the right hon. Gentleman left in one's mind was that all these ships were ready immediately to go on active service. If he will refer to his statement, he will see that my words are correct. In making a statement of that kind, I would say to the right hon. Gentleman that he is misleading no one who is going to be our enemy, and that all he is doing is to mislead the people of our own country. The principal question which we should like to have answered tonight by the right hon. Gentleman is this: Is there a plan? If there is a plan, where is it? Let us have it.

10.29 p.m.

The Minister of Defence (Mr. A. V. Alexander): When I saw this Amendment on the Order Paper, I wondered exactly why it had been put down in these terms, because it does not seem to have reference to the case which has been made out. The hon. Member for Hereford (Mr. J. P. L. Thomas), a very old friend and colleague at the Admiralty, whose work I very much appreciated, mentioned part of the policy of the Government in the matter, but not all of it. I will give it to the House:
My Ministers will accelerate the release of men and women from the Armed Forces to the maximum extent consistent with the adequate fulfilment of the tasks falling to the Forces.


They will press on with the reorganisation of the Forces on their peace-time basis and the task of obtaining the necessary voluntary recruits to build up the Regular Forces and the Auxiliary Services."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 21st October, 1947; Vol. 443, c. 6.]
In other words, the Government are getting on in their job with the long-term problem in view, as well as the immediate reduction which the Prime Minister announced last week. I am sorry, therefore, that it does not appear to have been recognised that the Gracious Speech conveyed adequately the Government's intention.
The way the Amendment has been supported tonight, with very few exceptions, shows quite clearly that it is very useful to have this opportunity of making quite clear as many points as possible. I make no complaint about the way the Debate has gone, except for the personal references of the hon. and gallant Member for Carshalton (Brigadier Head), which are not really worth any effort. The position can be quite easily stated with regard to the general run-down which has been undertaken. The complaint which has been made in the last half-hour or so about the size of the Forces at 31st March next, seems to me to have been very much over-stated. After all, at 31st March next we shall have 937,000 men and women in the Forces. I remember that by 1921, Members of the parties which formed the Coalition of that time had reduced the Forces in about the same period to barely over 500,000. In other words, in about the same period this Labour Government, which is so much attacked apparently for lack of courage in dealing with the situation, has kept in being nearly double the number in' the Forces as did the Coalition Government of 1918–1922.

Captain John Crowder: They learn by experience.

Mr. Alexander: I do not think that observation is relevant. I am answering the chief point which has been raised in the Debate as to the run-down in the Forces which the Government have undertaken. I have listened without saying a word throughout the whole of this Debate, and I hope that hon. Members opposite will give me a reasonable opportunity to reply.

Vice-Admiral Taylor: Will the right hon. Gentleman state the number of ships in commission in 1921?

Mr. Alexander: The number of ships in commission in 1921 was considerably more than is the case now if you include those engaged in training the recruits who were going in to replace the men who were demobilised, and if you include the ships which were used for training at home. No one disputes the general basis of the naval case put at the start by the hon. Member for Hereford. The vital nature of sea communications to us does not need to be preached to me. I know it so well. I have been in charge of the administration of the Navy for longer than any man who has sat in this House. I understand the case perfectly well. But I must also say that we are bound to consider the run-down of the Forces in the light of the trend of modern conditions. We shall have reduced, as I say, to 937,000 men and women by 31st March next, and we have got down to that figure from the originally proposed 1,087,000. Of that latter figure the Navy was to have 182,000, but we had an interim cut of 4,000 a few months ago, and now we shall have a rather sharper run-down to 147,000 by 31st March.
I want to make it quite clear that the Navy are coming down so rapidly during the next six months, not by an order of mine, but because the Admiralty feel that, if, over the period of the next year or two they will have to reach a peace-time figure of about 147,000, it is better for them to take the whole cut and go in for immediate reorganisation. This is proposed so that they may reach peace-time organisation and efficiency of the Fleet at the earliest possible moment. Now it is said that this is practically destroying the Home Fleet, but that is quite untrue—[An HON. MEMBER: "It is not."] I am quoting the words used just now in the course of the Debate. It is quite untrue.
The Home Fleet, I indicated the other day—the operational side of it—consisted of one battleship, five cruisers, twelve destroyers, and other auxiliary craft; with the exception of one cruiser, H.M.S. Dido, which, after paying off, will be put into reserve, the Fleet will not be reduced. All sorts of things have been said, but it will not go out of commission. It will be immobilised in part for varying periods, according to the particular ship and


whether, in the "sorting out" of the personnel, it is possible to man that ship. But I want to repeat that they will all be in commission and sent back to service as soon as particular ships can be manned.
Hon. Members will have seen, as I have seen, remarks in the newspapers; some of them based, I should think, on gossip in the Service clubs by some people who ought to know better. I have seen in the Press again this weekend statements that it would not be possible to have another cruise of the Fleet until early 1949. I would say that I believe that it is certainly going to be possible to readjust the complements of the ships early enough to have the Fleet out to sea and engaged, by the autumn of next year, in another cruise. That is part of the answer to the hon. and gallant Member for South Paddington (Vice-Admiral Taylor). I am not now speaking on any special line given me by the Admiralty, but I hope, from my experience of naval administration, that, by economy and direction by the Admiralty in the best possible way, the personnel provided will be allocated to the greatest advantage and that as a result, within the limits of the personel allowed, some of these ships will in fact be back in service earlier than may at present be anticipated.
A great many people have made comments to the effect that it is intolerable that so many personnel should be in the Royal Navy with so few ships at sea. Newspaper articles have stated it, too. I beg hon. Members in all parts of the House to consider the situation, because there is much more to it than that. It must be remembered that, in the early years of the war, in the Royal Navy we expanded up to 860,000 or thereabouts. It also has to be remembered that we have run down very quickly; very quickly, indeed. We shall be down to 147,000 next March, and it is essential, with the enormous number of long-service and skilled men who have gone out of the Navy, and with the large inflow coming into the Navy in the other direction, that we should have fully trained personnel as early as possible.
All the time the training is going on. The hon. and gallant Member for South Paddington said just now that I was making wrong references to the ships which were being used for training, and he questioned whether a turret was in order, or something of that kind. As a

matter of fact, in the sphere of battleships, aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates and submarines there are a large number of ships today which are being continuously used in the training of men, and the Fleet is up to a better state of efficiency than certainly I remember it in peace at any time when I was in charge of naval administration. [An HON. MEMBER: "At sea?"] Certainly they are afloat. Certainly they are not being manned by a full complement of regular sailors, but they are used for recruits. Certainly they would not expect to go straight away into battle, but they would come in and take on special men who would be skilled and trained people and properly prepared for action.

Captain Marsden: When the right hon. Gentleman says they would come in, is he suggesting that these ships are at sea, because the information we have is that they are not at sea?

Mr. Alexander: I am referring to the ships actually used for the training of recruits. They do go to sea and for long distances. I have a note here of the points raised by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Hereford, and as time is limited I should like to deal with some of these questions seriatim. One of the first he asked dealt with this point. He asked what has happened to the Portsmouth training flotilla. Is it going to be in service? The Portsmouth training flotilla is only one of a number of home port flotillas engaged in exactly the same work. My answer should not cover the Portsmouth flotilla only, but I should add other ports like Chatham, Portland and Devonport, for all have their flotillas. The position in the case of Portsmouth is that it had, I think, a flotilla amounting to seven ships. There will now be six ships. I do not want to mislead the hon. Member into thinking that, during the re-assortment of crews, each one of the six ships will be operational every day during the whole of the financial year. They will certainly be used for the actual training of recruits. The same thing applies to the flotillas based upon Portland and on Plymouth.
The hon. Member asked me, for example, where are the flotillas of submarines. Active submarine training is being carried out by these flotillas and each has very modern and fine submarines. I think that out of the 24 in


commission at this moment for the operational training of recruits, only three are smaller than the "A" and "T" classes. They are fully commissioned and working at training all the time. I think it was the Gosport and Portland bases which the hon. Member mentioned especially. At those two bases, 11 submarines are operating for the purpose and they will continue to operate. As I come to explain these things, I must say that obviously there has been far too much said in the Press which was not factually correct and people have not really understood what is being done.

Commander Galbraith: What the hon. and gallant Member for South Padding-ton was concerned about was the statement made by the right hon. Gentleman last Thursday when he spoke of an emergency and then went on with these words:
At all times, there will be two modern battleships and at least two modern aircraft carriers, with other ancillary craft, maintained in commission."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 23rd October, 1947; Vol. 443, c. 246.]

Mr. Alexander: In commission.

Commander Galbraith: Yes, but those ships will not be ready to go to sea properly for at least six weeks.

Mr. Alexander: I made it perfectly clear last Thursday—I do not know what the hon. and gallant Member is worrying about—that these ships would require time for preparation to be in a full state of efficiency for any actual battle action, or anything of that kind. But I beg the House to remember what, in face of an economic crisis, we are up against. Where is the major naval force from whom you expect a naval challenge in the next few months? We have to consider the training and manning of the ships in relation to this. I, for one, am unable to find any force of that character. Great play has been made, and scornful reference, to what has been described as the striking force of a cruiser and four battle-class destroyers. I am sure that I had in mind no striking force to send against a major fleet. Certainly not, but in relation to any kind of naval threat you would expect in home waters in the next six months, I should think that a large cruiser and four battle-class destroyers carrying power-mounted turrets and not only open gun mountings, and well equipped in every other direc-

tion, would be a considerable striking force against anything you might expect in home waters in that period. Therefore, I brush that aside.
The hon. Member for Hereford asked me what is the present strength of the Mediterranean Fleet and of formations east of Aden, and what naval strength is to be maintained on the American, West Indian and African Stations, and whether we are going to have a reduction in the Pacific and East Indies. Well, the Pacific and West Indies Fleets will be reduced, but there will be no reduction in the East Indies or the South Atlantic Stations. But I am sure, in spite of what was said tonight by hon. Members, that it would be contrary to policy and the public interest to divulge the actual strength of these various fleets at the present time. As to what extent we can, in future, divulge these matters and as to how we can improve and expand information available to the House, as I said to the right hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) last week, that is to be under discussion through the usual channels. We will do what we can, and it may be that we can give information as to what the strength was on a given day; but it is against the public interest, according to my technical advisers, that we should regularly give information of the kind that is asked for by the hon. Member for Hereford. It is not a question of being in immediate danger of naval attack, but a question of general information as to the disposition of the Armed Forces at all times.
The hon. Member for Hereford asked me whether there were to be any reductions on foreign stations and to what extent would they be due to currency difficulties, and to what extent would they be due to problems of manpower. Reduction in the strength of the Navy on overseas stations is primarily due to re-deployment of naval manpower consequent upon the accelerated run-down. That is the main reason, but in so far as these adjustments also contribute to savings in expenditure in hard currencies abroad, we think they are also welcome. But in each one of these stations where we have to make reductions I hope that, within reasonable time, with reorganisation of the personnel, we shall be able to restore, or at any rate, make some addition to the temporarily reduced strength at present.

Brigadier Head: May I remind the right hon. Gentleman that his time is nearly up, and as Minister of Defence he has not yet mentioned either of the other two Services.

Mr. Alexander: I suppose I might be allowed to answer an important series of questions put by the mover of the Amendment.

Commander Noble: Before the right hon. Gentleman leaves that point about security, I wonder whether he will make arrangements to see that his statement is passed on to the B.B.C. and the Press, so that we do not get a repetition of announcements like that about cuts in the Home Fleet.

Mr. Alexander: I must say that we have no official control over what the B.B.C. says. I think they got their information from a Press agency and I am sure that was right; as to how they got it, I am going into it, as I should like to prevent a repetition of that kind of thing. On the main policy I should have very much preferred to have announced it first in the House of Commons as soon as the House assembled.
The hon. Member for Hereford asked about the co-ordination of naval strength with the Dominions—whether it had been discussed and accepted by the Dominion Governments and their chiefs of staff. No, it has not been discussed or accepted by the Dominion Governments and their chiefs of staff. Of course, we notified, as we always would do, the chiefs of staff and heads of the Governments of the Dominions before announcing it to the House of Commons. They were informed beforehand of our decision. It would be a great pity if we dealt with the question of future co-operation with the Commonwealth arbitrarily on such an occasion as this. What we are out to do is to maintain at all times the system of liaison we are building up and which is growing very satisfactorily, and which is to move each member of the Commonwealth closer to the others, and to work together. It is not possible for people sitting in the Government here or standing in the House of Commons to dictate to the free nations of the Dominions exactly what they should contribute to collective defence, and I can assure the House frankly and fully that the Government are anxious to develop co-operation. A liaison system has

been set up and the professional officers are doing everything they possibly can to keep that work going. I am sure they will be successful in it.

Major Legge-Bourke: Since the Dominions have been informed, have they made any remarks upon this reduction?

Mr. Alexander: No; they have not answered at all to the reductions notified, but I am sure they recognise our difficulties, as we have recognised theirs when they have had to take decisions with regard to their own forces. May I add that no better evidence could be obtained on the progress that the Dominions are making in the recognition of their proper share in Commonwealth responsibility than the example of Australia with her new five-year plan for spending on defence five times what she spent in 1937, doubling her Navy, increasing her Army, and providing 16 squadrons in the air when the programme is complete. They are working to help us, as is Rhodesia, in training the air personnel of this country. With this co-operation going on, it is a great pity that Members here should cast reflections upon us and say that we are not making progress in that way.
The hon. Member also asked about the 147,000 men on 31st March, 1948–what percentage would be Regulars and also what would be the Regular percentage of naval strength in December, 1948. The estimated Regular and National Service components of the 147,000 on 31st March will, I expect, be about 114,000 Regulars and 22,000 National Service men, and the remainder will be Wrens or locally enlisted personnel. As to the proportion of the two components at December, 1948, I am not prepared, so far in advance, to give detailed figures, although naturally the Service Departments are working on certain planning assumptions. It would be quite impossible to give firm figures for next year. In the case of the Royal Navy, the figures for voluntary recruiting have been very satisfactory indeed. The Army, I am afraid, has not been so satisfactory, and what the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Carshalton said tonight is nothing new to us. It is a problem—a very grave one—of what is to be the allocation of National Service men between the three Services, and other such matters. I certainly would not be able to tell him


tonight which solution we are going to adopt, although from what he said he must have been speaking to someone in close touch with us.

Brigadier Head: I would like to make it quite clear that such information as I have came from published figures, and from my own past experience.

Mr. Alexander: I am delighted to hear that, but the hon. and gallant Gentleman was exceedingly well informed. Perhaps he did not mention all the possible solutions which still have to be canvassed in great detail before a decision is come to, but certainly we have it in mind.
The hon. Member for Worcester (Mr. Ward) was speaking about the auxiliary figures, and it might be interesting for the House to know that the Territorial Army have 32,000, the Naval Auxiliary Forces altogether have 11,800 and the Auxiliary Air Forces, which is much more difficult, because you cannot seem to get ground personnel to go long distances to look after the machines, have nearly 1,800, and they have to be looked after in other respects by the regular Air Force.
I have been asked how have we related this at all to a long-term plan. I said to the House many months ago that the intention was to get a properly balanced long-term plan. On 18th February the Prime

Minister approved a memorandum which I referred to the professional staffs setting out the main directions which the inquiries should follow for a long-term plan for balanced forces. I have been in touch with the professional staffs the whole time, and plans are being examined in great detail. I can assure the House that that plan is to be produced and finally approved when it meets to satisfaction the Government's requirements. There is not the slightest reason for anyone to think that this Government are not interested in a long-term efficient plan for the forces, and in what we are doing now in the short-term run-down I have been most careful to take priorities not interfering with the long-term plan.

In the light of circumstances with which we are faced, my own view is that the first priority, which must not be interfered with, is defence research. The second, in the light of the present developing situation, must be to maintain the structure of the Royal Air Force, and its initial striking power. The third priority is for the maintenance of our sea communications, and, therefore, for the most efficient Navy we can get in the circumstances, and then we will do the best we can for the Army.

Question put, "That those words be there added."

The House divided: Ayes, 111; Noes, 252.

Division No. 2.]
AYES.
[11.0 p.m.


Astor, Hon. M
Galbraith, Cmdr. T. D
Macpherson, N. (Dumfries)


Baldwin, A. E.
George, Maj Rt. Hn. G. Lloyd (P'ke)
Manningham-Buller, R. E.


Baxter, A. B.
Glyn, Sir R.
Marlowe, A A. H.


Beamish, Maj. T. V. H
Gridley, Sir A.
Marden, Capt. A.


Birch, Nigel
Grimston, R. V
Marshall, D. (Bodmin)


Boothby, R.
Hannon, Sir P. (Moseley)
Medlicott, F.


Bossom, A C
Hare, Hon d. H (Woodbridge)
Molson, A. H. E.


Bower, N.
Harvey, Air-Comdre. A. V.
Morrison, Maj, J. G. (Salisbury)


Boyd-Carpenter, J. A.
Haughton, S G.
Morrison, Rt. Hon. W. S. (Cir'nc'ster)


Braithwaite, Lt.-Comdr. J. G.
Head, Brig. A. H
Mott-Radclyffe, Maj. C. E.


Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. W.
Headlam, Lieut.-Col. Rt. Hon. Sir C.
Nicholson, G.


Buchan-Hepburn, P. G. T.
Hogg, Hon. Q
Noble, Comdr. A. H. P.


Bullock, Capt. M.
Hollis, M. C.
O'Neill, Rt. Hon. Sir H.


Carson, E.
Howard, Hon. A.
Peto, Brig. C. H. M.


Channon, H.
Hulbert, Wing-Cdr. N. J.
Pickthorn, K.


Clarke, Col. R. S.
Hurd, A
Pitman, I. J.


Clifton-Brown, Lt.-Col. G.
Hutchison, Col. J. R. (Glasgow, C.)
Ponsonby, Col. C. E.


Conant, Maj. R. J. E.
Jarvis, Sir J.
Poole, O. B. S. (Oswestry)


Corbett, Lieut.-Col. U. (Ludlow)
Jeffreys, General Sir G.
Prior-Palmer, Brig. O.


Crookshank, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. F. C.
Joynson-Hicks, Hon. L. W.
Reid, Rt. Hon. J. S. C. (Hillhead)


Crowder, Capt. John E
Keeling, E. H.
Renton, D.


Cuthbert, W. N.
Lancaster, Col. C. G.
Robertson, Sir D. (Streatham)


Darling, Sir W. V.
Langford-Holt, J.
Ropner, Col. L.


Digby, S W.
Law, Rt. Hon. R. K.
Ross, Sir R D. (Londonderry)


Dower, Lt.-Col. A. V. G. (Penrith)
Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.
Sanderson, Sir F.


Drayton, G. B
Linstead, H N
Shepherd, W. S. (Bucklow)


Drewe, C.
Low, A R. W.
Smithers, Sir W.


Dugdale, Maj. Sir T. (Richmond)
Lucas, Major Sir J
Spearman, A. C. M.


Eden, Rt. Hon. A.
Lucas-Tooth, Sir H
Strauss, H G. (English Universities)


Elliot, Rt. Hon. Walter
Macdonald, Sir P. (I. of Wight)
Stuart, Rt. Hon. J. (Moray)


Foster, J. G. (Northwich)
Mackeson, Brig. H. R.
Sutcliffe, H


Fyfe, Rt. Hon. Sir D. P M.
Macmillan, Rt. Hon. Harold (B'mley)
Taylor, C. S. (Eastbourne)




Taylor, Vice-Adm. E. A. (P'dd't'n, S.)
Wakefield, Sir W. W.
Williams, C. (Torquay)


Thomas, J. P. L. (Hereford)
Walker-Smith, D.
Williams, Gerald (Tonbridge)


Thorneycroft, G. E. P. (Monmouth)
Ward, Hon. G. R.
Willoughby de Eresby, Lord


Thornton-Kemsley, C. N.
Wheatley, Colonel M. J.



Thorp, Lt.-Col. R. A. F.
While, Sir D. (Fareham)
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Turton, R. H.
White, J. B. (Canterbury)
Commander Agnew and




Mr. Studholme.




NOES


Alexander, Rt. Hon. A. V.
Field, Capt. W. J.
Morley, R.


Allen, A. C. (Bosworth)
Fletcher, E. G. M. (Islington, E.)
Morris, Lt.-Col. H. (Sheffield, C.)


Alpass, J. H
Follick, M.
Morris, P (Swansea, W.)


Anderson, A. (Motherwell)
Foot, M. M.
Mort, D. L.


Anderson, F (Whitehaven)
Foster, W. (Wigan)
Moyle, A.


Attewell, H C.
Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. H. T. N.
Murray, J. D.


Attlee, Rt. Hon. C. R.
Ganley, Mrs C. S.
Nally, W.


Awbery, S. S.
Gibbins, J.
Neal, H. (Claycross)


Ayles, W. H.
Gibson, C. W
Nichol, Mrs. M. E. (Bradford, N.)


Ayrton Gould, Mrs. B
Gilzean, A.
Nicholls, H. R. (Stratford)


Baird, J.
Glanville, J. E. (Consett)
Noel-Baker, Capt. F. E. (Brentford)


Balfour, A.
Gordon-Walker, P. C.
Noel-Baker, Rt. Hon. P. J. (Darby)


Barstow, P. G
Granville, E. (Eye)
Noel-Buxton, Lady


Barton, C.
Greenwood, A. W. J. (Heywood)
O'Brien, T.


Battley, J. R.
Grenfell, D. R.
Orbach, M.


Bechervaise, A. E.
Gunter, R. J.
Paling, Will T. (Dewsbury)


Bellenger, Rt. Hon. F. J.
Guy, W. H.
Palmer, A. M. F.


Benson, G.
Hale, Leslie
Pargiter, G. A.


Berry, H.
Hall, Rt. Hon. Glenvil
Pearson, A.


Beswick, F.
Hannan, W. (Maryhill)
Peart, T. F.


Bing, G. H. C.
Hardy, E. A.
Perrins, W.


Binns, J.
Hastings, Dr. Somerville
Platts-Mills, J. F. F.


Blackburn, A R
Henderson, A. (Kingswinford)
Poole, Cecil (Lichfield)


Blenkinsop, A.
Henderson, Joseph (Ardwick)
Porter, E. (Warrington)


Blyton, W. R
Herbison, Miss M.
Porter, G. (Leeds)


Boardman, H.
Hobson, C. R.
Pritt, D. N.


Bowden, Flg.-Offr. H. W.
Holman, P.
Proctor, W. T.


Bowen, R
Holmes, H. E. (Hemsworth)
Randall, H. E.


Bowles, F. G. (Nuneaton)
House, G.
Ranger, J.


Braddock, T. (Mitcham)
Hoy, J.
Rees-Williams, D. R.


Bramall, E. A.
Hudson, J. H. (Ealing, W.)
Reid, T. (Swindon)


Brook, D. (Halifax)
Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayr)
Ridealgh, Mrs. M.


Brooks, T J. (Rothwell)
Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)
Robens, A.


Brown, George (Belper)
Hughes, H. D. (W'lverh'pton, W.)
Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvonshire)


Bruce, Maj. D. W. T.
Hynd, H. (Hackney, C.)
Robertson, J. J. (Berwick)


Butler, H. W. (Hackney, S.)
Hynd, J. B. (Attercliffe)
Rogers, G. H R.


Callaghan, James
Irvine, A. J. (Liverpool)
Royle, C.


Castle, Mrs. B. A
Irving, W. J. (Tottenham, N.)
Sargood, R.


Chamberlain, R. A.
Isaacs, Rt. Hon. G. A.
Scott-Elliot, W.


Champion, A. J.
Janner, B.
Segal, Dr. S.


Chetwynd, G. R.
Jay, D. P. T.
Shackleton, E. A. A.


Cobb, F. A.
Jeger, G. (Winchester)
Sharp, Granville


Cooks, F S.
Jeger, Dr. S. W. (St. Pancras, S. E.)
Shawcross, C. N. (Widnes)


Collindridge, F.
Jonas, D. T. (Hartlepools)
Shinwell, Rt. Hon. E.


Collins, V. J.
Jones, Elwyn (Plaistow)
Shurmer, P.


Colman, Miss G. M.
Jones, J. H. (Bolton)
Silverman, J. (Erdington)


Comyns, Dr. L.
Jenes, P. Asterley (Hitchin)
Simmons, C. S.[...]


Corbet, Mrs. F. K. (Camb'well, N. W.)
Keenan, W.
Smith, C. (Colchester)


Corlett, Dr J.
Kendall, W. D.
Smith, Ellis (Stoke)


Crawley, A.
Kenyan, C.
Smith, H. N. (Nottingham, S.)


Crossman, R. H. S.
King, E. M.
Smith, S. H. (Hull, S. W.)


Daggar, G.
Kinghorn, Sqn.-Ldr. E.
Snow, J. W.


Daines, P.
Kinley, J.
Sorensen, R. W.


Dalton, Rt. Hon. H.
Lawson, Rt. Hon. J. J.
Soskice, Maj. Sir F.


Davies, Edward (Burslem)
Lee, F. (Hulme)
Sparks, J. A.


Davies, Haydn (St. Pancras, S. W.)
Leslie, J. R.
Stamford, W.


Davies, R. J. (Westhoughton)
Levy, B. W.
Steele, T.


Davies, S. O. (Merthyr)
Lindgren, G. S.
Stewart, Michael (Fulham, E.)


Deer, G.
Longden, F.
Stokes, R. R.


de Freitas, Geoffrey
McAdam, W.
Strauss, Rt. Hon. G. (Lambeth, N.)


Delargy, H. J.
McEntee, V La T.
Stross, Dr. B


Diamond, J.
McGhee, H. G.
Swingler, S.


Donovan, T.
Mackay, R. W. G. (Hull, N. W.)
Sylvester, G. O.


Dugdale, J. (W. Bromwich)
Mallalieu, J. P. W.
Taylor, H. B. (Mansfield)


Dye, S.
Manning, C. (Camberwell, N.)
Taylor, R. J. (Morpeth)


Ede, Rt. Hon. J. C.
Manning, Mrs. L. (Epping)
Taylor, Dr. S. (Barnet)


Edelman, M.
Marquand, H. A.
Thomas, D. E (Aberdare)


Edwards, John (Blackburn)
Marshall, F. (Brightside)
Thomas, I. O. (Wrekin)


Edwards, N. (Caerphilly)
Mellish, R. J.
Thomas, George (Cardiff)


Edwards, W. J. (Whitechapel)
Messer, F
Thorneycroft, Harry (Clayton)


Evans, A. (Islington, W.)
Middleton, Mrs. L.
Thurtle, Ernest


Evans, John (Ogmore)
Mikardo, lan.
Titterington, M. F.


Ewart, R.
Mitchison, G. R.
Tomlinson, Rt. Hon. G.


Farthing, W. J.
Moody, A. S.
Turner-Samuels, M.


Fernyhough, E.
Morgan, Dr. H. B.
Ungoed-Thomas. L.







Vernon, Maj. W. F
Whiteley, Rt. Hon. W.
Wilson, Rt. Hon. J. H.


Viant, S. P.
Wilcock, Group-Capt. C. A. B.
Woodburn, A


Walker, G. H.
Wilkes, L
Woods, G. S


Wallace, G. D. (Chislehurst)
Wilkins, W A.
Wyatt, W.


Wallace, H. W. (Walthamstow, E.)
Willey, F. T. (Sunderland)
Young, Sir R. (Newton)


Watkins, T. E.
Willey, O. G. (Cleveland)
Younger, Hon Kenneth


Webb, M. (Bradford, C.)
Williams, J. L, (Kelvingrove)
Zilliacus, K


Wells, W. T. (Walsall)
Williams, W. R. (Heston)



West, D. G.
Willis, E.
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


While, C. F. (Derbyshire, W.)
Wills, Mrs. E. A.
Mr Popplewell and




Mr Richard Adams.


Question put, and agreed to.

Main Question again proposed.

It being after Eleven o'clock, the Debate stood adjourned.

Debate to be resumed To-morrow.

EXPIRING LAWS CONTINUANCE [MONEY]

Considered in Committee. [King's Recommendation signified.]

[Major MILNER in the Chair]

Resolved:
That, for the purposes of any Act of the present Session to continue certain expiring laws, it is expedient to authorise—

(a) the payment out of moneys provided by Parliament of such expenses as may be occasioned by the continuance of the Cotton Manufacturing Industry (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1934, The Population (Statistics) Act, 1938, the Rent of Furnished Houses Control (Scotland) Act, 1943, and the Furnished Houses (Rent Control) Act, 1946, until the thirty-first day of December, nineteen hundred and forty-eight, and of the Debts Clearing Offices and Import Restrictions Act, 1934, until the thirty-first day of March, nineteen hundred and forty-nine, being expenses which under any of the five last mentioned Acts are to be defrayed out of such moneys; and
(b) the payment into the Exchequer of such receipts as may be occasioned by the continuance of the Debts Clearing Offices and Import Restrictions Act, 1934, until the said thirty-first day of March, being receipts which under that Act are to be paid into the Exchequer."—[Mr. Glenvil Hall.]

Resolution to be reported To-morrow.

KITCHEN AND REFRESHMENT ROOMS (HOUSE OF COMMONS)

Select Committee appointed to control the arrangements for the Kitchen and Refreshment Rooms in the department of the Serjeant at Arms attending this House:—To consist of Seventeen Members:—Commander Agnew, Mr. Alexander Anderson, Mrs. Ayrton Gould, Mr. Bartlett, Lieutenant-Commander Gurney Braithwaite, Mr. Collins, Viscountess Davidson, Mr. Haydn Davies, Mr. Guy,

Mr. Keeling, Mr. Arthur Lewis, Mr. McEntee, Mr. Mainwaring, Captain Marsden, Sir Henry Morris-Jones, Mrs. Nichol and Mrs. Ridealgh:—Power to send for persons, papers and records:—Three to be the Quorum.—[Mr. R. J. Taylor.]

DOCKS AND DOCKYARDS, SCOTLAND

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."— [Mr. Simmons.]

11.13 p.m.

Colonel J. R. H. Hutchison: The matter to which I wish to draw the attention of this honourable, if somewhat attenuated, House is one which merits a greater occasion than this; but the system of legislation and discussion which the present Government have adopted forces this important Scottish question to be treated in this comparatively minor way. The two subjects to which I wish to draw the attention of the House tonight are the present and future position of Rosyth, and the necessity for a large-scale graving dock on the River Clyde.
In order to grasp the picture adequately, it is necessary to go back just a little while in history. In the first world war, that tremendous concourse of naval ships known as the Grand Fleet found sanctuary in Scottish waters almost throughout the whole of the war—in the Firth of Forth, Rosyth, and Cromarty Firth. And so was vindicated the action of the Admiralty which, in 1903, had formulated plans to turn Rosyth into a first-class naval base, and which in 1909 had partly, at least, completed its plan. The Admiralty had created the only dockyard in the United Kingdom which, at any state of the tide and at any time of the night or day, could harbour the whole of the Grand Fleet. That, in itself, one would imagine, would have given Rosyth pride of place in all considerations of naval strategy, and


it is to the naval strategy question that I should like to draw the attention of the House, because strategy must be paramount and all other considerations, weighty though they be, must, ultimately, depend on strategic conception.
At the same time that Rosyth was extended by the Admiralty, very considerable expenditure was undertaken by the local authorities there to keep the roadways and buildings up to date and in step with what the Admiralty was doing. It was with a good deal of surprise and consternation that we saw, after the war was finished, the Grand Fleet sail south. There followed a period of gloom and despair in that part of Scotland to which I refer. It seemed as though a great dust-sheet had been taken out and spread over a set of valuable furniture no longer in use. The priceless advantage of Scottish waters during that war was forgotten—until the next war came along. I said that we saw with surprise the Fleet move south because of the expert opinions which had been given. Earl Beatty, in January, 1919, said these words, supported almost in their entirety by Vice-Admiral Sir John Green, who was Admiral-Superintendent at Rosyth. I ask hon. Members to listen to these prescient words:
The Firth of Forth in war-time has been the principal naval base of the greatest Fleet that has ever sailed the seas. I maintain that it should remain so. We have built a great dockyard—the most modern. We have an anchorage capable of receiving the greatest Fleet in the world. There are few on the coasts of Great Britain which are capable of doing so, and, although strategical reasons which have necessitated the development of the Firth of Forth do not appear on the surface very apparent at present, for the time being the Firth of Forth is as good a place as any other and, having been developed and vast moneys having been spent upon it, it should be used.
Those words, falling from those lips, might have been calculated to bear considerable weight. When the second world war came along, we find, suddenly, the gloom and despair which had settled over Rosyth changed to something far different. All is bustle to get the place ready for the Fleet again. This time, we see a new Scottish waterway come into the picture—the Firth of Clyde. Once again, mighty fleets are concentrated in those parts. Is it surprising when one realises the relative invulnerability from air attack of the Clyde, as well as the Forth? It was a splendid invulnerability, and the invulner-
ability

ability from sea attack was almost complete Whatever attack may come in the future, be it by atomic bomb, guided rocket, or other missile, it will find a far more difficult target in Scotland than in the south of England. Yet, we see money spent on the development of Devonport, Chatham, and Portsmouth, which were ports virtually put out of action in the early stages of the last war. It is with regret that we heard today of flotilla after flotilla going into these ports in the south of England—Portland, Portsmouth, Chatham, Devonport—but not one to the bases to which I have referred; bases which have served this country well in two world wars.
May I turn for a moment to the Clyde? During this second world war, the Clyde was the scene of a concourse of ship ping, both battleships and transports, such as this country has never seen be fore. There ended one of those all-important Atlantic sea-lanes, by which this country's supplies of food and munitions were, in fact, brought across, and he would be a bold man today who would say that there is going to be no more war. If he says there is going to be more war, I ask where is it coming from—from the Atlantic or from Europe? There can only be one answer to that, and so once again we can expect to see these same naval waters in the Firth of Clyde harbouring the same ships, and playing the same important rôle in the supplies of this country. Convoys will once again have to be assembled as they were in the last war. Repairs will have to be carried out. Ships will have to be equipped. I say repairs will have to be carried out, because some repairs were carried out to those great vessels during the last war. But they were limited re pairs. Under-water repairs were carried out only on the smaller vessels and only floating repairs on the big vessels which came into the Firth of Clyde.
Surely, it is an anomaly that the Clyde, which can build and has built the biggest vessels which sail the seas, the "Queen Elizabeth" and the "Vanguard," can no longer repair these vessels in dry dock once they leave. The River Clyde is probably the greatest basin in Britain or in the world devoted to shipbuilding and marine engineering. Yet once these vessels sail on the great wide seas any under-water repairs which have to be


carried out to them have to be carried out elsewhere, though the skill and experience are still there in the Clyde, and time and money are wasted in transferring it to the ships which are in some other area for under-water repairs. At the same time there may be grave risk to the ships themselves. This was perfectly clear to the Admiralty in 1944, because they wrote to the Greenock Harbour Authorities and the Clyde Trustees asking them to formulate plans for a graving dock, the dimensions of which were to be 1,200 by 135 by 46. Both these authorities sent their plans to the Admiralty. It is no part of my case to plead the claims of one or the other authority, but I am reinforced in my argument by the findings of that admirable report which came to be known as the Cooper Report, and which advocated that somewhere in the Clyde estuary a graving dock of this kind should be prepared.
Not only that, but the Clyde and the part which I am examining tonight is a Development Area. We see the Government bending their efforts to try to develop industries there. Very welcome though they are, they are foreign to many of the workers in that area. To use a mixed metaphor, it would be more "up the Clyde's street" if it were given the dry dock which it requires and for which it has the skill and experience, to carry out that work which has been the bread and butter of the workmen of the area almost for generations. So as a Development Area scheme, this project should be pushed forward and set on foot.
On the Clyde trade is dwindling. Already in 1946 it was half what it was in 1938, and in January of this year the Clyde Trustees found it necessary to increase the dues by 25 per cent. approximately over what they had been up to that date. Then coal, upon which the port of Glasgow and the Clyde in general depended so much as an export, has entirely disappeared, and so shipping depression has hit the Clyde. It has fallen heavily upon the Clyde and it is a measure such as this that would restart, and refurnish the possibilities, and the activities of that area. I know that the question of economy looms large before everybody's eyes at the present time, but I submit to the Government that economies which could not be endured are economies in those things which will be

immediately productive. That is the whole of the Government's task at the present time: to distinguish between capital expenditure which will be immediately productive and that which will be only productive in the more distant future. A graving dock of these dimensions would be immediately productive. It has a strategical importance and a Development Area importance. Therefore, I press for this measure.
Back in 1944 a deputation came from-Scotland to wait upon the now Minister of Defence, when the claims of Rosyth were pressed. They were informed that that would be given the gravest consideration. Between that day and now only a deep silence has reigned. It is as though the Government had adopted as an example Rodin's statue "The Thinker" and were lost in permanent thought. But while they are deep in thought, Rosyth is deep in anxiety and in decay. I press for a decision now. Scotland presses for this. All we have heard today is lamentably poor talk from the Minister of Defence who tries to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds and say that while we are weak we are really strong. I accept this from him at its face value, that at the moment we are reducing ourselves to a situation of comparative impotence intending later on to strengthen our Fleet again, and that once again these important ships are to be at our disposal. If they are to be at our disposal, and if there is danger of war these battleships once again are going to leave for these waters of Scotland which have furnished anchorage for them in two world wars. I am reminded of the poem by Kipling of the soldier about whom; while he is fighting, it is a case of "Tommy here and Tommy there" but when the fighting is over he is forgotten. If the House will substitute the name "Jock" for "Tommy," they will realise pretty clearly how Scotland feels on these matters.

11.28 p.m.

Mr. Willis: I am sure we are, indebted to the hon. and gallant Member for Central Glasgow (Colonel Hutchison) for having raised this matter. I cannot quite agree with him, however, that this hole-and-corner method is the only way he has of raising this matter. It has been raised often in the House and a great many speeches have been made about it. I would like to remind him that it was the Tories who


closed it previously. I would also like to remind him that the fact that there is no graving dock on the Clyde is a comment on Tory administration in the past. Hon. Members opposite do not like the truth. They like to condemn the Government for what it is not doing conveniently forgetting of course, that these problems are not new problems
Having said that, I would like to support the plea that an early decision should be made about Rosyth. The arguments are familiar and the question is important in the minds of the Scottish people. Rosyth's natural advantages, which have been fully appreciated in two wars, are well known. The fact that it is probably the finest and most up-to-date dockyard in this country today is also well known and I do not think we should allow Rosyth once again to be closed down whilst a dockyard built hundreds of years ago, and completely out of date and unable to take a modern battleship, should be left. But, of course, we want for Rosyth something more than a mere dockyard. We want Rosyth as a manning port. The Admiralty says they have manning ports near London because London is a large recruiting area. That argument is good up to a point, but I think we have to remember that if we want to get the full interest of Scotland in the Navy, we have to get a manning port in Scotland, and we have not got that up to the present. One could say a great deal about the advantages of Rosyth, but I have time only to press the Government to make a decision early for these reasons.
There is a great deal of anxiety being felt by the people working in Rosyth as to their future. There is a great deal of anxiety in the district and locality concerning what is to be the future of Rosyth. The local authority is unable to plan ahead because it does not know what is going to happen. In fact, the whole of Scotland is concerned in this matter, and there is a limit to the period during which people and local authorities can be kept in suspense. Finally, might I urge this point? At the present juncture we are considering new cuts in the Services expenditure. Surely, it is time that a decision was arrived at quickly as to which docks are to be closed and which are not. It seems to me that in the present circumstances there is no argument at all for delay. The Admiralty

knows the position of the docks; it knows the urgency of a graving dock on the Clyde; it knows that very rapidly there is to be a reduction in the Services and so the quicker a decision is made the better satisfied will be the people of Scotland.

11.33 p.m.

The Civil Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. W. J. Edwards): Might I mention at the outset that I was rather pleased that I had to reply to this matter on the Adjournment, because since I have had the privilege of holding my present position, I have learned quite a lot about Rosyth Dockyard and the proposed graving dock on the Clyde. Scottish Members see that this House is reminded of the anxiety with which they look for a statement with regard to the permanency of Rosyth Dockyard and the commencement of a scheme for a graving dock on the Clyde. There really is not a lot that I can tell the House in addition to what has been stated in reply to the very large number of Questions which have been put on the Order Paper since 1945. I must admit that the Scottish Members who have put these Questions on the Order Paper, and perhaps people living in Scotland, have not had a lot of satisfaction out of the replies, but I must say that one does not always give a positive reply to Questions put down in this House. It seems that there is no other answer suitable to Scottish Members on this issue.
I agree entirely with what was said by the hon. and gallant Member for Central Glasgow (Colonel Hutchison) with regard to Rosyth and Scapa Flow. I served for quite a long time in the Navy in those parts just after the first world war, and during the last war. It is no secret to say that the Admiralty have thought a lot of Rosyth, and we greatly appreciate what was done by Rosyth in the interests of the Admiralty and of the State during those two world wars. In between the wars, a previous Government decided not to wait until the next war came before anything was done in that area. There is one point I am sure the hon. and gallant Member for Central Glasgow did not mean to infer, when he complained that the Admiralty were proposing to spend money on developing Portsmouth, Chatham and Devonport and that those bases were put out of action soon after the war started. I would like to say that those ports played


their part every bit as well as Rosyth, Invergordon and the other ports in Scotland.

Sir William Darling: Do I understand the Civil Lord to say that in his opinion Portsmouth and Rosyth have equal priority?

Mr. Edwards: I did not express an opinion. I said that those ports had not been put out of action but continued to play their part in the same way as Rosyth and the Clyde. My hon. Friend the Member for North Edinburgh (Mr. Willis) desires to have Rosyth Dockyard declared a permanent institution. I cannot quite understand what is meant by this permanency because even if we get the four dockyards, the possibility is that a smaller number of men will be employed.

Mr. Willis: Is it not possible to find civilian employment in Rosyth Dockyard for those who cannot be retained?

Mr. Edwards: During the past year we have found some civilian employment father than create unemployment, not only in Rosyth but in all other Royal Dockyards as well. But one cannot tell how far that policy can go. There may be some reductions as and when the Navy Estimates cannot provide sufficient money for the employment of present numbers, but I do hope no one is going to try to commit the Admiralty to making a statement that the numbers employed in Rosyth Dockyard, or any other dockyard must continue to be employed there for the next 10 years or so.
The only thing we can say, as far as Rosyth Dockyard is concerned, is that we appreciate its value, and it is our present intention to retain it on an active basis; but as we all know, the economic position dominates quite a number of things which one wants to do, and in view of the economic situation I certainly cannot give an undertaking that it will remain permanent. But it may satisfy the people of Scotland, and others interested, for me to be able to state that should the

economic and manpower state of the country cause consideration of a reduction of the number of Royal Dockyards in full commission, Rosyth will not be overlooked and will have consideration with all the other dockyards that we have. I am hoping that at least it may not be necessary for any of the dockyards to be affected in that way, but we have heard for quite a long time this afternoon of the difficulties with which the Admiralty are confronted both in manpower and ships because of the economic state of the country, and we cannot blind ourselves to the fact that there may be difficulties in front of us which may prevent us from making decisions. We certainly cannot bind a future Parliament. We do desire to retain Rosyth on an active basis.

Mr. Willis: What exactly is meant by "active basis"? I was stationed there when three or four reserve flotillas of destroyers were in Rosyth, but there was no one working there at all. Is that active?

Mr. Edwards: "Active basis" means as it is at present, which means that it will be used in the same way as the other dockyards in the country. So far as the graving dock on the Clyde is concerned, the Admiralty did send to Greenock to give us plans in connection with a new graving dock. We also investigated the possibility of other places, and all those were taken into consideration. It must be borne in mind that to have to spend millions of pounds on a graving dock at the present time is a matter which one has to take seriously into account in view of our financial difficulties. It has not been turned down. It is still under consideration, and while I cannot hold out any hopes of an early decision, it will continue to receive consideration in the same way as the other things we have in mind as far as the graving dock facilities in the country are concerned.

Adjourned accordingly at Nineteen Minutes to Twelve o'Clock.